Brown v. State of New York ( 2022 )

18-3122 (L)
Brown v. State of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 27th day of July, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.*
————————————————————————
JOHN STRANDBERG, AS PRESIDENT
AND ON BEHALF OF THE NEW YORK
STATE SUPREME COURT OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION, JOHN CLANCY, AS
PRESIDENT AND ON BEHALF OF THE
COURT OFFICERS BENEVOLENT
ASSOCIATION OF NASSAU COUNTY,
BRENDA LEVINSON, AS PRESIDENT
AND ON BEHALF OF THE COURT
ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, JOSEPH C. WALSH,
*
Judge Peter W. Hall, originally a member of the panel in this case, died on March 11, 2021.
The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, authorized the issuance of
this Summary Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone,
140 F.3d 457, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1998).
AS PRESIDENT AND ON BEHALF OF
THE NEW YORK STATE COURT CLERKS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. Nos. 18-3122-cv (L), 18-3166
(C), 18-3345 (C)
KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, JANET
DIFIORE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF JUDGE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
LAWRENCE K. MARKS, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE
COURTS OF NEW YORK STATE,
PATRICIA A. HITE, INDIVIDUALLY,
REBECCA A. CORSO, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL
SERVICE DEPARTMENT, CAROLINE W.
AHL, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK
STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
LANI V. JONES, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, ROBERT L. MEGNA,
INDIVIDUALLY, ROBERT F. MUJICA, JR.,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR OF THE NEW YORK STATE
DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, THOMAS P.
DINAPOLI, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF NEW
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YORK,
Defendants-Appellees.**
————————————————————————
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS: STEPHEN G. DENIGRIS, The DeNigris
Law Firm PLLC, Albany, NY, for Plaintiff-
Appellant John Strandberg.
SETH H. GREENBERG, Greenberg
Burzichelli Greenberg P.C., Lake Success,
NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants John Clancy,
Brenda Levinson, and Joseph Walsh.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: FREDERICK A. BRODIE, Assistant
Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood,
Solicitor General, Andrea Oser, Deputy
Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia
James, Attorney General, State of New
York, Albany, NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
**
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above. To the extent that
former state officials were sued in their official capacity, current officeholders are substituted
as defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). Former New York
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, named as a defendant in both his individual and official
capacities below, moved to be stricken from the caption because the district court dismissed
the individual-capacity claims against him in an earlier order, see Brown v. New York, 975
F. Supp. 2d 209, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2013), and Plaintiffs-Appellants did not pursue those claims
any further, in the district court or on appeal. That motion is GRANTED. J. Dennis Hanrahan
and A. Gail Prudenti, also sued in their individual capacities below (and also dismissed from
the case in the district court), are stricken from the caption for the same reason.
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Plaintiffs-Appellants, officers of the New York State Supreme Court
Officers Association, the Court Officers Benevolent Association of Nassau
County, the Court Attorneys Association of the City of New York, and the New
York State Court Clerks Association (collectively, “the Court Employee Union
Plaintiffs”), appeal the judgment of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, J.) granting summary
judgment to Defendants-Appellees, various State officials (collectively, “the
State”) on all claims in this contractual and constitutional dispute growing out of
the State’s 2011 decision to alter its rates of contribution to active and retired
former employees’ health insurance plans. We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the facts, the procedural history of the case, and the specifications of issues
on appeal, which we set forth only as necessary to explain our decision.
We reserved decision in this case pending disposition of Donohue v. Hochul,
No. 18-3193-cv, which was designated both in the district court and in this Court
as the lead case of eleven related cases alleging breach of contract and
constitutional contract-impairment claims based on the alteration of State health
insurance contribution rates for retirees – and, in this case, active employees as
well. Following this Court’s final disposition of Donohue, we directed the parties
in this and the other related cases “to file letter-briefs stating their views on how
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their case should be resolved in light of Donohue v. Cuomo (‘Donohue II’), 980 F.3d
53 (2d Cir. 2020), Donohue v. Cuomo (‘Donohue III’), 38 N.Y.3d 1 (2022), and
Donohue v. Hochul, [32 F.4th 200 (2d Cir. 2022)] (‘Donohue IV’),” addressing in
particular “the extent to which anything in the collective bargaining agreements
at issue in the case, or any other circumstances specific to the case, distinguish the
case from Donohue.” ECF No. 119 at 2. In response, all of the Court Employee
Union Plaintiffs except for Plaintiff-Appellant John Strandberg filed a
supplemental letter-brief arguing that their CBAs are materially distinguishable
from those at issue in Donohue, while Strandberg filed a letter informing this
Court that he did not oppose the State’s supplemental letter-brief.
The Court Employee Union Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and contractual
impairment claims, like those in Donohue, necessarily fail absent provisions
guaranteeing a vested right to continuous contribution rates from the State. See
Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 206. In arguing that their CBA, unlike those at issue in
Donohue, create such a right, the Court Employee Union Plaintiffs rely on Section
8.1 of their 2007-2011 CBA, which provides:
The State shall continue to provide health and
prescription drug benefits administered by the
Department of Civil Service. Employees enrolled in
such plans shall receive health and prescription drug
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benefits to the same extent, at the same contribution
level and in the same form and with the same co-
payment structure that applies to the majority of
represented Executive Branch employees covered by
such plans.
J. App’x at 518. The Court Employee Union Plaintiffs argue that since they never
negotiated a successor to their 2007-2011 CBA, that CBA remained in effect
pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209-a(1)(e), and that Section 8.1 therefore
entitled active employees (until the negotiation of such a successor agreement)
and retirees for life to a continuous contribution rate equal to that applicable to
the majority of represented executive-branch employees – 90 percent for
individual coverage and 75 percent for dependent coverage.
The Court Employee Union Plaintiffs’ argument fails with respect to active
employees because Section 8.1 requires only parity with executive-branch
employees, which the State’s amendment of contribution rates for active
employees preserved. The State does not dispute that the Court Employee Union
Plaintiffs’ 2007-2011 CBA remained in effect, but argues that Section 8.1 created
“a floating contribution rate that varied with those applicable to executive-branch
employees,” even if that rate changes. Appellees’ Resp. Supp. Letter-Br. at 4. We
conclude that the State’s reading is unambiguously correct. By its plain terms,
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Section 8.1 entitles covered employees to coverage “at the same contribution
level” that the State pays for “the majority of represented Executive Branch
employees.” J. App’x at 518. It does not qualify that entitlement by making an
exception for subsequent changes to the contribution rates for executive-branch
employees. In other words, by agreeing to Section 8.1, the Court Employee Union
Plaintiffs agreed to tie their contribution rates to those for executive-branch
employees rather than negotiating their own fixed rates. And when the State
modified its contribution rates for executive and judicial employees alike, it
continued to honor that agreement, and thus could not have breached the 2007-
2011 CBA with respect to active employees or impaired its contractual
obligations to those employees.
The Court Employee Union Plaintiffs’ argument also fails with respect to
retirees for the same reason, as well as for two additional reasons. First, tying
covered employees’ contribution rates to those of the majority of represented
executive-branch employees cannot in itself create a lifetime vested right to
continuous contribution rates for retirees, because the majority of represented
executive-branch employees were represented by the Civil Service Employees
Association (“CSEA”), whose CBAs, we held in Donohue IV, did not create such a
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right. 32 F.4th at 207-09. Second, there is no language in Section 8.1 that one could
reasonably read as freezing retirees’ contribution rates in perpetuity at the rate
paid for a majority of executive-branch employees at the time of retirement, since
that provision makes no mention of retirees or of any temporal duration besides
the duration of the CBA. In other words, even if active employees were entitled
to a fixed contribution rate for the duration of the CBA, it would not follow from
the express language of the CBA that retirees were entitled to that same rate for
the rest of their lives. Thus, like the plaintiffs in Donohue, the Court Employee
Union Plaintiffs “ask us to infer ambiguity from what the CBAs do not say rather
than anything they do say,” which, as a matter of New York law, we may not do.
Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 208; see Donohue III, 38 N.Y.3d at 17-18. We therefore hold
that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the State on the
Court Employee Union Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to retirees for the same
reasons explained in Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 206-11.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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