Kaur v. Garland ( 2022 )

20–414
Kaur v. Garland
BIA
Navarro, IJ
A 206 564 360/361/362/363
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 17th day of June, two thousand twenty-two.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
9 STEVEN J. MENASHI,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 DALJIT KAUR, SATPAL SINGH, MANVEER
14 SINGH BHAMRA, KARANVEER SINGH BHAMRA,
15 Petitioners,
16
17 v. 20–414
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONERS: Genet Getachew, Esq., Law Office
25 of Genet Getachew, Brooklyn, NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
28 Attorney General; Anthony P.
1 Nicastro , Assistant Director;
2 Timothy Bo Stanton, Trial
3 Attorney, Office of Immigration
4 Litigation, United States
5 Department of Justice, Washington,
6 DC.
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
10 is DENIED.
11 Petitioners Daljit Kaur, Satpal Singh, Manveer Singh
12 Bhamra, Karanveer Singh Bhamra, natives and citizens of
13 India, seek review of a January 7, 2020 decision of the BIA
14 affirming a March 30, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge
15 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
16 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Daljit
17 Kaur, et al., Nos. A 206 564 360/361/362/363 (B.I.A. Jan. 7,
18 2020), aff’g Nos. A 206 564 360/361/362/363 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.
19 City Mar. 30, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
20 the underlying facts and procedural history.
21 We review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
22 sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland
23 Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review adverse
24 credibility determinations for substantial evidence, see Hong
2
1 Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and we
2 treat the agency’s findings of fact as “conclusive unless any
3 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
4 contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “The scope of review
5 under the substantial evidence standard is exceedingly
6 narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless the
7 petitioner demonstrates that the record evidence was so
8 compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
9 him eligible for relief.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106,
10 113 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
12 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
13 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
14 the applicant . . ., the inherent plausibility of the
15 applicant’s . . . account, the consistency between the
16 applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . ., the
17 internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency
18 of such statements with other evidence of record . . ., and
19 any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without
20 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
21 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
3
1 relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer
2 . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
3 totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
4 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
5 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
6 accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.
7 We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
8 adverse credibility determination. To begin with, Singh and
9 Kaur alleged that Singh was beaten and detained and that their
10 family was threatened because of their support for the
11 Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party. But the agency
12 reasonably relied on inconsistencies between statements from
13 Singh, Kaur, and Singh’s father, as well as omissions from
14 Singh’s own statements relating to the severity of the abuse
15 that prompted Singh to flee to Canada in 1987 and 1997, what
16 happened to his family in India while he was away, and whether
17 he was detained and tortured by the police when he returned
18 from Canada in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu
19 Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[A]n IJ may rely on any
20 inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility
21 determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’
4
1 establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.”). The
2 agency was not required to accept Singh and Kaur’s explanation
3 that Kaur did not tell Singh about threats while he was away,
4 since Kaur told Singh about less serious harm. Siewe v.
5 Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are
6 two permissible views of the evidence,” we defer to the
7 factfinder’s choice “so long as the deductions are not
8 illogical or implausible.” (internal quotation marks
9 omitted)).
10 The agency also reasonably relied on a lack of
11 corroboration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Where the
12 trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide
13 evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such
14 evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have
15 the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”);
16 Zou v. Garland, No. 19-2003, 2021 WL 4097775, at *1 (2d Cir.
17 Sept. 9, 2021) (“Even absent an adverse credibility
18 determination, a lack of corroboration may be an independent
19 basis for the denial of relief if the agency identifies
20 reasonably available evidence that should have been
21 presented.”). The agency reasonably gave little weight to
5
1 supporting affidavits because Singh’s father’s affidavit was
2 inconsistent with Singh’s own statements, and affidavits from
3 two Mann party officials include some identical language. 1
4 See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We
5 defer to the agency’s determination of the weight afforded to
6 an alien’s documentary evidence.”); Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t
7 of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[S]triking
8 similarities between affidavits are an indication that the
9 statements are ‘canned.’”).
10 The inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration
11 provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility
12 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
13 Lin, 534 F.3d at 166–67. The adverse credibility
14 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
15 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on
16 the same discredited factual predicate. See Paul v.
17 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
18
19
1 Petitioners do not acknowledge or explain why one of the
affidavits pertains to an unrelated individual, S. Dilbag Singh.
Certified Admin. Record at 260.
6
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
3 stays VACATED.
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6 Clerk of Court
7