Chahoud v. Holder ( 2010 )

09-4864-ag
Chahoud v. Holder
BIA
A094 126 091
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 18 th day of August, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
Chief Judge,
JON O. NEWMAN,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
______________________________________
JEAN ELIAS CHAHOUD,
Petitioner,
09-4864-ag
v. NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Justin Conlon, North Haven, Conn.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division; Jennifer Paisner
Williams, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Colette J. Winston, Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner, Jean Elias Chahoud, a native and citizen of
Lebanon, seeks review of a November 16, 2009, order of the BIA
denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re
Jean Elias Chahoud, No. A094 126 091 (B.I.A. Nov. 16, 2009).
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history of the case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d
Cir. 2006). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of
country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review
the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d
Cir. 2008).
An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do
so within 90 days of the final administrative decision.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no
dispute that Chahoud’s motion to reopen – filed nearly two
years after the BIA issued a final order in his case – was
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untimely. However, there is no time limitation if the alien
establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the
country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here,
the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Chahoud failed to establish changed circumstances in Lebanon
after the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War.
The BIA reasonably found that Chahoud did not establish
changed country conditions based on his assertion that he
would be accused of spying for the West because Chahoud failed
to provide sufficient evidence in support of this claim. See
Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).
Although Chahoud proffered an expert’s report that Lebanese
authorities would target him because of his ties to the United
States, the BIA reasonably afforded the report diminished
weight in light of the expert’s “speculative” conclusions and
his failure “to tie any actions on the part of [Chahoud], or
opinion held by him, to the alleged danger.” See Xiao Ji Chen
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 324 (2d Cir. 2006)
(finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence
in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion
of the agency).
Chahoud also argues that the BIA ignored evidence
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demonstrating that following the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War,
he would be accused of spying for the West because of his
Christian beliefs. However, the BIA specifically addressed
this argument in denying Chahoud’s first motion to reopen, and
found that “there [was] no indication that this short
conflict, now ended, has produced lasting change in Lebanon
generally, much less for Lebanese Christians.” Although
Chahoud argues that more recent articles establish that the
BIA’s initial finding was erroneous, the BIA considered this
new evidence and reasonably determined that it was merely
“repetitive” of evidence Chahoud provided in support of his
first motion to reopen. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.
Finally, we find unavailing Chahoud’s argument that
remand is required by our decision in Poradisova v. Gonzales,
420 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2005). Unlike in Poradisova, the BIA
analyzed Chahoud’s documentary evidence and provided ample
support for its finding that Chahoud failed to meet his burden
of proof. We therefore find no error in the BIA’s denial of
Chahoud’s untimely motion to reopen. See Jian Hui Shao, 546
F.3d at 169.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
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that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in
this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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