Qi Ju Zheng v. Holder ( 2010 )


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  •     08-3521-ag
    Zheng v. Holder
    BIA
    A076 684 568
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 30 th day of July, two thousand ten.
    PRESENT:
    REENA RAGGI,
    RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    QI JU ZHENG,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                   08-3521-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. ATTORNEY
    GENERAL, *
    Respondent.
    _______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                 Peter L. Quan, New York, New York.
    *
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
    43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., is
    automatically substituted for former Attorney General
    Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    FOR RESPONDENT:           Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant
    Attorney General, Blair T. O’Connor,
    Assistant Director, Remi Adalemo,
    Attorney, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, Civil Division, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
    hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for
    review is DENIED.
    Petitioner Qi Ju Zheng, a native and citizen of the
    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 27, 2008
    order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal
    proceedings.   In re Qi Ju Zheng, No. A076 684 568 (B.I.A.
    June 27, 2008).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
    We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
    abuse of discretion, mindful that such motions are
    “‘disfavored.’”     See Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d
    Cir. 2006) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 322-23
    (1992)).   An alien who has been ordered removed may file one
    motion to reopen within ninety days of the final
    administrative order of removal.     8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
    This deadline may be excused if the alien can establish
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    “changed country conditions arising in the country of
    nationality.”     8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii).     Here, the BIA properly denied
    Zheng’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed
    more than five years after his May 6, 2002 final order of
    removal.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(2).
    Relying on Shou Yung Guo v. Gonzales, 
    463 F.3d 109
     (2d
    Cir. 2006), Zheng maintains that he has adduced new evidence
    establishing that he would be forcibly sterilized based on
    the birth of his two United States-born children.     This
    argument is foreclosed by Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 169, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2008), which explained that the
    documents adduced in Guo do not, by themselves, demonstrate
    an alien’s prima facie eligibility for relief.     Accordingly,
    the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s
    motion to reopen.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii).
    With respect to Zheng’s derivative asylum claim, as the
    government concedes, the BIA erroneously relied on Zheng’s
    age at the time his derivative asylum application was filed,
    rather than at the time his father’s asylum application was
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    filed.    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(3)(B).   Remand, however, would be
    futile because the BIA properly found that Zheng is now
    married and therefore does not qualify as a child eligible
    to derive asylum from his parent under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(3)(B).    See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
    
    471 F.3d 315
    , 338 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that error does
    not require remand if remand would be futile); see also
    Akhtar v. Gonzales, 
    406 F.3d 399
    , 407 (6th Cir. 2005)
    (holding that agency properly precluded petitioner, who
    turned twenty-one years old while his parent’s application
    was pending, from applying for derivative asylum because he
    was married).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
    oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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