Javier v. Deringer-Ney Inc. , 419 F. App'x 100 ( 2011 )

09-4603-cv
Javier v. Deringer-Ney Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE
32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A
PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 15th day of April, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
AMALYA L. KEARSE,
DENNY CHIN
Circuit Judges,
JED S. RAKOFF,
District Judge.*
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MARIO A. JAVIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v.- 09-4603-cv
DERINGER-NEY INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MARIO A. JAVIER, pro se, Hartford,
Connecticut.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: KORI TERMINE WISNESKI (Jean E.
Tomasco, on the brief), Robinson &
Cole LLP, Hartford, Connecticut.
*
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-appellant Mario A. Javier, proceeding pro se,
appeals from the district court's September 30, 2009, judgment
granting the motion of defendant-appellee Deringer-Ney Inc.
("Deringer-Ney") for summary judgment in this employment
discrimination suit. We assume the parties' familiarity with the
facts and procedural history of the case.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo to
determine whether the district court properly concluded that
there were no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v.
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).
"In determining whether there are genuine issues of material
fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128,
137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, "reliance upon conclusory statements or mere
allegations is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion." Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
After reviewing the record, we find, for substantially the
reasons stated by the district court, that Javier has not offered
sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude that
the reasons proffered for terminating his employment at Deringer-
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Ney were a pretext for discrimination. See Vivenzio v. City of
Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010); Howley v. Town of
Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2000).
Javier further claims that the district court erred in
deciding the summary judgment motion before discovery was
complete. "The management of discovery lies within the sound
discretion of the district court, and the court's rulings on
discovery will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion." Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 561
(2d Cir. 1997). In his memorandum opposing summary judgment,
Javier claimed that Deringer-Ney failed to comply with his
requests for disclosure and production. He indicated that
"amendment and[/]or supplementation [of his brief] will be
requested and will follow," but after nearly eight months had
elapsed, Javier had not utilized the tools available to compel
discovery under either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
the district court's individual practices. See Caidor v.
Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) ("'[P]ro se
litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding
procedural rules and to comply with them.'" (quoting Edwards v.
INS, 59 F.3d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1995))). The district court did not
abuse its discretion at that point in reaching the merits of the
summary judgment motion under these circumstances.
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We have considered Javier's other arguments and
conclude they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of
the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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