United States v. Suarez-Martinez ( 2017 )

16-1099
United States v. Suarez-Martinez
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
the 8th day of March, two thousand seventeen.
Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
-v- No. 16-1099
MIGUEL SUAREZ-MARTINEZ, AKA
AQUILITO, AKA FACE, AKA JAYSON S.
RAFFUCCI ARCELAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
For Defendant-Appellant: Yuanchung Lee, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Federal Defenders of New York,
Inc., New York, NY.
For Appellee: Andrew C. Adams, Micah W.J. Smith,
Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet
Bharara, United States Attorney for the
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Southern District of New York, New York,
NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Caproni, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Miguel Suarez-Martinez appeals from the judgment against him and his sentence of 156
months’ imprisonment for conspiring to commit murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He
argues that a conspiracy charged under § 371 cannot be a crime of violence within the meaning
of § 924(c) and that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
and the issues on appeal.
By pleading guilty to violating § 924(c), Suarez-Martinez waived his argument that a
conspiracy charged under § 371 cannot be a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(c).
“It is well settled that a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily enters a guilty plea waives all
non-jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.” United States v. Garcia, 339 F.3d 116, 117
(2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Although Suarez-Martinez claims that his present challenge is
jurisdictional, we have held that “[i]n order to invoke a district court’s jurisdiction, an indictment
need only allege that a defendant committed a federal criminal offense at a stated time and place
in terms plainly tracking the language of the relevant statute.” United States v. Rubin, 743 F.3d
31, 38 (2d Cir. 2014). Because the information charging Suarez-Martinez with violating § 924(c)
alleged that Suarez-Martinez committed a § 924(c) offense at a specific time and place in terms
tracking the language of § 924(c), the district court would still have had jurisdiction over Suarez-
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Martinez’s case even if a § 371 conspiracy cannot be a crime of violence under § 924(c). See
Rubin, 743 F.3d at 37 (discussing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916)). Accordingly,
Suarez-Martinez’s present challenge to his § 924(c) conviction is not jurisdictional and is
therefore waived.
With respect to his sentence, Suarez-Martinez first challenges the district court’s finding
that he was an experienced killer for hire. We review a district court’s “underlying factual
findings with respect to sentencing . . . for clear error.” United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86
(2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Suarez-Martinez
was an experienced killer for hire. Suarez-Martinez’s own statements provided ample support for
such a finding.
Suarez-Martinez also argues that the district court erred in taking into account individuals
outside of the United States when applying 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), which requires a
sentencing court to consider “the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant.” Because Suarez-Martinez did not object below, we review the district court’s
interpretation of § 3553(a)(2)(C) for plain error. “We typically will not find [plain] error where
the operative legal question is unsettled, including where there is no binding precedent from the
Supreme Court or this Court.” United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). By acknowledging that we have never held that a district court may
not take into account individuals outside of the United States when considering the need to
protect the public from a defendant’s further crimes, Suarez-Martinez concedes that the district
court did not plainly err. Accordingly, Suarez-Martinez’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.
Suarez-Martinez’s sentence was also substantively reasonable. We “identif[y] as
substantively unreasonable only those sentences that are so shockingly high, shockingly low, or
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otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law that allowing them to stand would damage the
administration of justice.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In the present case, the district court’s thoughtful consideration of
mitigating factors, as well as its discussion of the allegedly unwarranted disparity between
Suarez-Martinez’s sentence and that of a similarly situated defendant, support the substantive
reasonableness of Suarez-Martinez’s sentence.
We have considered all of plaintiff-appellant’s contentions on appeal and have found in
them no basis for reversal. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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