Watson v. Geithner ( 2009 )

08-6069-cv
Watson v. Geithner
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS
FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1
AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A
LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST
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TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
the 4th day of December, two thousand nine.
PRESENT:
Amalya L. Kearse,
Robert D. Sack,
Robert A. Katzmann,
Circuit Judges.
__________________________________________
Rosetta Watson,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 08-6069-cv
Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury,*
Henry M. Paulson, Jr.,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________________________
*
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Secretary of the Treasury
Timothy F. Geithner is automatically substituted as the Appellee.
FOR APPELLANT: Rosetta Watson, Brooklyn, N.Y.
FOR APPELLEE: Brian K. Morgan, Sarah S. Normand, Assistant
United States Attorneys, for Lev Dassin,
Acting United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (Marrero, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Rosetta Watson, pro se, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing her claims of
discrimination and retaliation against the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
issues on appeal.
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to decline to
consider an untimely response to summary judgment motion for
abuse of discretion. See Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132
(2d Cir. 1984). Here, Watson was properly notified of the
consequences of failing to respond to the motion for summary
judgment, and even received an extension of time to file her
response. Despite these warnings, Watson failed to timely file
an opposition, and, thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling on the Government’s motion based on the file
it had before it. Moreover, Watson did not raise this argument
in her opening brief, and we generally do not consider arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Thomas v. Roach,
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165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999).
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, and
ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were
no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In
determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact,
this Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128,
137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). However,
“conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient
to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316
F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case
law reveals that the district court properly granted the
Government’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the district
court judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the
district court in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum and
order.
We have considered all of Watson’s contentions on this
appeal and have found them to be without merit. For the
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
By:___________________________
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