Lulbadda Waduge Don v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-240
    Lulbadda Waduge Don v. Barr
    BIA
    A076 500 755
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 11th day of December, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JON O. NEWMAN,
    8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    9            PETER W. HALL,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   SHIRAN DULIP KARUNADASA LULBADDA
    14   WADUGE DON, AKA SHIRAN DULIP
    15   KARUNADASA,
    16            Petitioner,
    17
    18                    v.                                         18-240
    19                                                               NAC
    20   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    21   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    22            Respondent.
    23   _____________________________________
    24
    25   FOR PETITIONER:                 Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                 Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
    28                                   General; Jeffery R. Leist, Senior
    29                                   Litigation Counsel; Alexander J.
    30                                   Lutz, Trial Attorney, Office of
    31                                   Immigration Litigation, United
    32                                   States Department of Justice,
    33                                   Washington, DC.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Petitioner Shiran Dulip Karunadasa Lulbadda Waduge Don,
    6   a native and citizen of Sri Lanka, seeks review of a January
    7   29, 2018, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen
    8   his removal proceedings.   In re Lulbadda Waduge Don, No. A076
    9   500 755 (B.I.A. Jan. 29, 2018).      We assume the parties’
    10   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    11   in this case.
    12       We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for
    13   abuse of discretion.   Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 518 (2d
    14   Cir. 2006).   Lulbadda Waduge Don moved to reopen in order to
    15   apply to adjust status based on an approved visa petition
    16   filed on his behalf by his U.S. citizen wife.   The agency did
    17   not abuse its discretion in denying the November 2017 motion
    18   because it was untimely filed more than two years after the
    19   removal order became final and did not fall within any of the
    20   statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limit for a
    21   motion to reopen.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (90-day
    22   deadline for motions to reopen); Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N.
    23   Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009).    Lulbadda Waduge Don argues that
    2
    1   his approved visa petition is new, material, and previously
    2   unavailable     evidence        that    warrants       reopening,    but    he
    3   overlooks that the evidentiary standard for a timely motion
    4   to reopen does not implicate any exception to the 90-day
    5   deadline.     See Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA
    6   1992);    compare      8       C.F.R.       §    1003.2(c)(2)    (timeliness
    7   requirement)    with       8   C.F.R.       §    1003.2(c)(1)   (evidentiary
    8   requirement).    We otherwise lack jurisdiction to review the
    9   BIA’s “entirely discretionary” decision not to exercise its
    10   sua sponte authority to reopen his proceedings.                     Ali, 
    448 11 F.3d at 518
    .
    12       Although     we    may     remand       if   the   agency   “declined   to
    13   exercise its sua sponte authority because it misperceived the
    14   legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening
    15   would necessarily fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 
    570 F.3d 466
    , 469
    16   (2d Cir. 2009), Lulbadda Waduge Don has not demonstrated that
    17   the BIA misperceived the law.                    The BIA did not find him
    18   ineligible for the relief sought; it simply determined that
    19   his situation was not so exceptional as to warrant reopening.
    20   This is precisely the determination we lack jurisdiction to
    21   review.   See 
    Ali, 448 F.3d at 518
    .
    22
    23
    3
    1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    2   DENIED.   As we have completed our review the motion for a
    3   stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    4                              FOR THE COURT:
    5                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    6                              Clerk of Court
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-240

Filed Date: 12/11/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/11/2020