United States v. Jason Marley ( 2020 )

18‐2243‐cr
United States of America v. Jason Marley
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 15th day of January, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
DENNY CHIN,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 18‐2243‐cr
JASON MARLEY, aka MAURNEY, aka BARBER,
Defendant‐Appellant,
ORLANDO HARLEY, aka OLIVER, aka
GUNNER, NYKOLI WILLIAMS, aka SHAUNEY,
RADIANNA THOMPSON, aka RAIDY,
Defendants.
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FOR APPELLEE: DAVID ABRAMOWICZ, Assistant United
States Attorney (Timothy V. Capozzi, Michael
D. Longyear, Won S. Shin, Assistant United
States Attorneys, on the brief), for Geoffrey S.
Berman, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New York,
New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: MATTHEW BRISSENDEN, Matthew W.
Brissenden, P.C., Garden City, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Caproni, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐appellant Jason Marley appeals from a judgment entered July
31, 2018, following a jury trial, convicting him of participating in a narcotics conspiracy,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and using and carrying firearms during a narcotics
conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A)(i) and (2).
On appeal, Marley argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts,
procedural history, and issues on appeal.
I. The Facts
A. The Suppression Hearing
The district court held a suppression hearing on July 20 and 21, 2017,
which established the following facts: In 2014, the Drug Enforcement Agency (the
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ʺDEAʺ) began a money laundering investigation into Joseph Stern. On February 4,
2015, DEA Special Agent James Enders was reviewing data from a pen register on
Sternʹs cellphone and noticed it had been in contact with a phone number ending in
4484 (the ʺ4484 numberʺ) several times on February 3 and 4, 2015. The pattern of the
contacts between Sternʹs phone and the 4484 number led Enders to believe that Stern
and the 4484 number were involved in a money laundering scheme.
That same day, DEA Special Agent Marlow Luna, who was working with
Enders, called the 4484 number. Luna spoke in Spanish and claimed he was calling on
behalf of ʺJulianʺ ‐‐ a made‐up name. The recipient of the call asked Luna if he was
calling on behalf of ʺFelipe,ʺ to which Luna responded yes. Luna told the recipient that
he ʺhad a hundred to give him.ʺ Appʹx at 302. The recipient responded that he was out
of town and could meet later that week when he returned to New York City. After the
call, an Assistant District Attorney (the ʺADAʺ) applied for a pen register and GPS
tracking order for the 4484 number, submitting an affidavit that, inter alia, summarized
the events relating to Lunaʹs undercover telephone call. Later that day, a state court
judge approved an order authorizing the collection of geolocation information from the
4484 number (the ʺFebruary 2015 Orderʺ).
On February 8, 2015, as a result of the geolocation data collected from the
February 2015 Order, DEA agents identified and stopped a vehicle in which Marley was
a passenger. Marley and the driver were arrested after the agents smelled marijuana.
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Upon his arrest, agents seized the 4484 phone, a second phone with a 3271 number, and
$20,000 in cash.
B. Additional Evidence
In March and April 2015, the government obtained three judicially
authorized wiretaps on Sternʹs phones (the ʺStern Wiretapsʺ). The affidavits supporting
these wiretaps referenced Marley and included a summary of the events leading up to
the February 2015 Order. The affidavits, however, also contained other facts regarding
Sternʹs activities. The Stern Wiretaps intercepted multiple communications between
Stern and Marley, who was using the 3271 number.
The Stern Wiretaps also led to incriminating communications between
Stern and a Jamaican phone number later revealed to belong to Carlton Powell. The
Jamaican government also obtained wiretaps on the phone numbers associated with
Powell (the ʺPowell Wiretapsʺ). The Powell Wiretaps intercepted communications
between Powell and Marley involving drug trafficking.
From January to April 2016, the government intercepted communications
over several phones used by Marley. On December 30, 2015, DEA agents were
authorized to wiretap the 3271 number and a 9720 number also tied to Marley. This
wiretap and two subsequent wiretaps enabled the government to gather significant
evidence of criminal activity. The wiretaps also led the government to obtain warrants
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to search five locations in Brooklyn and Queens where the government seized
marijuana, cocaine, and firearms, and arrested several individuals.
II. Proceedings Below
On April 3, 2017, Marley filed his motion to suppress. First, Marley
challenged the February 2015 Order authorizing the collection of geolocation data from
the 4484 phone. Marley argued that the affidavit submitted to obtain the February 2015
Order contained misstatements in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Marley sought to suppress the geolocation data collected pursuant to the February 2015
Order and other categories of evidence that he argued were fruits of the Franks
violation. Second, Marley argued that the two cellphones seized incident to his arrest
on February 8, 2015, were unlawfully searched that night without a warrant in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
On October 31, 2017, the district court denied Marleyʹs suppression
motion. The district court concluded that paragraph 12 of the affidavit supporting the
February 2015 Order contained several misleading statements exaggerating the
evidence gathered from Lunaʹs undercover call. Nonetheless, the district court
ʺsubstitut[ed] the facts as disclosed in Lunaʹs testimony for the misleading statements in
the affidavit, and supplement[ed] the affidavit with facts that were omitted,ʺ and
concluded that the corrected affidavit would have supported a finding of probable
cause. S. Appʹx at 14. As a result, the district court held that the misstatements were
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not material and that Marley failed to show a Franks violation. The district court
declined to reach the question of whether the ADA and DEA agents made the
misstatements ʺdeliberately or recklessly.ʺ S. Appʹx at 15. The district court also
concluded that Marleyʹs cellphones were not unlawfully searched the night of his arrest.
On March 19, 2018, a jury found Marley guilty on both counts. On July 31,
2018, the district court sentenced Marley principally to 96 monthsʹ imprisonment on
Count 1 and 60 monthsʹ on Count 2, to be served consecutively. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In evaluating a district courtʹs ruling on a motion to suppress, ʺwe review
legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.ʺ United States v.
Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). We give special deference to the district courtʹs ʺfactual determinations going
to witness credibility.ʺ United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
Marley challenges the seizures resulting from the February 2015 Order
and the purported warrantless search of his cellphones.
I. The February 2015 Order
ʺTo suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an affidavit containing
erroneous information, the defendant must show that: (1) the claimed inaccuracies or
omissions are the result of the affiantʹs deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the
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truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the [issuing] judgeʹs
probable cause finding.ʺ United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717‐18 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). When an affidavit in support of a wiretap contains inaccurate
information, we remove that information from consideration and review the affidavit de
novo to determine if probable cause still exists. Canfield, 212 F.3d at 718. In assessing
the materiality of the false statements, this Court has instructed that the ʺfirst task is to
correct the affidavit to account for the alleged inaccuracies.ʺ Id.
Under Franks, ʺ[t]he ultimate inquiry on a motion to suppress is not . . .
whether the affidavit contains false allegations or material omissions, but whether after
putting such aside, there remains a residue of independent and lawful information
sufficient to support probable cause.ʺ United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 849 (2d
Cir. 1985). Here, after conducting a Franks hearing, the district concluded that the
affidavit without the inaccuracies and misstatements was still sufficient to establish
probable cause. We agree.
As corrected by the district court, the facts in the affidavit support a
finding of probable cause: Luna was an experienced DEA agent who participated in
numerous drug and money laundering investigations. The 4484 phone was identified
during the money laundering investigation involving Stern. Based on their experience
in such investigations, the DEA agents identified a pattern of calls between Stern and
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the 4484 phone suggesting money laundering activities. In the undercover phone call,
the recipient of the phone call responded in a way that suggested he implicitly agreed
to meet Luna about the ʺhundredʺ he had ʺto give him.ʺ Appʹx at 302. Viewed in the
totality of the circumstances, these facts are sufficient to support probable cause.
Consequently, even without the inaccuracies and omitted information, the affidavit
would have supported a determination of probable cause.
The district court properly concluded that the remaining portions of the
affidavit were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.1
II. The Warrantless Search of Marleyʹs Phones
Finally, the district court did not commit clear error when it rejected
Marleyʹs allegation that officers searched his phone without a warrant after his
February 8, 2015 arrest. In his pro se brief, Marley argues that the toll records and
geolocation data ʺshow that DEA agents bypassed the password protected cellphones
and accessed data stored within the phones.ʺ Appellantʹs Pro Se Br. at 3.
The district court ruled, based largely on credibility determinations, that
Marleyʹs allegation was ʺbaseless speculation.ʺ S. Appʹx at 23. In so ruling, the district
court found the agentsʹ testimony credible that they ʺknew of no one at the DEA office
1 The parties disagree as to whether the district court was permitted, in addition to
striking inaccurate information, to insert omitted truths. We need not decide the issue, as we
conclude the affidavit was sufficient even without the omitted information ‐‐ the pattern of calls
between the 4484 number and the third number.
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the evening of the arrest who had broken through the passwords and searched the
phones, let alone had the training to do so.ʺ S. Appʹx at 23‐24. The district court did not
commit clear error in rejecting Marleyʹs arguments. First, Marley argued that the
geolocation data somehow showed that the agents searched his phone, but this Court
has held that testimony concerning the interpretation of geolocation data requires
expert testimony. See United States v. Natal, 849 F.3d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(holding that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, testimony regarding how cell phone
towers operate requires expertise because it is based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge). Second, even if we credit Marleyʹs interpretation of the
geolocation data, the fact that Marleyʹs phone was turned off and on does not establish
that his phones ‐‐ which were passcode protected ‐‐ were unlawfully searched.
* * *
We have considered Marleyʹs remaining arguments and conclude they are
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
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