Doucoure v. Barr ( 2020 )

18-2953
Doucoure v. Barr
BIA
A095 862 113
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 22nd day of December, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MAKAN DOUCOURE,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 18-2953
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Genet Getachew, Law Office of
24 Genet Getachew, Brooklyn, NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
27 Assistant Attorney General;
28 Brianne Whelan Cohen, Senior
29 Litigation Counsel; Robbin K.
1 Blaya, Trial Attorney, Office of
2 Immigration Litigation, United
3 States Department of Justice,
4 Washington, DC.
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
8 is DENIED.
9 Petitioner Makan Doucoure, a native and citizen of
10 Mauritania, seeks review of a September 26, 2018, decision of
11 the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Makan Doucoure,
12 No. A 095 862 113 (B.I.A. Sept. 26, 2018). We assume the
13 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
14 history in this case. The applicable standards of review are
15 well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d
16 138, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008).
17 Doucoure moved to reopen his proceedings based on his
18 support for an anti-slavery activist group while in the United
19 States and the Mauritanian government’s persecution of anti-
20 slavery groups. It is undisputed that Doucoure’s motion to
21 reopen was untimely and number barred because it was his
22 second motion to reopen filed more than 14 years after he was
23 ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i);
2
1 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time and numerical
2 limitations do not apply if the motion is to reopen
3 proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed
4 country conditions arising in the country of nationality or
5 the country to which removal has been ordered, if such
6 evidence is material and was not available and would not have
7 been discovered or presented at the previous
8 proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R.
9 § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
10 conclusion that Doucoure failed to establish a material
11 change related to the continued practice of slavery and
12 suppression of anti-slavery groups in Mauritania since his
13 2004 proceedings, see In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253
14 (BIA 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a
15 motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country
16 conditions that would justify reopening, [the agency]
17 compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with
18 the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits
19 hearing below.”).
20 At the time of his merits hearing in 2004, Doucoure
21 submitted evidence describing the long history of slavery in
3
1 Mauritania, that the Mauritanian government had banned or
2 refused to authorize several political parties, including
3 anti-slavery non-governmental organizations, and that the
4 government had detained the leader of an anti-slavery
5 activist group. The evidence he submitted in support of
6 reopening described similar conditions of the continued
7 practice of slavery despite its illegality, the suppression
8 of anti-slavery groups, and the arrest and imprisonment of
9 supporters who campaign for abolitionist movements. Based
10 on this record, the BIA was not compelled to conclude that
11 conditions in Mauritania had materially worsened. See 8
12 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“the administrative findings of fact
13 are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
14 compelled to conclude to the contrary”); Jian Hui Shao, 546
15 F.3d at 168–69. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion
16 in the BIA’s denial of Doucoure’s motion to reopen as untimely
17 and number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i),
18 (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).
19 Because this basis for the denial of the motion to reopen
20 is dispositive, we do not reach the BIA’s alternate ruling
21 that Doucoure failed to establish prima facie eligibility for
4
1 relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104–05 (1988) (agency
2 may deny untimely motion for failure to show material change
3 or for failure to establish prima facie eligibility); INS v.
4 Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
5 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
6 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
8 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
9 stays VACATED.
10 FOR THE COURT:
11 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
12 Clerk of Court
5