United States v. Marcus Snow ( 2020 )

19‐3115‐cr
United States v. Marcus Snow
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE
A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 23rd day of December, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges,
GARY R. BROWN,
District Judge.*
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 19‐3115‐cr
MARCUS SNOW, AKA FLASH,
Defendant‐Appellant.**
* Judge Gary R. Brown, District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
** The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
_____________________________________
For Defendant‐Appellant: James C. Egan, Law Office of James C.
Egan, PLLC, Rochester, NY.
For Appellee: Katherine A. Gregory, Assistant United
States Attorney, for James P. Kennedy,
Jr., United States Attorney for the
Western District of New York, Buffalo,
NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York (Charles J. Siragusa, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the case is REMANDED to the district court.
Defendant Marcus Snow appeals from an order of the district court that
denied his request for a sentence reduction pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115‐391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). In 2004,
following a jury trial, Snow was convicted on several counts, including
(i) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, and (ii) possession with
intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). The district court originally imposed a life sentence
2
on Snow for each of those counts, but subsequently reduced that to 360 months’
incarceration following certain retroactive amendments to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.
Separately, in August 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub.
L. No. 111‐220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), which “altered the threshold drug quantities
that trigger the varying penalty ranges for crack cocaine offenses located in 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1),” United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 2020). “As
relevant to [Snow], the Fair Sentencing Act increased the threshold quantity for
conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A) from 50 to 280 grams of crack cocaine.” Id. But,
as those changes did not apply retroactively to defendants who were sentenced
prior to their enactment, id., the Fair Sentencing Act provided Snow no avenue for
relief. That is, until 2018, when Congress enacted the First Step Act.
Section 404(b) of the First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act’s penalty
threshold modifications retroactive, providing that:
A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense
may, on motion of the defendant, . . . impose a reduced
sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act
of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was
committed.
First Step Act, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222 (internal citation omitted); see also id.
3
§ 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222 (defining “covered offense” to mean “a violation of a
Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by
section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, that was committed before
August 3, 2010” (internal citation omitted)).
On May 10, 2019, Snow moved for a further reduction in his sentence
pursuant to the First Step Act. Such motions require a court to conduct a two‐
part inquiry. “First, the court must determine whether the defendant is eligible
for a reduction.” United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2020). “Second,
if the defendant is eligible, the court must determine whether, and to what extent,
to exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence.” Id. Here, the district court
denied Snow’s motion at the first stage, finding that he was statutorily ineligible
for relief given that the Fair Sentencing Act “does not have any impact on the
guideline range subsequent to the [c]ourt’s previous reduc[ti]on to [Snow’s]
sentence.” App’x at 154. In other words, although the Fair Sentencing Act,
together with the First Step Act, changed the statutory penalties for Snow’s crime,
the district court nonetheless determined that Snow was ineligible for relief
because the two acts did not also alter his applicable Guidelines range.
4
But just seven months after the district court’s order, we issued our opinion
in United States v. Holloway, in which we held that a change in Guidelines range is
not relevant to whether a defendant is eligible for a First Step Act resentencing.
956 F.3d at 665–66. Rather, we concluded that a defendant is eligible for relief so
long as his motion concerns a sentence that “was imposed ‘for a covered offense,’”
which includes violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Id. at 664 (quoting First Step
Act, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222).
In light of Holloway, the government agrees with Snow that a remand is
warranted so that the district court may consider Snow’s motion on the merits.
After reviewing the record, we concur: Snow is eligible for a reduced sentenced
under the First Step Act. Of course, the mere fact that Snow is eligible for
discretionary relief, does not mean that he is entitled to it. Id. at 666. As a result,
whether Snow’s sentence should be reduced “is a matter left to the district court’s
sound discretion.” Id.; see also Moore, 975 F.3d at 92 n.36 (explaining that “a
district court retains discretion to decide what factors are relevant as it determines
whether and to what extent to reduce a sentence”).
5
Accordingly, we REMAND the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
6