Amides-Galdamez v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      19-1290
    Amides-Galdamez v. Barr
    BIA
    Poczter, IJ
    A205 734 146
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 22nd day of April, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    8                 Chief Judge,
    9            DENNY CHIN,
    10            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   JOSE AMIDES-GALDAMEZ,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                    v.                                  19-1290
    18                                                        NAC
    19   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                  Abdolreza Mazaheri, Esq., Sethi &
    25                                    Mazaheri, LLC, New York, NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
    28                                    General; Jessica E. Burns, Senior
    1                                    Litigation Counsel; Edward C.
    2                                    Durant, Trial Attorney, Office of
    3                                    Immigration Litigation, United
    4                                    States Department of Justice,
    5                                    Washington, DC.
    6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    8    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    9    is DENIED.
    10       Petitioner Jose Amides-Galdamez, a native and citizen of
    11   El Salvador, seeks review of an April 1, 2019 decision of the
    12   BIA affirming an October 12, 2018 decision of an Immigration
    13   Judge (“IJ”) ordering removal and denying asylum, withholding
    14   of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
    15   In re Jose Amides-Galdamez, No. A 205 734 146 (B.I.A. Apr. 1,
    16   2019), aff’g No. A 205 734 146 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 12,
    17   2018).       We   assume   the    parties’   familiarity   with   the
    18   underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    19       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s opinions “for
    20   the sake of completeness.”          Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland
    21   Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir. 2006).        Amides-Galdamez does
    22   not challenge his removability or the denial of asylum and
    23   related relief.      He asserts only that the agency erred in
    24   declining to continue his removal proceedings pending a final
    2
    1   decision in his bond proceedings or pending resolution of his
    2   application for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”).
    3   We review the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion.
    4   Flores v. Holder, 
    779 F.3d 159
    , 164 (2d Cir. 2015).                        The
    5   agency abuses its discretion in denying a continuance only
    6   “if (1) [the] decision rests on an error of law (such as
    7   application    of    the    wrong    legal      principle)     or   a   clearly
    8   erroneous factual finding or (2) [the] decision—though not
    9   necessarily    the    product       of   a     legal   error   or   a   clearly
    10   erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within the range
    11   of permissible decisions.”           Morgan v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 549
    ,
    12   551-52 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    13   The   agency   did    not    abuse       its    discretion     in   denying   a
    14   continuance     based       on      Amides-Galdamez’s          pending     bond
    15   proceedings or SIJS application.
    16         In deciding whether to grant a continuance, the agency
    17   “should assess whether good cause supports such a continuance
    18   by applying a multifactor analysis, which requires that the
    19   . . . principal focus be on the likelihood that the collateral
    20   relief will be granted and will materially affect the outcome
    21   of the removal proceedings.”             Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N.
    3
    1   Dec. 405, 406 (A.G. 2018).       The burden of establishing good
    2   cause is on the party requesting the continuance.
    Id. at 3
      413.
    4          The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying a
    5   continuance based on Amides-Galdamez’s pending bond appeal.
    6   The IJ and BIA correctly observed that bond proceedings are
    7   “separate and apart from” removal proceedings.             8 C.F.R.
    8   § 1003.19(d).     Furthermore,    as   the   agency   reasoned,   the
    9   outcome of the bond proceedings was too speculative to support
    10   a continuance for two reasons: first, the IJ had yet to
    11   determine whether Amides-Galdamez posed a flight risk; and,
    12   second, there was no guarantee that his SIJS application would
    13   be adjudicated prior to his merits hearing even if his case
    14   was transferred to the non-detained docket.       Finally, Amides-
    15   Galdamez’s pending bond proceedings did not relate to the
    16   merits of his applications for relief from removal, but rather
    17   to the timing of his hearing.        See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I.
    18   & N. Dec. at 406.
    19          The agency also did not abuse its discretion in denying
    20   a continuance based on the pending SIJS application.         First,
    21   contrary to Amides-Galdamez’s claims, he did not file a
    4
    1   written motion for a continuance before the IJ or orally
    2   request a continuance based on his pending SIJS application
    3   at his final hearing.   Accordingly, there was no request for
    4   the IJ to rule on.   See Prabhudial v. Holder, 
    780 F.3d 553
    ,
    5   555 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that an applicant waives an issue
    6   that he does not raise before the IJ); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27
    7   I. & N. Dec. at 413 (burden to establish good cause is on the
    8   party requesting the continuance).
    9       Second, the BIA analyzed the merits of a continuance
    10   pending resolution of the SIJS application.   Amides-Galdamez
    11   has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying
    12   a continuance.   While he contends that the agency neglected
    13   to analyze the L-A-B-R- factors and improperly based its
    14   decision solely on the remoteness of his visa priority date,
    15   “good cause does not exist if the alien’s visa priority date
    16   is too remote to raise the prospect of adjustment of status
    17   above the speculative level.”     Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. &
    18   N. Dec. at 418; cf. Elbahja v. Keisler, 
    505 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d
    19   Cir. 2007) (“[I]t does not constitute an abuse of discretion
    20   for an IJ to decline to continue a removal proceeding in order
    21   to permit adjudication of a removable alien's pending labor
    5
    1   certification.”).   The BIA thus reasonably concluded that
    2   even assuming that Amides-Galdamez was eligible for SIJS, the
    3   likelihood of that relief remained speculative given the
    4   “lengthy wait [time] for an available visa.”    As such, the
    5   agency did not abuse its discretion in determining that his
    6   pending SIJS application did not constitute good cause for a
    7   continuance.
    8       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    9   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    10   stays VACATED.
    11                               FOR THE COURT:
    12                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    13                               Clerk of Court
    6