Hunter v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2023 )

22-787
Hunter v. Commissioner of Social Security
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 23rd day of March, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT: Rosemary S. Pooler,
Richard C. Wesley,
Steven J. Menashi,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
DOMINIQUE HUNTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 22-787
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: Dominique Hunter, pro se, Niagara Falls,
NY.
For Defendant-Appellee: Christopher Hurd, Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Ellen E. Sovern, Associate General
Counsel, United States Social Security
Administration, for Trini E. Ross, United
States Attorney for the Western District of
New York, Buffalo, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York (Skretny, J.).
Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Dominique Hunter, proceeding pro se, sought review of
a final determination by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her
application for disability benefits and supplemental security income. The district
court granted the Commissioner judgment on the pleadings, reasoning that
substantial evidence supported the decision of the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) that Hunter was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act. The ALJ reached that conclusion because he determined that Hunter retained
2
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to do light work with some limitations
and that a person with this RFC could perform Hunter’s past work as a debt
collector. Hunter appeals. We presume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and
procedural history.
“On an appeal from the denial of disability benefits, we focus on the
administrative ruling rather than the district court’s opinion.” Estrella v. Berryhill,
925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We conduct a
plenary review of the administrative record to determine if there is substantial
evidence, considering the record as a whole, to support the Commissioner’s
decision and if the correct legal standards have been applied.” Id. (quoting Cichocki
v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2013)). The substantial evidence standard
means that “once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable
factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r,
683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
A review of the certified administrative record and relevant case law reveals
that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that the determination that
Hunter was not disabled between 2016 and 2019 was supported by substantial
evidence. In concluding that Hunter did not have a severe impairment meeting or
3
equaling a listed impairment, for example, the ALJ relied on Hunter’s ability to
perform day-to-day activities such as caring for a family member and attending
appointments. The ALJ relied on medical records and several medical opinions in
concluding that Hunter had the RFC to perform light work with limitations and
was capable of performing her past relevant work as a debt collector.
Hunter argues that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential evaluation,
when the ALJ determined that Hunter’s physical and psychiatric impairments
were not severe and did not meet or equal a listed impairment. However, the ALJ
fully considered the conditions and explicitly noted that, even when considered in
combination, the conditions caused no more than mild limitations. This conclusion
is supported by the medical records before the ALJ.
Hunter also contends that at the disability hearing the ALJ wrongly ignored
testimony from the vocational expert who stated that she could not work. But the
testimony to which Hunter refers was given in response to hypothetical questions
about a claimant with more severe limitations. The ALJ determined that Hunter
could work at her previous job as a debt collector, which is supported by the
vocational expert’s testimony that a hypothetical individual with the limitations
Hunter was ultimately found to have could perform that work.
4
Hunter additionally suggests that the ALJ applied incorrect legal principles.
But Hunter does not identify—and we have not identified—a legal error that the
ALJ committed. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the substantial evidence
standard is inapplicable.
Finally, Hunter argues that the ALJ did not adequately develop the record.
An ALJ has an affirmative duty to develop the record. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34,
37 (2d Cir. 1996). However, Hunter does not specify which providers’ records were
missing or what those records would show. The record before the ALJ contained
numerous medical evaluations and several medical opinions assessing Hunter’s
physical and mental impairments. The additional records that Hunter submitted
to the Appeals Council do not establish a gap in the record before the ALJ that
required reconsideration. Her arguments that the ALJ did not help her fully
develop the record, or that there are new records that should be considered, are
unavailing.
We have considered Hunter’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are
without merit. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that
5
Hunter is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
6