Kacaj v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-1696
    Kacaj v. Barr
    BIA
    A095 474 444
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 3rd day of March, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            PETER W. HALL,
    8            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    9            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   EJLL KACAJ,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                   v.                                  18-1696
    17                                                       NAC
    18   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                 James A. Lombardi, New York, NY.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                 Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
    26                                   General; John S. Hogan, Assistant
    27                                   Director; Laura Maroldy, Trial
    28                                   Attorney, Office of Immigration
    29                                   Litigation, United States
    30                                   Department of Justice, Washington,
    31                                   DC.
    1        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4    is DENIED.
    5        Petitioner Ejll Kacaj, a native and citizen of Albania,
    6    seeks review of a May 8, 2018 decision of the BIA denying his
    7    motion to reopen his removal proceedings.           In re Ejll Kacaj,
    8    No. A095 474 444 (B.I.A. May 8, 2018).     We assume the parties’
    9    familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    10   in this case.
    11       We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
    12   abuse of discretion and its country conditions determination
    13   for substantial evidence.    See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546
    
    14 F.3d 138
    , 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008).       An alien seeking to reopen
    15   may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the
    16   final administrative decision.         8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),
    17   (C)(i);   8 C.F.R.   § 1003.2(c)(2).      It   is    undisputed   that
    18   Kacaj’s 2017 motion to reopen was number-barred and untimely
    19   because it was his second motion to reopen and it was filed
    20   more than 12 years after his 2004 order of removal.          However,
    21   the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen
    22   do not apply if the motion is filed in order to apply for
    2
    1    asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the
    2    country of nationality or the country to which removal has
    3    been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not
    4    available and would not have been discovered or presented at
    5    the previous proceedings.”           8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);
    6    see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
    7         “In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion
    8    to   reopen    demonstrates      a    material     change   in   country
    9    conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s]
    10   the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion
    11   to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing
    12   below.”   In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007).
    13   The agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that
    14   Kacaj’s evidence was insufficient to establish a material
    15   change in conditions in Albania.
    16        First,    Kacaj   submitted         country   conditions    evidence
    17   showing tensions between political parties and abuses of
    18   political     protestors   and       journalists     critical    of   the
    19   government.     The agency did not abuse its discretion in
    20   finding that this evidence was not material because the agency
    21   previously found Kacaj not credible as to his claim that he
    22   was a political dissident or active in Albania’s Democratic
    3
    1    Party.     See Kaur v. BIA, 
    413 F.3d 232
    , 234 (2d Cir. 2005)
    2    (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of reopening where
    3    new evidence “did not rebut [underlying] adverse credibility
    4    finding”).      In    any    event,   this     evidence      did    not   show
    5    conditions that were materially worse than those existing at
    6    the time of Kacaj’s 2004 hearing.
    7        Second, Kacaj submitted declarations from friends and
    8    family in Albania, largely concerning his claims regarding
    9    past events.         The agency did not err in assigning this
    10   evidence “minimal weight” because the authors were interested
    11   parties not available for examination and because of the
    12   agency’s prior adverse credibility finding.                   See Y.C. v.
    13   Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to
    14   agency’s    decision    to   afford       little   weight    to    relative’s
    15   letter   from   China    because      it    was    unsworn    and    from   an
    16   interested witness); Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 143
    ,
    17   146-47 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA may reasonably
    18   rely on an adverse credibility finding in the underlying
    19   asylum proceedings in evaluating the evidence presented in
    20   support of a motion to reopen).                Even if the agency had
    21   afforded this evidence more weight, it did not support the
    22   conclusion that conditions had materially worsened for Kacaj
    4
    1    in Albania since 2004, as the authors alleged that threats
    2    against Kacaj and his family had persisted for decades.
    3        Because the record supports the BIA’s conclusion that
    4    Kacaj     failed   to   demonstrate   a   material   worsening   of
    5    conditions for similarly situated people in Albania as needed
    6    to excuse the time and number bars to his motion, the BIA did
    7    not err in denying his motion to reopen.             See 8 U.S.C.
    8    § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C).      Because this finding is dispositive,
    9    we do not reach the BIA’s alternative finding that Kacaj
    10   failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief.          See
    11   INS v. Bagamasbad, 
    429 U.S. 24
    , 25 (1976) (“As a general rule
    12   courts and agencies are not required to make findings on
    13   issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results
    14   they reach.”).
    15       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    16   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    17   stays VACATED.
    18                                  FOR THE COURT:
    19                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    20                                  Clerk of Court
    5