Chen v. Barr ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •      18-1205
    Chen v. Barr
    BIA
    A078 853 842
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 24th day of April, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    8            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    9            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   CUI PING CHEN, AKA ANNIE DUONG,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                  v.                                           18-1205
    17                                                               NAC
    18   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                  Dehai Zhang, Esq., Flushing, NY.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
    26                                    General; Derek C. Julius,
    27                                    Assistant Director; Margaret
    28                                    Kuehne Taylor, Senior Litigation
    29                                    Counsel, Office of Immigration
    30                                    Litigation, United States
    31                                    Department of Justice, Washington,
    32                                    DC.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4    is DENIED.
    5        Petitioner Cui Ping Chen, a native and citizen of the
    6    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 16, 2018,
    7    decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen.   In re Cui
    8   Ping Chen, No. A 078 853 842 (B.I.A. Apr. 16, 2018).        We
    9   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    10   procedural history.
    11       An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one
    12   motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final
    13   administrative decision.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i);
    14   8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).    Chen’s 2017 motion was untimely
    15   because it was filed approximately six years after her final
    16   removal order.   But there is an exception: “There is no time
    17   limit on the filing of a motion to reopen if the basis of the
    18   motion is to apply for [asylum] and is based on changed
    19   country conditions arising in the country of nationality or
    20   the country to which removal has been ordered, if such
    21   evidence is material and was not available and would not have
    22   been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”    8
    23   U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
    2
    1          We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for
    2   abuse of discretion but review any finding regarding changed
    3   country conditions for substantial evidence.                    Jian Hui Shao
    4   v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008).                       “An abuse
    5   of discretion may be found in those circumstances where the
    6   [BIA’s]      decision        provides        no     rational         explanation,
    7   inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of
    8   any    reasoning,      or    contains       only    summary     or    conclusory
    9   statements; that is to say, where the [BIA] has acted in an
    10   arbitrary or capricious manner.”              Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t
    11   of Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations
    12   omitted).
    13          The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to
    14   reopen to the extent that Chen sought to apply for asylum
    15   because her motion largely relied on her changed personal
    16   circumstances.        See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 
    437 F.3d 270
    , 273
    17   (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that changed personal circumstances
    18   do    not   fall    within    the   changed        conditions    exception    to
    19   reopening).        And her limited country conditions evidence only
    20   addressed events after 2015; it did not address how conditions
    21   have    changed     since    her    2011    final     removal    order.      Her
    22   evidence      showed        persecution       of     Christians        attending
    23   unregistered churches in some parts of China, but it did not
    3
    1   reflect a material worsening of conditions as compared to the
    2   record before the IJ.         For example, a 2007 State Department
    3   report    that   Chen    submitted       with   her    original      asylum
    4   application notes that in some parts of China, “local security
    5   officials use threats, demolition of unregistered property,
    6   interrogation, arrest, imprisonment, and sometimes severe
    7   physical abuse to target unregistered religious leaders and
    8   their followers.”       The BIA reasonably concluded that Chen
    9   failed to establish that conditions have changed materially
    10   since her 2009 hearing.         See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
    11   247,    253   (BIA   2007)    (“In    determining     whether      evidence
    12   accompanying     a   motion   to    reopen   demonstrates      a   material
    13   change in country conditions that would justify reopening,
    14   [the   BIA]   compare[s]      the   evidence    of   country    conditions
    15   submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time
    16   of the merits hearing below.”).
    17          The BIA also     reasonably observed that Chen              has   not
    18   presented evidence that Chinese authorities are aware of, or
    19   are likely to become aware of, her practice of Christianity
    20   in the United States, as required to establish prima facie
    21   eligibility for asylum for claims based solely on activities
    22   undertaken within the United States.             See Hongsheng Leng v.
    23   Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    , 143 (2d Cir. 2008); see also INS v.
    4
    1   Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    , 104–05 (1988) (even assuming there has
    2   been a change in conditions, the agency may nevertheless deny
    3   reopening where a movant fails to demonstrate prima facie
    4   eligibility for relief from removal).   Chen did not support
    5   her claim that Chinese authorities are surveilling her with
    6   any evidence.
    7       While the BIA has regulatory authority to reopen untimely
    8   proceedings sua sponte, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), Chen has not
    9   raised this issue before the agency or this Court.
    10       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    11   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    12   stays VACATED.
    13                               FOR THE COURT:
    14                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    15                               Clerk of Court
    5