Jones v. City of New York ( 2021 )

20-1442
Jones v. City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 12th day of February, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Kareem Omar Jones,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 20-1442
The City of New York, New York Police Officer
Gelphin Gomez, Shield #04967, New York Police
Sergeant Anthony Peters, District Attorney Cyrus
Vance, New York County, Angie Godoy, Assistant
District Attorney of the County of New York, New
York Police John Doe #1, New York Police Officer
John Doe #2,
Defendants-Appellees,
Bridget Brennan, Special Assistant District
Attorney, Angie Morelli, Assistant District
Attorney, Lauren Stoia, Assistant District Attorney,
Gene Conway, Attorney, Ricky Ghosh, Attorney,
Blaine Fogg, President, Brandon Young, Assistant
District Attorney,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Kareem Omar Jones, pro se,
Sonyea, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearances.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Stanton, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Kareem Jones, pro se, sued the City of New York, several police officers, the New York
County district attorney, and an assistant district attorney. Mr. Jones alleges that the police pulled
his car over in a public parking lot with no probable cause, and that subsequent unlawful searches
yielded evidence that led to his indictment by a grand jury. Mr. Jones was convicted of criminal
possession of a controlled substance and acquitted of several other charges. The relevant
conviction was upheld on appeal. See People v. Jones, 113 N.Y.S.3d 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t
2019), leave to appeal denied, 35 N.Y.3d 942 (2020). In his complaint, Mr. Jones asserts claims
for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, violations of due process and equal protection,
municipal liability, and prima facie tort. The district court dismissed Mr. Jones’s amended
complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues
on appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Zaleski v. Burns, 606 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). While a court
must construe a pro se complaint liberally and “with special solicitude, . . . to raise the strongest
claims that it suggests,” Williams v. Correction Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2016), 1
it must also dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it determines that the action “fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
1
In quoting cases, we omit internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and alterations.
Mr. Jones’s appellate brief focuses only on his false arrest and malicious prosecution
claims. It contains only passing mentions of his other claims. He has therefore waived any
arguments relating to those claims. See Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d
139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013). We thus address only the claims for false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution.
I. False Imprisonment
Mr. Jones’s false imprisonment claims are untimely. The statute of limitations for a § 1983
claim of false arrest or false imprisonment begins to run “when the alleged false imprisonment
ends.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). A false imprisonment ends when “the victim
becomes held pursuant to [legal] process—when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or
arraigned on charges.” Id. Here, Mr. Jones was arraigned on July 3, 2016, the day after his arrest,
thus starting the three-year statute-of-limitations clock on his false imprisonment claims. See
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (holding that state law statute of limitations applies
to § 1983 claims); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (providing for three-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions). This suit was filed on September 30, 2019, more than three years after
that date. The false imprisonment claims are therefore untimely.
Mr. Jones argues that the district court should have equitably tolled the limitations period
because he was unaware of the officers’ reasons for stopping him until they testified at a February
2017 suppression hearing. Equitable tolling is applied only in “rare and exceptional
circumstances,” where a party was prevented from timely performing a required act and where
that party “acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he sought to toll.” Walker v.
Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005). Even accepting Mr. Jones’s assertion that he was
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unaware of the officers’ reason for the stop until February 2017, he does not offer any explanation
for why he then waited an additional two-and-a-half years to file suit. Dismissal of the false
imprisonment claims was therefore appropriate.
II. Malicious Prosecution
In assessing a malicious prosecution claim brought under § 1983, federal courts look to the
relevant state tort law. See Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2018). In New
York, a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution must show “(1) the commencement or
continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of
the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal
proceeding and (4) actual malice.” De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 760 (2016).
The favorable termination requirement has clearly not been met for the drug charge on
which Mr. Jones was convicted and which was affirmed on appeal. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Lanning, 908 F.3d at 28 (holding that, to state a malicious prosecution claim,
plaintiff must allege that the “termination of the prosecution[] against him affirmatively indicated
his innocence”). 2
As to the charges that ended in acquittal, the complaint does not adequately allege that
there was no probable cause to prosecute. “Once a suspect has been indicted [New York] law holds
that the Grand Jury action creates a presumption of probable cause.” Rothstein v. Carriere, 373
F.3d 275, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2004). This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the indictment
2
Mr. Jones was also convicted of a marijuana charge, but that conviction was vacated on
appeal due to the passage of a state law expunging some marijuana-related convictions. See
Jones, 113 N.Y.S.3d at 38. Mr. Jones does not meaningfully discuss this conviction in his
complaint or appellate brief, and any claims relating to it are therefore waived.
4
“was produced by fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken
in bad faith.” Id. at 283. Mr. Jones admits that a grand jury indicted him on all six charges for
which he was prosecuted, but asserts that the prosecution was predicated on “fabricated” police
allegations, namely that the police fraudulently concealed (until the 2017 suppression hearing) that
they based their stop on the fact that he was double parked. But the complaint’s allegations concern
only the events that took place during Mr. Jones’s arrest, and the complaint contains no well-
pleaded allegations of misconduct relating to the grand jury proceedings. It therefore does not
allege facts that would rebut the presumption of probable cause. See Rothstein, 373 F.3d at 283.
Accordingly, the complaint does not state a claim for malicious prosecution.
We have considered all of Mr. Jones’s remaining arguments and find in them no basis for
reversal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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