Ramos-Gorrin v. Lynch , 675 F. App'x 13 ( 2017 )


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  •      15-4177
    Ramos-Gorrin v. Lynch
    BIA
    Connelly, IJ
    A208 078 140
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
    BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
    WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
    CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
    “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF
    IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   10th day of January, two thousand seventeen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DENNIS JACOBS,
    8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    9            PETER W. HALL,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   OMAR RAMOS-GORRIN,
    14
    15                           Petitioner,
    16
    17                  v.                                        15-4177
    18
    19   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21
    22                 Respondent.
    23   _____________________________________
    24
    25   FOR PETITIONER:                          Stephen K. Tills, Orchard
    26                                            Park, New York.
    27
    1   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal
    2                                      Deputy Assistant Attorney
    3                                      General; Terri J. Scadron,
    4                                      Assistant Director; Hillel R.
    5                                      Smith, Attorney, Office of
    6                                      Immigration Litigation,
    7                                      United States Department of
    8                                      Justice, Washington, D.C.
    9
    10        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    11   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    12   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    13   DENIED.
    14        Petitioner Omar Ramos-Gorrin, a citizen of Spain and Cuba,
    15   seeks review of a December 14, 2015, decision of the BIA
    16   affirming the August 25, 2015, decision of an Immigration Judge
    17   (“IJ”) denying his motion for a continuance in asylum-only
    18   proceedings. In re Omar Ramos-Gorrin, No. A208 078 140 (B.I.A.
    19   Dec. 14, 2015), aff’g No. A208 078 140 (Immig. Ct. Batavia Aug.
    20   25, 2015).    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    21   underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    22        Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
    23   the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.”
    24   Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir.
    25   2006). We review the IJ’s denial of a request for a continuance
    26   “under a highly deferential standard of abuse of discretion.”
    27   Morgan v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 549
    , 551 (2d Cir. 2006). The IJ
    28   did not abuse its discretion in denying Ramos-Gorrin’s motion
    29   to continue his asylum-only proceedings to pursue adjustment
    30   of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act.
    31        An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good cause
    32   shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. The IJ abuses his discretion only
    33   if his “decision rests on an error of law (such as application
    34   of the wrong legal principle)[,] . . . a clearly erroneous
    35   factual finding[,] or . . . cannot be located within the range
    36   of permissible decisions.” 
    Morgan, 445 F.3d at 551-52
    (quoting
    37   Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 
    252 F.3d 163
    , 169 (2d Cir.
    38   2001)).
    39        Under the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”), “certain aliens may
    40   enter the United States without a visa for up to 90 days if they
    41   waive their right to contest any action for deportation (other
    2
    1    than on the basis of an asylum application) against them.”
    2    Jean-Baptiste v. Reno, 
    144 F.3d 212
    , 216-17 (2d Cir. 1998); see
    3    also 8 U.S.C. § 1187. In asylum only proceedings (commenced
    4    after a VWP violator seeks asylum),
    5            [t]he scope of review . . . [is] limited to a
    6            determination of whether the alien is eligible for
    7            asylum or withholding or deferral of removal, and .
    8            . . all parties are prohibited from raising or
    9            considering any other issues, including but not
    10            limited to issues of admissibility, deportability,
    11            eligibility for waivers, and eligibility for any other
    12            form of relief.
    13   8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i). And, although a VWP participant
    14   may adjust to lawful status, he “may not contest removal on the
    15   basis of an adjustment of status application filed after that
    16   participant overstays the 90-day period of authorized stay.”
    17   Gjerjaj v. Holder, 
    691 F.3d 288
    , 293 (2d Cir. 2012) (addressing
    18   adjustment based on immediate relative visa petition).
    19        Because Ramos-Gorrin did not apply to adjust status prior
    20   to expiration of his 90-day authorized stay, he was not
    21   permitted to contest his removal or obtain a continuance in
    22   order to do so in his asylum-only proceedings. See 8 C.F.R.
    23   § 1208.2(c)(3)(i); 
    Gjerjaj, 691 F.3d at 293
    .           Moreover,
    24   Ramos-Gorrin admitted that he was not eligible to adjust status
    25   at the time he requested a continuance. See Elbahja v. Keisler,
    26   
    505 F.3d 125
    , 128-29 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that because “the
    27   petitioner was not, at the time of the hearing, ‘eligible for
    28   adjustment of status, . . . he had no right to yet another delay
    29   in the proceedings so that he could attempt to become eligible
    30   for such relief’” (quoting 
    Morgan, 445 F.3d at 552
    )).
    31   Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding
    32   no good cause to continue Ramos-Gorrin’s proceedings. See
    33   
    Morgan, 445 F.3d at 551-52
    .
    34        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    35   DENIED.
    36                                FOR THE COURT:
    37                                CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    3