Li Min Lin v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •      20-3683
    Li Min Lin v. Garland
    BIA
    Vomacka, IJ
    A205 894 760
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 22nd day of March, two thousand twenty-
    5   three.
    6
    7   PRESENT:
    8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    9            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
    10            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   LI MIN LIN,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                     v.                                   20-3683
    18                                                          NAC
    19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Yee Ling Poon, Esq., New York,
    25                                      NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
    28                                      Attorney General; Song Park,
    1                                   Senior Litigation Counsel; Rosanne
    2                                   M. Perry, Trial Attorney, Office
    3                                   of Immigration Litigation, United
    4                                   States Department of Justice,
    5                                   Washington, DC.
    6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    9   is DENIED.
    10       Petitioner Li Min Lin, a native and citizen of the
    11   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 29,
    12   2020, decision of the BIA affirming a June 20, 2018, decision
    13   of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her application for
    14   asylum,   withholding    of     removal,    and   relief     under   the
    15   Convention Against Torture (CAT).          In re Li Min Lin, No. A205
    16   894 760 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2020), aff’g No. A 205 894 760
    17   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 20, 2018).         We assume the parties’
    18   familiarity with the case.
    19       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and
    20   modified by the BIA.          See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of
    21   Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
    22   standards of review are well established.               See 8 U.S.C.
    23   § 1252(b)(4)(B)   (“[A]dministrative         findings   of    fact   are
    24   conclusive   unless     any    reasonable     adjudicator    would    be
    2
    1   compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v.
    2   Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse
    3   credibility      determination       under     substantial       evidence
    4   standard).
    5         The   IJ   may,   “[c]onsidering        the     totality   of   the
    6   circumstances, . . . base a credibility determination on . . .
    7   the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account,”
    8   and   inconsistencies    in    her       statements    or   between   her
    9   statements and other evidence, “without regard to whether an
    10   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
    11   the applicant’s claim.”       
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).          “We
    12   defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
    13   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
    14   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
    15   ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir.
    16   2008).
    17         Lin asserted a claim of past persecution, alleging that
    18   that she was forced to have an intrauterine device (“IUD”) in
    19   1995, and an abortion and a second IUD in 1999.               The agency
    20   pointed to multiple inconsistencies between her application,
    21   statements at her asylum interview, hearing testimony, and
    3
    1   documentary evidence in concluding that she had not stated a
    2   credible claim.     See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).
    3          Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
    4   determination.     Lin’s statements at her asylum interview and
    5   hearing were inconsistent about when she had the IUD removed
    6   before    coming   to   the   United       States     and    whether   Chinese
    7   authorities were aware she had had it removed.                    She argues
    8   that     the   interview      record       is   unreliable       because    of
    9   translation     problems,        but    she     did    not     exhaust     this
    10   explanation before the BIA, and, even if she had, asylum
    11   interviews are not subject to “special scrutiny” to establish
    12   their     reliability      and    the      record      does     not    reflect
    13   comprehension issues.         Ming Zhang v. Holder, 
    585 F.3d 715
    ,
    14   723 (2d Cir. 2009).
    15          Lin’s testimony contradicted itself in other places, too.
    16   At one point, she testified that she and her husband had come
    17   to the United States because they wanted to move to a country
    18   with more reproductive freedom; elsewhere, she stated that
    19   she had come to visit her son who was in the United States on
    20   a student visa and learned that she might be eligible for
    21   asylum only after her arrival.                  The IJ did not err in
    4
    1   concluding that this last allegation was not plausible under
    2   the circumstances.
    3          Lin also changed her explanation for failing to provide
    4   her family planning medical record book as evidence.             During
    5   her asylum interview, she said that she was required to bring
    6   the book to every checkup.             Later, she testified that she
    7   never had the book at home and only signed it during checkups
    8   at the family planning office.           The agency was not required
    9   to credit her explanation that the process changed over time.
    10   See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
    11   petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
    12   for h[er] inconsistent statements to secure relief; [s]he
    13   must    demonstrate   that    a   reasonable     fact-finder   would    be
    14   compelled to credit h[er] testimony.” (internal quotation
    15   marks omitted)).
    16          Finally, the IJ did not err in relying on additional
    17   minor    discrepancies       between     Lin’s   statements    and     her
    18   documentary evidence about her son’s level of education and
    19   her address in China.        See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu
    20   Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
     (“[E]ven where an IJ relies on
    21   discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern
    5
    1   matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative
    2   effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential by the fact-
    3   finder.”).
    4         The inconsistencies, taken together, provide substantial
    5   evidence for the adverse credibility determination.              See
    6   Likai Gao v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 137
    , 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)
    7   (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from
    8   showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.”).
    9    The   adverse   credibility   determination   disposes   of    Lin’s
    10   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief claims because
    11   all three are based on the same factual predicate.       See Paul
    12   v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).             To the
    13   extent Lin argues that the agency failed to consider her
    14   country conditions evidence, the evidence confirms a one
    15   child family planning policy in China in 1999 but does not
    16   resolve the inconsistencies about Lin’s own experience.          See
    17   Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008)
    18   (agency need not “expressly parse or refute on the record
    19   each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the
    20   petitioner”).
    21
    6
    1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    3   stays VACATED.
    4                               FOR THE COURT:
    5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    6                               Clerk of Court
    7