Bosel v. Garland ( 2021 )

19-172
Bosel v. Garland
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A205 614 579
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 25th day of March, two thousand twenty-one.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNY CHIN,
8 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 HOM PRASAD BOSEL,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 19-172
17 NAC
18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.*
21 _____________________________________
22
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Jason Schaffer, Esq., Mungoven &
25 Associates, P.C., New York, NY.
26
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Merrick B. Garland is automatically
substituted as Respondent.
1 FOR RESPONDENT: Liza S. Murcia , Senior Litigation
2 Counsel; Raya Jarawan, Trial
3 Attorney, Office of Immigration
4 Litigation, United States
5 Department of Justice, Washington,
6 DC.
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
10 is DENIED.
11 Petitioner Hom Prasad Bosel, a native and citizen of
12 Nepal, seeks review of a December 18, 2018 decision of the
13 BIA affirming a November 22, 2017 decision of an Immigration
14 Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding
15 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
16 (“CAT”). In re Hom Prasad Bosel, No. A205 614 579 (B.I.A.
17 Dec. 18, 2018), aff’g No. A 205 614 579 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C.
18 Nov. 22, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
19 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
20 We review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA
21 under the substantial evidence standard, and we review
22 questions of law de novo. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
23 Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).
24
2
1 Where, as here, the agency found past persecution, an
2 asylum applicant has a rebuttable presumption of a well-
3 founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
4 § 1208.13(b)(1). † The government may rebut that presumption
5 if it shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that
6 there has been “a fundamental change in circumstances such
7 that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of
8 persecution in [his or her] country of nationality,” or that
9 the applicant could avoid future persecution “by relocating
10 to another part of [his or her] country of nationality . . .,
11 and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to
12 expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–
13 (ii). Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports
14 the agency’s relocation finding, we do not reach its changed
15 circumstances determination. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429
16 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies
17 are not required to make findings on issues the decision of
18 which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
19 The record supports the agency’s conclusion that Bosel
20 could reasonably relocate within Nepal to avoid future
† All citations are to the version of the regulations in effect at
the time of the IJ’s decision.
3
1 persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); Singh v.
2 BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Asylum in the United
3 States is not available to obviate re-location to sanctuary
4 in one’s own country.”). In determining the reasonableness
5 of relocation, the agency may consider, among other factors,
6 “whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the
7 place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife
8 within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial
9 infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and
10 cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social
11 and familial ties.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). The agency
12 considered Bosel’s ability to relocate, noting that he had
13 relocated and remained unharmed for two extended periods in
14 different parts of Nepal. Bosel relocated to Parbat in
15 August 2005 and remained unharmed but politically active
16 until returning to his hometown in June 2007. And he lived
17 unharmed in Kathmandu for 20 months before leaving for the
18 United States despite allegations that the Maoists knew his
19 location. Given that Bosel previously successfully avoided
20 persecution by relocating within Nepal, the agency reasonably
21 concluded that the government rebutted the presumption of
4
1 future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3); Singh, 435
2 F.3d at 219. This conclusion is dispositive of asylum,
3 withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder,
4 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).
5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
6 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
7 stays VACATED.
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
10 Clerk of Court
5