Fowlkes v. Thomas , 667 F.3d 270 ( 2012 )

10-5192
Fowlkes v. Thomas
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
_______________
August Term, 2011
(Submitted: December 12, 2011 Decided: January 31, 2012)
________________________________________________________
FELIPE OTEZE FOWLKES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
—v.—
PAUL THOMAS, District Manager &
JOHN ADAMEC, Counselor,
Defendants-Appellees,
JOSEPH F. GIBBONS, Administrative Law Judge,
Defendant
Docket No. 10-5192-pr
________________________________________________________
B e f o r e : SACK, KATZMANN, PARKER, Circuit Judges.
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Plaintiff-Appellant Felipe Oteze Fowlkes appeals from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.) denying his motion “for compliance”
with a June 29, 2007 Order of an Administrative Law Judge awarding Fowlkes $9,785.37 in past
social security benefits. We hold that the Social Security Administration is barred by the No Social
Security Benefits for Prisoners Act, Pub. L. No. 111-115, 123 Stat. 3029 (2009) (the “Act”), from
tendering payment to Fowlkes while he remains incarcerated, even though the underlying obligation
to pay arose before the Act’s enactment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant: FELIPE OTEZE FOWLKES, pro se, Shirley, MA
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees: KRISTINA COHN, Special Assistant United States
Attorney (Stephen P. Conte, Regional Chief Counsel -
Region II, Social Security Administration, of counsel),
for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the
Northern District of New York, Syracuse, N.Y.
_______________
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Felipe Oteze Fowlkes, pro se and incarcerated, appeals the district court’s
order denying his post-judgment motion for an order directing the Social Security Administration
(the “SSA”) to re-tender a check for retroactive supplemental social security benefits that he is
owed. We hold that the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act (or the “Act”), Pub. L. No.
111-115, 123 Stat. 3029 (2009), bars the SSA from making any payment to an incarcerated
individual covered by the Act, regardless of when the underlying obligation to pay the individual
arose. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Fowlkes motion.
In April 2002, Fowlkes, pro se and incarcerated, filed a complaint against John Adamec and
Paul Thomas, two SSA officials, and Joseph F. Gibbons, an SSA administrative law judge (“ALJ”),
alleging, inter alia, that his supplemental social security benefits had been improperly suspended in
March 2000 on the erroneous conclusion that he was a fugitive felon, and that this suspension
constituted a violation of his right to due process. The district court granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss the complaint, determining, among other things, that Fowlkes was not seeking relief in the
form of a remand to the SSA. Fowlkes appealed, and, in December 2005, this Court affirmed in part
and remanded in part, holding that the district court had properly dismissed Fowlkes’s due process
claims, but that the court should have construed the remainder of his complaint as a petition for
review of an adverse SSA determination. See Fowlkes v. Adamec, 432 F.3d 90, 95, 98 (2d Cir.
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2005). Accordingly, we remanded to the district court with instructions that the case be further
remanded to the SSA for additional proceedings. Id. at 98.
On remand, by Order dated June 29, 2007, an SSA ALJ held that there was no evidence that
Fowlkes had been a fugitive felon, and that Fowles was therefore retroactively entitled to past
supplemental social security benefits. In the Notice of Award, dated December 11, 2007, the SSA
wrote “you are now eligible for SSI payments . . . . We are sending you your first SSI check of
$9,785.37.” The US Treasury then sent a check dated December 12, 2007 in that amount to Fowlkes
at his prison address. When the check arrived at the prison, Fowlkes alleges that it was
“intercepted” by prison authorities, who told Fowlkes that, pursuant to prison regulations, he could
only endorse the check and deposit it into his inmate account. However, because he wanted to send
the check to a person or a bank outside of the prison, Fowlkes refused to deposit the check into his
inmate account and, in a letter dated January 3, 2008, the prison authorities returned the check to the
SSA. In a correspondence dated January 7, 2008, the SSA acknowledged the receipt of the returned
check. Subsequently, Fowlkes filed complaints with the Commissioner of the SSA and the United
States Treasury Department to have the check returned, but was informed that he was no longer
entitled to receive the check while incarcerated. In November 2010, Fowlkes filed the instant
motion in the Northern District Court of New York seeking an order directing the SSA to re-tender
the check to him.
Although we generally review a district court’s decision on a post-judgment motion for
abuse of discretion, “where the determination is based upon a legal interpretation, de novo review is
appropriate.” Mortimer Off Shore Servs. v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 615 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir.
2010), cert denied, 131 S Ct. 1502 (2011).
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On December 15, 2009, Congress enacted the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act
with the express purpose of “prohibit[ing] retroactive payments to individuals during periods for
which such individuals are prisoners.” Pub. L. No. 111-115, pmbl., 123 Stat. 3029, 3029 (2009). To
that end, § 2(b) of the Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b), which addresses, inter alia, the procedure
to be used by the SSA when it is determined that a recipient of supplemental social security
disability benefits has been underpaid. See Pub. L. No. 111-115, § 2(b). Specifically, the Act
provides that:
In the case of payment of less than the correct amount of benefits to or on behalf of
any individual, no payment shall be made to such individual pursuant to this
subsection during any period for which such individual–
(i) is not an eligible individual . . . because such individual is an inmate of
a public institution that is a jail, prison, or other penal institution or
correctional facility . . .
until such individual is no longer considered an ineligible individual . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(7)(A). The Act also provides that it “shall be effective for payments that
would otherwise be made on or after the date of . . . enactment of this Act.” Pub. L. No. 111-115,
§ 2(c).
Where the words of a statute are unambiguous, our inquiry is generally confined to the text
itself. See Universal Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Statutory interpretation
always begins with the plain language of the statute, assuming the statute is unambiguous.”). Here,
the text of the Act is clear: an incarcerated individual who has been underpaid social security
benefits may not receive payment of those benefits until he or she is released from prison. In
particular, we read the relevant statutory language, that the Act “shall be effective for payments that
would otherwise be made” after the date of the Act’s enactment, as clearly stating that no payments
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shall be made to prisoners after the Act’s enactment, even if the underlying obligation to pay
predates the Act. Accordingly, because the SSA’s issuance of a check constitutes a “payment,” the
SSA is barred under the plain language of § 1383(b)(7)(A) from tendering a check to Fowlkes until
he is released from prison. The fact that SSA had attempted to pay Fowlkes in 2007, before the
Act’s enactment, does not affect this result. To pay Fowlkes now would require SSA to re-tender a
check to him while he remains “an inmate of a public institution that is a jail, prison, or other penal
institution or correctional facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(7)(A). The text of the Act clearly bars
such payments, without exception. See id. (“no payment shall be made . . . during any period” in
which an individual is incarcerated).
Moreover, even if we were to find the text of the Act ambiguous, which we do not, the Act’s
legislative history makes clear that Congress intended to prohibit any payments of social security
benefits to prisoners, without exception, after the Act’s effective date. In particular, during the
floor debate in the House of Representatives, the Act’s House co-sponsors emphasized the “need
for this law to be done quickly . . . because . . . [w]ithout this legislation, the [SSA] will be
obligated under court order to make payments to some [incarcerated individuals] as early as next
week.” 155 Cong. Rec. H13,596 (2009) (statement of Rep. Tanner); see also id. at H13,597
(statement of Rep. Herger) (“The bill before us would immediately prevent checks for past-due
Social Security and SSI benefits from being sent to currently incarcerated individuals, including
checks that, without this action, could pay inmates tens of thousands of dollars while they are
behind bars”). Accordingly, in an effort to ensure that the SSA would be immediately barred from
making any payments of retroactively-issued social security benefits to prisoners, the House of
Representatives suspended its rules and passed the Act on the same day it was introduced for
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debate. See id. This legislative history strongly indicates that Congress intended the Act to bar
retroactive payments of social security benefits even in cases where, like here, the SSA had made
an unsuccessful attempt to render payment over two years before the date of the Act’s enactment.
Finally, the Act is not impermissibly retroactive because it directs only that social security
benefit payments be held until an individual is “no longer considered . . . ineligible” to receive
benefit payments under the Act, through their release from incarceration. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(b)(7)(A). Accordingly, the Act alters only the procedure and timing by which certain
individuals receive their retroactive social security benefit payments; it does not affect their
substantive right to those benefits. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994)
(“A statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from
conduct antedating the statute’s enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, the
court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment.”) (internal citation and footnote omitted)). And the Act did not “impose new
duties with respect to transactions already completed,” id. at 280, because Fowlkes had not
completed the payment transaction by accepting the funds prior to the Act’s effective date.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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