Brown v. Vitucci ( 2023 )

22-1070-cv
Brown v. Vitucci
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of April, two thousand
twenty-three.
PRESENT:
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Chief Judge,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
ROBERT D. SACK,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Linford A. Brown, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Crown Acquisition Holding Corp.,
Plaintiff,
v. 22-1070
Christopher Vitucci, B.C.A. Leasing, Ltd.,
B.C. Benjamin Auto Sales, Inc., Det.
Manuel F. Nash, Det. Glen T. Kenah,
individually and in their professional
capacity, County of Nassau,
Defendants-Cross-
Claimants-Cross-
Defendants-Appellees. *
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Linford A. Brown, Jr.,
pro se, Valley Stream,
NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-CROSS-CLAIMANTS- Scott H. Mandel, Esq.,
CROSS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES LaBonte Law Group,
CHRISTOPHER VITUCCI AND PLLC, Jericho, NY.
B.C.A. LEASING, LTD.:
FOR DEFENDANT-CROSS-CLAIMANT- No appearance.
CROSS-DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
B.C. BENJAMIN AUTO SALES,
INC.:
FOR DEFENDANTS-CROSS-CLAIMANTS- Robert F. Van der Waag,
CROSS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES Stephen Carlin,
DET. NASH, DET. KENAH, AND Samantha A. Goetz,
COUNTY OF NASSAU: Deputy County
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
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Attorneys, for Hon.
Thomas A. Adams,
Nassau County
Attorney, Mineola, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Hurley, Judge; Shields, Magistrate Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Appellant Linford A. Brown, Jr., proceeding pro se on appeal, brought this
action in connection with a dispute over his lease of a Bentley after two Nassau
County detectives arrested him for unauthorized use of a vehicle. He named the
two detectives as defendants, along with Nassau County; two companies
associated with the lease; and the companies’ owner, Christopher Vitucci, whose
police report led to Brown’s arrest. A magistrate judge recommended granting
summary judgment to the defendants on Brown’s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 and state-law claims, and denying Brown’s cross-motion for summary
judgment on those claims. The district court adopted that recommendation in
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substantial part, except that it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Brown’s state law contract and quasi-contract claims. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
issues on appeal.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 1 Garcia v. Hartford Police
Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “Summary judgment is
proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A decision declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Shahriar v.
Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 243 (2d Cir. 2011). “[W]e liberally
construe . . . briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise
the strongest arguments they suggest.” 2 McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864
1Brown does not raise any separate arguments about the denial of his cross-
motion for summary judgment.
2Because Brown was represented by counsel in the district court, however, his
district court filings are not entitled to the same liberal construction.
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F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
I. Section 1981
Brown, who is African American, alleges that the detective defendants
interfered with his right to enjoy the benefits of his lease in violation of § 1981,
which “outlaws discrimination with respect to the enjoyment of benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of a contractual relationship.” Patterson v.
County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2004). To avoid summary judgment
on a § 1981 claim, there must be a genuine dispute as to whether the defendants
“inten[ded] to discriminate on the basis of race.” Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Brown argues that this discriminatory intent may be inferred from the
detectives’ conduct because, he maintains, they did not carefully investigate
whether he was legitimately in possession of the Bentley or whether a portion of
the lease that Vitucci showed them was forged, and they interrogated him after he
retained counsel. We disagree. No reasonable jury could draw an inference of
racial discrimination from these facts alone; absent some evidence that the
defendants acted differently toward people who are not African American, the
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mere fact that they may have acted negligently or wrongfully toward an African
American person does not suggest racial animus. Brown has not identified any
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that suggests any intent to discriminate based
on his race. Accordingly, because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as
to discriminatory intent, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
the detectives on Brown’s § 1981 claim.
II. Section 1983
A. False Arrest
In analyzing § 1983 false arrest claims, we generally look to the tort law of
the state in which the arrest occurred. Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196,
203, 208 (2d Cir. 2007). Probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest
claim in New York. See Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458 (1975). “Probable
cause exists when an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient
to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”
People v. Maldonado, 86 N.Y.2d 631, 635 (1995) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In determining whether there was probable cause, the Court
must consider the totality of the circumstances, reviewing “plainly exculpatory
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evidence alongside inculpatory evidence to ensure the court has a full sense of the
evidence that led the officer to believe that there was probable cause to make an
arrest.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). This standard does not “demand that an officer’s
good-faith belief that a person has committed a crime be ‘correct or more likely
true than false.’” Mara v. Rilling, 921 F.3d 48, 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)).
The district court correctly determined that the detective defendants had
probable cause to arrest Brown. As relevant here, a person is guilty of
unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third decree under N.Y. Penal Law § 165.05(3)
when that person has possession of a vehicle pursuant to an agreement to return
it to the owner at a specified time, but intentionally retains possession without the
owner’s consent “for so lengthy a period beyond the specified time as to render
such retention . . . a gross deviation from the agreement.” Vitucci’s statements
gave the detectives a reasonable basis to believe that Brown committed this crime.
Vitucci affirmed that his company owned the Bentley and leased it to Brown;
Brown had defaulted by missing the past eight monthly payments on the lease;
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the lease had converted to a weekly rental upon the default; Vitucci had demanded
the Bentley’s return; and Brown still had the Bentley despite lacking permission to
use it. See Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that
information from a putative victim that a crime was committed can establish
probable cause “unless the circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s [reliability
or] veracity” (citation omitted)). Vitucci supported his statements by showing the
detectives a lease agreement.
Brown argues that he faxed evidence showing his innocence to the Nassau
County Police Department, in the form of the lease agreement and a copy of a
check. But that information was not obviously exculpatory. Even if the police
knew the check was delivered and applied only to then-future payments, it was
still for less than Brown owed under the lease between the check’s date and the
date the fax was sent. And even if—as Brown argues—an addendum in the
version of the lease that Vitucci presented was both necessary to establish probable
cause and was a forgery, there is no evidence a reasonable officer would have had
reason to believe the document was inauthentic. Finally, Detective Nash’s
decision not to arrest Brown during their first interaction does not establish a lack
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of probable cause; a police officer is not required to make an arrest in every
instance where there is probable cause to believe a crime has occurred. See Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 759–62 (2005) (discussing the “well
established tradition of police discretion” over whether to make an arrest).
B. Property Seizure
Brown next argues that the detective defendants are liable for a violation of
his due process rights in connection with the Bentley’s seizure, because they
reported the Bentley as a stolen vehicle in a police database, resulting in its later
seizure by a New Jersey police department. Assuming without deciding that the
report established personal involvement in the initial seizure sufficient for
liability, the district court was nonetheless correct to conclude that there was no
underlying constitutional violation because there existed probable cause for the
Bentley’s initial seizure for the same reasons there was probable cause for Brown’s
arrest. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (probable cause to seize property exists when
“the facts available to the officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution
in the belief that [the seized] items may be contraband or stolen property or useful
as evidence of a crime” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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C. Equal Protection
“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race.” Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 162 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)). Brown argues that the detective defendants
would have treated him differently if he was not African American. But, as
already discussed, he does not identify any evidence from which a reasonable jury
could so conclude. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary
judgment to the detectives on Brown’s § 1983 equal protection claim.
D. Municipal Liability
To prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused a
claimed constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692–
94 (1978). The district court properly granted summary judgment to the County
on Brown’s Monell claim because he did not show that a constitutional violation
occurred, pursuant to a municipal policy or otherwise. See Segal v. City of New
York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
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III. Sections 1985 and 1986
The district court also properly granted summary judgment to the
defendants on Brown’s §§ 1985(3) and 1986 claims. To prevail on a § 1985(3)
claim, a plaintiff must show, among other things, a conspiracy “motivated by some
racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus.” Cine
SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
As discussed above, there is no evidence that the detective defendants had
such a motivation. As to Vitucci and the two companies, Brown argues that racial
animus may be inferred because they had never pursued criminal charges against
another lessee. That is not a reasonable inference, because Brown does not point
to any evidence that the defendants’ other lessees were of different races or—if
they were of different races—evidence that they were similarly situated in other
respects. Brown also appears to argue that racial animus may be inferred because
these defendants acted wrongfully toward him by forging the lease addendum,
presenting it to the police, and accepting the Bentley following its seizure. But
even assuming that these were all wrongful acts (and that Brown has preserved
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these arguments), the fact that a wrong was directed at a person of a particular
race does not, without more, reasonably suggest the wrongdoer was motivated by
the victim’s race. In the absence of a viable § 1985 claim, Brown’s § 1986 claim
also fails. See Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that
“a § 1986 claim is contingent on a valid § 1985 claim”).
IV. Abandonment of State Claims
In his appellate brief, Brown challenges the magistrate judge’s
recommended disposition of his state contract and quasi-contract claims, but not
the district court’s decision to instead decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over these claims. He has thus abandoned any challenge to that decision. 3 See
LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995) (treating issue not
raised in pro se appellate brief as abandoned). Brown also has not challenged on
appeal the district court’s ruling that he abandoned his other state claims.
Accordingly, those claims are also abandoned. See id.3 In any event, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims after it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction here.
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V. Judicial Bias
Finally, to the extent that Brown argues that the magistrate judge and
district court were biased against him, “judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis” for questioning a judge’s impartiality, and we see no
reason to find improper bias here. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
* * *
We have considered Brown’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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