Lewis v. Lynch ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •     15-2133
    Lewis v. Lynch
    BIA
    Cheng, IJ
    A095 989 875
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    19th day of October , two thousand sixteen.
    PRESENT:
    RALPH K. WINTER,
    ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    WAYNE LEWIS,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                              15-2133
    NAC
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                      Audrey A. Thomas, Rosedale, New
    York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                      Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General; John W.
    Blakeley, Assistant Director; W.
    Daniel Shieh, Trial Attorney, Office
    of Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    Petitioner Wayne Lewis, a native and citizen of Trinidad
    and Tobago, seeks review of a June 3, 2015, decision of the BIA
    affirming a September 9, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge
    (“IJ”) denying Lewis’s motion to rescind his removal order
    entered in absentia.         In re Wayne Lewis, No. A095 989 875
    (B.I.A. June 3, 2015), aff’g No. A095 989 875 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.
    City Sept. 9, 2014).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with
    the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the
    BIA.    See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
    We review the agency’s denial of a motion to rescind for abuse
    of discretion.    See Alrefae v. Chertoff, 
    471 F.3d 353
    , 357 (2d
    Cir. 2006).    An order of removal entered in absentia “may be
    rescinded only--(i) upon a motion to reopen filed within 180
    days after the date of the order of removal if the alien
    demonstrates    that   the    failure   to   appear   was   because   of
    exceptional circumstances . . ., or (ii) upon a motion to reopen
    2
    filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that the alien did
    not receive notice . . . and the failure to appear was through
    no fault of the alien.”    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C).    Because
    Lewis’s attorney of record had notice of his October 2010
    hearing, his motion to rescind the IJ’s removal order entered
    in absentia at that hearing was subject to the 180-day time
    limit, and he was required to demonstrate that exceptional
    circumstances excused his failure to appear.       See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(b)(5)(C); Song Jin Wu v. INS, 
    436 F.3d 157
    , 162 (2d Cir.
    2006).
    It is undisputed that Lewis’s 2014 motion to rescind was
    untimely filed more than three years after his 2010 removal
    order.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).    Equitable tolling
    of the time to file may be available for claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel.    See Cekic v. INS, 
    435 F.3d 167
    , 170 (2d
    Cir. 2006).   The agency did not err in finding no basis for
    tolling.
    In order to warrant tolling, an alien is required to
    demonstrate “due diligence” in pursuing his claim during “both
    the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel
    was or should have been discovered and the period from that point
    3
    until the motion to reopen is filed.”    Rashid v. Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 127
    , 132 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Cekic, 
    435 F.3d at 170
    .
    Lewis failed to demonstrate due diligence.     He did not assert
    that he took any action in his case during the more than three
    years that passed between the IJ ordering him removed in
    absentia in October 2010 and his filing of a motion to rescind
    in April 2014.    See Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 
    508 F.3d 710
    , 715-16
    (2d Cir. 2007).   Lewis’s separate claim that he failed to appear
    due to illness provides no ground for equitable tolling.
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for oral argument
    in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    4