Oluyomi v. Napolitano , 481 F. App'x 693 ( 2012 )

11-4036-cv(L)
Oluyomi v. Napolitano
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 29th day of August, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT: REENA RAGGI,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ALABA OLUYOMI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Nos. 11-4036-cv(L);
11-4097-cv(CON)
JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
FOR APPELLANT: Alaba Oluyomi, pro se, Lawrenceville, New Jersey.
FOR APPELLEES: James Nicholas Boeving, Benjamin H. Torrance,
Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara,
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, New York, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (Gabriel W. Gorenstein, Magistrate Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment entered on August 11, 2011, is AFFIRMED.
In these consolidated cases, Alaba Oluyomi, an African American man of Nigerian
descent, appeals pro se from an award of summary judgment against him—and from the
denial of his own cross-motion for summary judgment—on his Title VII claims of unlawful
discrimination and retaliation relating to his being denied a pair of promotions and suspended
twice from his position as an adjudication officer with the Naturalization Unit in the New
York Field Office of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in the Department
of Homeland Security. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior
proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.
We review decisions on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo, examining
each party’s motion “on its own merits” and drawing all permissible inferences “against the
party whose motion is under consideration.” Chandok v. Klessig, 632 F.3d 803, 812 (2d Cir.
2011). We will uphold the district court’s ruling only if the record reveals “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact” and the prevailing party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Having conducted an independent review of the record in light
of these principles, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants for substantially
the reasons stated by Magistrate Judge Gorenstein in his thorough and well-reasoned opinion.
See Oluyomi v. Napolitano, 811 F. Supp. 2d 926 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
2
Oluyomi’s arguments on appeal do not alter our conclusion. Oluyomi contends that
the district court failed to “accept” or “consider” the evidence he submitted in support of his
opposition and cross-motion below, because the magistrate judge “did not make clear” that
Oluyomi’s belated Local Rule 56.1 statement and declaration attesting to the authenticity of
his exhibits were filed as of April 14, 2011, the date he originally submitted his motion
papers, rather than on August 10, 2011, the date that appears on the docket sheet. This
argument is meritless. The district court’s opinion specifically states that, by submitting the
declaration and 56.1 statement in August 2011, Oluyomi had “cur[ed] the defects of his
previous motion.” Id. at 930. The opinion thereafter references and relies upon Oluyomi’s
various exhibits. See id. at 942–47. Moreover, our own independent review reveals no
evidence adduced by Oluyomi that raises a triable issue of fact on whether defendants’
proffered reasons for their challenged promotion and suspension decisions were pretexts for
unlawful discrimination or retaliation.
Oluyomi argues that two co-workers’ affidavits support his position that defendants’
justifications for not promoting him to the Senior Adjudication Officer (Temporary) position
were pretextual. But in their affidavits, both co-workers conceded that they played no part
in the hiring process for that position and, thus, that they lacked personal knowledge of both
the selection criteria and the specifics of Oluyomi’s interview. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)
(requiring that affidavit supporting or opposing summary judgment motion be made on
personal knowledge); accord Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir.
1988).
3
Finally, because summary judgment was proper regarding Oluyomi’s claim that his
one-day suspension was the product of illegal discrimination or retaliation, his argument that
the ensuing 14-day suspension cannot be legal, as it was based on his disobeying the
conditions of a prior unlawful suspension, fails as a matter of law.
We have considered all of Oluyomi’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
4