Gong v. Holder , 440 F. App'x 41 ( 2011 )


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  • 10-2788-ag
    Gong v. Holder
    BIA
    Nelson, IJ
    A088 775 825
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
    A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand eleven.
    PRESENT:
    RALPH K. WINTER,
    REENA RAGGI,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    HAI LIN GONG
    Petitioner,
    v.                                     10-2788-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                Ke-en Wang, New York, NY
    FOR RESPONDENT:                Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Michelle G. Latour,
    Assistant Director, Nairi S.
    Gruzenski, Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, U.S.
    Department of Justice, Washington
    D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
    Hai Lin Gong, a native and citizen of the People’s
    Republic of China, seeks review of the June 17, 2010 order
    of the BIA affirming the September 12, 2008, decision of
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Barbara A. Nelson denying his
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re Hai Lin
    Gong, No. A088 775 825 (B.I.A. June 17, 2010), aff’g No.
    A088 775 825 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 12, 2008).     We
    assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    and procedural history in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions.   See Yun-Zui Guan v.
    Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 391
    , 394 (2d Cir. 2005).     The applicable
    standards of review are well-established.     See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1252(b)(4)(B); Corovic v. Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 90
    , 95 (2d
    Cir. 2008).
    As an initial matter, we dismiss the petition for
    review to the extent that Gong challenges the denial of his
    application for asylum.   We do not have jurisdiction to
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    review the agency’s pretermission of that application as
    untimely because Gong has not raised any constitutional
    claim or question of law regarding that ruling.    See 8
    U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (providing that no court shall have
    jurisdiction to review the agency’s finding that an asylum
    application was untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B));
    
    id. § 1252(a)(2)(D)
    (providing that courts of appeals retain
    jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions
    of law); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 328-29 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a question of law
    is not implicated “when the petition for review essentially
    disputes the correctness of an IJ’s fact-finding or the
    wisdom of his exercise of discretion”).
    We deny the remainder of Gong’s petition.     The agency’s
    adverse credibility determination is based on substantial
    evidence given inconsistencies in Gong’s testimony and
    inconsistencies between his testimony and his written
    application, as well as the IJ’s demeanor finding.    See
    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that an adverse
    credibility determination may be based on “the consistency
    between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
    statements . . ., the internal consistency of each such
    statement, the consistency of such statements with other
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    evidence of record . . ., and any inaccuracies or falsehoods
    in such statements, without regard to whether an
    inconsistency . . . goes to the heart of the applicant’s
    claim”).     As the agency found, Gong’s written application
    indicated that in China he worked as a construction worker
    from 1995 to 2005, and Gong testified on direct examination
    that he worked as a construction worker and that he only
    reached a level of education equivalent to the ninth grade
    in the United States.     But he testified on cross-examination
    that he worked as a school principal.     See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).     The agency reasonably relied on this
    inconsistency because Gong’s explanation – that he did not
    include his work as a school principal on his written
    application because a legal assistant instructed him to list
    only what was contained in his corroborating documents and
    he did not have documentation of his employment as a school
    principal – did not address why when he was originally asked
    about his employment in China he testified that he was a
    construction worker and did not mention that he was a school
    principal.     See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80–81 (2d
    Cir. 2005) (holding that the agency need not credit an
    applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless
    those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to
    do so).
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    Given this inconsistency, in conjunction with the IJ’s
    demeanor finding that Gong was hesitant and unresponsive, to
    which we give “particular deference,” and which Gong does
    not challenge, see Dong Gao v. B.I.A., 
    482 F.3d 122
    , 126–27
    (2d Cir. 2007), the agency’s adverse credibility
    determination is supported by substantial evidence, see 8
    U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008).       Thus, the agency properly
    denied withholding of removal and CAT relief.       See 
    Majidi, 430 F.3d at 81
    –82 (concluding that petitioner failed to
    establish, inter alia, eligibility for withholding of
    removal because substantial evidence supported the agency’s
    adverse credibility finding); Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 155-57 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that when the same
    factual assertions are needed for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and CAT relief, an adverse credibility finding
    regarding those assertions forecloses all forms of relief).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.       As we have completed
    our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously
    granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion
    for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is
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    DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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