Allen v. Stringer ( 2021 )

20-3953-cv
Allen v. Stringer
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 30th day of September, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT:
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges,
JOHN G. KOELTL,
District Judge.*
_____________________________________
Doran Allen,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 20-3953
Scott M. Stringer, New York City Comptroller,
Warden AMKC-C-95,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Doran Allen, pro se, Ossining NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance.
* Judge John G. Koeltl of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, sitting by designation.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Stanton, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Doran Allen, proceeding pro se, sued Scott M. Stringer, in his capacity as New
York City Comptroller, and the unnamed warden of the Rikers Island Anna M. Kross Center
(“AMKC”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Allen alleges that, while he was detained at AMKC, a corrections officer refused to
help him carry breakfast trays, causing him to slip and fall on broken stairs, injuring himself. The
district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Zaleski v. Burns, 606 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2010). Under that statute, the district
court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it determines that the action “(i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (recognizing that “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a
viable claim). Pro se submissions are reviewed with “special solicitude,” and “must be construed
liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted).
Conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir.
2017). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective prong and a subjective
prong. See id. The objective prong requires “showing that the challenged conditions were
sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations of the right to due process,” while the
subjective prong requires “showing that [an] officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to
the challenged conditions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If a conditions-of-
confinement claim is predicated on an unsafe condition, a court will analyze “whether society
considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
Allen alleges that he slipped or tripped on broken stairs, causing him to fall. But while
the existence of broken stairs could be deemed to constitute negligence on the part of the prison,
broken stairs alone cannot satisfy the objective prong of a conditions-of-confinement claim. See
McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that the defendant’s complaint
alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement after a slip and fall in an icy prison yard did
not show “exceptional circumstances” that would “elevate” the conditions “beyond the typical
level of danger presented by a slippery sidewalk or a wet floor”). Because broken stairs cannot
be considered a risk that is “so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency,” Allen’s
conditions-of-confinement claim was properly dismissed. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
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But even if it could be argued that Allen alleged an objectively serious condition, the
district court properly dismissed Allen’s claims against Stringer and the AMKC warden due to the
obvious deficiencies in Allen’s complaint. As the district court concluded, the suit against the
warden in his official capacity was more properly a suit against the City of New York because
Allen did not allege that the warden personally had done or failed to do anything that violated his
rights. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits against state officials in their official
capacity . . . should be treated as suits against the State.”). Similarly, Stringer, as the New York
City Comptroller, is sued in his official capacity. Allen was therefore obligated to allege
sufficient facts showing that the Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred “pursuant to a
municipal policy or custom,” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692–94 (1978)), or was caused by
a “failure to train,” Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell,
436 U.S. at 694). Allen did not allege any facts showing that the corrections officer acted pursuant
to an unconstitutional policy or custom, or that the City of New York failed to train its corrections
officers, as required for such a claim.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state-law claims because the district court properly dismissed Allen’s § 1983
claim, the only claim over which it had original jurisdiction. See Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian
Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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Finally, the district court did not err by denying Allen leave to amend his complaint. A
district court should not dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint without granting leave to amend
“when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
discussed above, the incident involving the corrections officer and the broken steps did not amount
to a due process violation, and that deficiency in the complaint cannot not be cured. Accordingly,
amendment would have been futile.
We have considered all of Allen’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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