United States v. Kunz ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • 21-2577-cr
    United States of America v. Kunz
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    August Term, 2022
    Argued: November 30, 2022          Decided: May 22, 2023
    Docket No. 21-2577-cr
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    — v. —
    VICTOR C. KUNZ
    Defendant-Appellant.
    B e f o r e:
    LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, CALABRESI and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-Appellant Victor C. Kunz appeals from a judgment of the
    United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.)
    imposing, among other things, special conditions of supervised release making
    Kunz’s internet and computer access contingent on his compliance with
    computer monitoring terms devised by the U.S. Probation Office. Kunz
    challenges both the court’s special conditions themselves, and the computer
    monitoring terms they contemplate, on procedural reasonableness, substantive
    reasonableness, and improper delegation grounds. Although Kunz’s appeal
    raises legitimate concerns, nearly all of those concerns can be resolved by
    construing his computer monitoring restrictions to avoid the troublesome
    implications that, in a few cases, an expansive reading might suggest. We
    therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment as so construed.
    TIFFANY H. LEE, Assistant United States Attorney, for Trini E.
    Ross, United States Attorney for the Western District of
    New York, Buffalo, NY, for Appellee.
    ANNE M. BURGER, Federal Public Defender’s Office,
    Western District of New York, Rochester, NY,
    for Defendant-Appellant.
    GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant-Appellant Victor C. Kunz (“Kunz”), a convicted sex offender,
    challenges the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district
    court (Charles J. Siragusa, J.) in response to Kunz’s latest in a long string of
    supervised release violations. He targets several facets of his court-ordered
    computer monitoring obligations, arguing that his restrictions are both
    procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and that the district court
    2
    impermissibly delegated its judicial authority to the U.S. Probation Office
    (“Probation”) by imposing them. We agree that an expansive reading of certain
    of Probation’s Computer and Internet Monitoring Program (“CIMP”) terms
    themselves, as well as the court-imposed special conditions requiring Kunz’s
    compliance with those terms in order to access the internet, raise a number of
    legitimate concerns. Nonetheless, because we believe that a sensible reading of
    the restrictions neutralizes the most troubling of those concerns, we AFFIRM the
    judgment of the district court as construed in the manner set forth below.
    BACKGROUND
    I.     Kunz’s Past Offenses
    The violation prompting the sentence at issue here is the latest in a series of
    supervised release violations committed by Kunz, a 44-year-old man from
    Pittsford, New York. In 2005, Kunz pled guilty to one count of possession of child
    pornography, admitting to the receipt of images containing child pornography
    over the internet. Later that year, he was sentenced to 71 months’ imprisonment
    and a life term of supervised release, subject to special conditions that included
    computer monitoring. He was released from prison and into supervised release
    in December 2009.
    3
    Between 2010 and 2017, Kunz was accused of several violations of his
    supervised release (“VOSR”), including failure to comply with both his court-
    ordered sex offender treatment and computer monitoring obligations. He pled
    guilty to violating the sex-offender program conditions five separate times – in
    2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2017 – prompting the district court to revoke his
    supervised release on all five occasions, to sentence him to terms of
    imprisonment ranging from 3 to 12 months, and to gradually reduce the duration
    of his supervised release. In 2017, the district court sentenced Kunz to 9 months’
    imprisonment and 38 years’ supervised release, subject to special conditions that
    included the following:
    The defendant must provide the U.S. Probation Office
    advance notification of any computer(s), automated
    service(s), or connected device(s) that will be used
    during the term of supervision. The U.S. Probation
    Office is authorized to install any application as
    necessary to surveil[] all activity on computer(s) or
    connected device(s) owned or operated by the
    defendant. The U.S. Probation Office shall be notified
    via electronic transmission of impermissible/suspicious
    activity or communications occurring on such computer
    or connected device, consistent with the computer
    monitoring policy in effect by the probation office. As
    triggered by impermissible/suspicious activity, the
    defendant shall consent to and cooperate with
    unannounced examinations of any computer equipment
    4
    owned or used by the defendant.
    App’x 19. Kunz reentered supervised release in July 2018.
    II.   Kunz’s 2021 VOSR Proceeding
    A.     The Violation
    This appeal concerns Kunz’s most recent VOSR proceeding. In February
    2021, Probation reported that Kunz had once more violated his conditions of
    supervised release by again failing to follow the rules of his court-ordered sex-
    offender treatment program. This time, the offending conduct included
    masturbating to pictures of 14-16 year-olds in a high school publication, watching
    prostitutes on the street, using an adult telephone sex chat line, spying on women
    in his neighborhood through their windows using binoculars, and neglecting to
    disclose any of this to his treatment provider or his probation officer. Kunz
    admitted that behavior and pled guilty to the violation. He does not challenge
    any aspect of his sex-offender treatment program on this appeal.
    B.     The Computer and Internet Monitoring Program
    In September 2021, Probation Officer Tom Gilbert emailed to the district
    court several recommendations in advance of Kunz’s upcoming VOSR
    sentencing. First, he proposed a sentence of time served plus a reduced 33-year
    5
    term of supervised release. He assured the court that, apart from “a few issues,”
    Kunz’s “compliance has been good.” Gilbert Email 1. Second, Gilbert suggested
    that because Kunz had originally been sentenced some 15 years earlier, it was
    now “necessary to update his special conditions to reflect both the language and
    philosophy being used in the supervision by the U.S. Probation Office at the
    present time.” Id. He therefore proposed, among other things, a special condition
    barring Kunz from using a computer or the internet unless he agreed to
    participate in the CIMP, or unless authorized by the district court or Probation.
    Id. at 2-3.
    Kunz objected to that proposed special condition. He first took issue with
    language in the proposed condition implying that Probation could unilaterally
    alter the applicable CIMP terms in the future – that Probation “shall be notified
    via electronic transmission of impermissible/suspicious activity . . . consistent with
    the computer monitoring policy in effect by the probation office,” App’x 42-43
    (emphasis added) – which he argued would constitute an impermissible
    delegation of judicial authority. That same language had appeared in past
    iterations of his conditions of supervised release, apparently without objection.
    6
    Separately, Kunz specifically flagged several of the CIMP terms themselves
    as excessive and unworkable. To substantiate that latter point, he submitted an
    unsworn declaration from a digital forensics expert who opined that many of the
    terms were “extremely vague and would be difficult if not impossible for a user
    to comply with as they are currently worded.” Id. at 52. Among the CIMP terms
    relevant to Kunz’s objections were the following:
    1. I, ______, have been placed in the Computer
    Monitoring Program as ordered by the Court. I agree to
    comply with all program rules set forth in this
    agreement, and the instructions of my probation officer.
    I agree to install, or allow to be installed at my own
    expense[,] equipment or software to monitor my
    approved computer or internet ready device. I agree to
    waive any expectations of privacy from the supervising
    probation officer, his or her designee, and the
    monitoring company. . . .
    5. I understand that I may be limited to the possession
    and use of one Internet-capable device. . . .
    7. I shall notify the U.S. Probation Office of any
    alterations to computer(s)/connected device(s) and/or
    passwords/screen names prior to executing change[s]
    (i.e. new programs, email accounts, social networking
    accounts, etc.). . . .
    10. I understand that I will not use any encrypted email
    accounts. . . .
    13. I shall not utilize any service that conceals or spoofs
    my Internet Protocol address. . . .
    7
    15. I agree not to employ any evidence cleaning utility,
    or defragmentation technology unless preapproved by
    [my] probation officer. This includes, but is not limited
    to, utilizing the “system restore” or defragment
    function.
    16. I agree to obtain permission and coordinate with my
    probation officer prior to ALL computer repairs and/or
    alterations to my computer hardware and or software.
    17. I shall not purchase, download, possess and/or
    install any anti-virus, anti-spyware, firewall, and/or
    internet security application without advance[]
    authorization by the U.S. Probation Office and my
    probation officer.
    18. I shall not use any type of encryption unless
    pre-approved by my probation officer. . . .
    21. I shall not alter the current operating system (i.e.
    Windows, Linux, etc.) on any authorized computer
    without pre-approval and authorization from my
    probation officer.
    App’x 48-49.
    C.    Kunz’s Special Conditions
    At his sentencing hearing, Kunz reiterated that while he had “no objection
    to there being computer monitoring” in general, he still strenuously opposed the
    “unworkable” technological constraints embedded in the CIMP terms, App’x 59-
    60, and any “sentence that would incorporate by reference any future new
    programs with new terms that probation comes up with in the future,” id. at 61.
    8
    The district court overruled both objections with little explanation. It
    remarked simply that it was “going to order the conditions proposed by
    probation” and that “they are conditions that we’re ordering now.” Id. at 60.
    Dispensing with Kunz’s counsel’s final plea to “at least remov[e] the sentence
    that would incorporate by reference any future new programs with new terms
    that probation comes up with in the future,” the court replied flatly: “It’s the
    condition that we’ve been ordering in all these kind[s] of cases. . . . I’m going to
    order the conditions as recommended by Probation.” Id. at 61-62.
    With those objections resolved, the district court commended all parties for
    Kunz’s progress: “Victor, I hope you keep going the way you are and I’m sure
    there’s not going to be any other issues . . . .” Id. at 62. “[D]espite the missteps,”
    the court continued, “you’ve always been intent on trying to deal with the issues,
    and that’s certainly to your credit, and . . . I’m sure it’s to Mr. Gilbert’s credit
    too.” Id. at 61. Addressing Kunz’s mother, the court added, “[i]t’s [to] your credit
    too, ma’am.” Id. at 67.
    The court ultimately ordered, as Probation had recommended, a
    time-served sentence accompanied by a 33-year period of supervised release.
    9
    App’x 70-71. Among the court-imposed special conditions was the following,
    which was identical to the language Gilbert had proposed:
    The defendant shall not use or possess any computer,
    data storage device, or any internet capable device
    unless the defendant participates in the Computer and
    Internet Monitoring Program (CIMP), or unless
    authorized by the Court or the U.S. Probation Office.
    The defendant must provide the U.S. Probation Office
    advance notification of any computer(s), automated
    service(s), or connected device(s) that will be used
    during the term of supervision. The U.S. Probation
    Office is authorized to install any application as
    necessary to surveil all activity on computer(s) or
    connected device(s) owned or operated by the
    defendant. The defendant will be required to pay the
    cost of monitoring services. The U.S. Probation Office
    shall be notified via electronic transmission of
    impermissible/suspicious activity or communications
    occurring on such computer or connected device,
    consistent with the computer monitoring policy in effect
    by the probation office. As triggered by
    impermissible/suspicious activity, the defendant shall
    consent to and cooperate with unannounced
    examinations of any computer equipment owned or
    used by the defendant. This examination shall include
    but is not limited to retrieval and copying of all data
    from the computer(s), connected device(s), storage
    media, and any internal or external peripherals, and
    may involve removal of such equipment for the purpose
    of conducting a more thorough inspection. Any such
    monitoring or examinations shall be designed to avoid,
    as much as possible, reading any privileged information
    or any private material that is not illegal or reasonably
    10
    likely to lead to illegal material or evidence related to
    illegal activity.
    App’x 73. This appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    Kunz presents three basic arguments on appeal: (1) that the district court
    failed to adequately justify its decision to order special conditions that were more
    restrictive than those previously imposed; (2) that several of the CIMP terms are
    technically vague or unworkable; and (3) that both the CIMP terms themselves
    and the special condition permitting Probation to unilaterally alter those terms in
    the future constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority. We
    address each argument in turn.
    I.     Legal Standards
    A.    Standard of Review
    “A district court retains wide latitude in imposing conditions of supervised
    release, and we therefore review a decision to impose a condition for abuse of
    discretion.” United States v. MacMillen, 
    544 F.3d 71
    , 74 (2d Cir. 2008).
    Nevertheless, we will “carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions.”
    United States v. McLaurin, 
    731 F.3d 258
    , 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
    11
    marks omitted). And where a challenged condition implicates an issue of law,
    “we review the imposition of that condition de novo, bearing in mind that any
    error of law necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.” MacMillen, 
    544 F.3d at 75
    .
    B.     Conditions of Supervised Release, Generally
    “Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (d), the imposition of certain conditions of
    supervised release is mandatory, but district courts also have discretion to
    impose other, non-mandatory conditions of supervised release, which are
    commonly referred to as ‘special conditions.’” United States v. Browder, 
    866 F.3d 504
    , 510 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). That
    discretion is constrained by 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (d)(1) and Sentencing Guidelines
    § 5D1.3(b), which each require, among other things, that the special conditions be
    “reasonably related” to familiar sentencing factors such as the nature of the
    offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, broader deterrence and
    public protection interests, and various needs of the defendant. Additionally,
    both admonish that special conditions should involve “no greater deprivation of
    liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve those purposes, and should be
    12
    “consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
    Commission.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (d)(2)-(3); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); see also United States
    v. Johnson, 
    529 U.S. 53
    , 59 (2000) (“Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends,
    distinct from those served by incarceration.”).
    For sex offenses involving a computer, those policy statements recommend
    in relevant part special conditions (A) imposing “treatment and monitoring,” (B)
    “limiting the use of a computer or an interactive computer service,” and (C)
    requiring the defendant to “submit to a search, at any time, with or without a
    warrant, . . . of the defendant’s . . . computer, other electronic communication or
    data storage devices or media . . . upon reasonable suspicion concerning a
    violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the
    defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7). Finally, it bears noting that district courts
    retain broad discretion to “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of
    supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term
    of supervised release.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(2).
    II.    Substantive and Procedural Reasonableness
    Kunz’s first set of arguments attack the reasonableness of his special
    conditions. Like other aspects of a sentence, conditions of supervised release are
    13
    reviewed for both substantive and procedural reasonableness. United States v.
    Eaglin, 
    913 F.3d 88
    , 94 (2d Cir. 2019). The procedural inquiry looks to whether the
    sentencing judge has properly accounted for the factors that constrain its
    sentencing discretion; substantive reasonableness examines whether, after
    accounting for those constraints, the district court’s exercise of its discretion can
    be “located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Matta, 
    777 F.3d 116
    , 124 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    A.     Procedural Reasonableness: Failure to Explain
    Although Kunz’s remark that his special conditions are “greater than
    necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing” hints at a substantive
    unreasonableness argument, Appellant’s Br. 17, the crux of his reasonableness
    challenge is procedural. He does not suggest – except through his technology-
    driven arguments, addressed below – that the restrictions are by their nature
    necessarily more restrictive than is called for under these circumstances.1 Rather,
    1
    At oral argument, Kunz’s counsel expressly disavowed any contention that
    Kunz’s computer monitoring obligations violate our edict, under United States v.
    Lifshitz, that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment privacy interests require that
    computer monitoring “be narrowly tailored, and not sweep so broadly as to draw
    a wide swath of extraneous material into its net.” 
    369 F.3d 173
    , 190 (2d Cir. 2004).
    Kunz also “raises no First Amendment challenge and thus waived [that]
    14
    he contends that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to
    impose those restrictions with “particularized findings” that they did not
    “constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to
    accomplish the goals of sentencing.” Id. at 20, quoting Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 124
    . We
    disagree.
    To be sure, the considerable leeway we afford district courts’ substantive
    sentencing choices “is only warranted . . . once we are satisfied that the district
    court complied with . . . procedural requirements, and this requires that we be
    confident that the sentence resulted from the district court’s considered judgment
    as to what was necessary to address the various, often conflicting, purposes of
    argument on appeal.” Browder, 
    866 F.3d at
    511 n.26, citing Packingham v. North
    Carolina, 
    582 U.S. 98
     (2017); see Eaglin, 
    913 F.3d at 96-97
     (recognizing that “in
    modern society, citizens have a First Amendment right to access the Internet,”
    and therefore that “[i]n only highly unusual circumstances will a total Internet
    ban imposed as a condition of supervised release be substantively reasonable”).
    Finally, to the extent Kunz attempts any other generalized substantive
    reasonableness challenge, it fails for the same reasons similar challenges have
    failed for similar defendants. See, e.g., Browder, 
    866 F.3d at 512
     (computer
    monitoring was substantively reasonable because it was “reasonably related
    to . . . the nature and circumstances of the [child pornography] offense and [the
    defendant’s] history and characteristics” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    And as noted above, computer monitoring and computer search conditions are
    generally supported by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.
    15
    sentencing.” United States v. Cavera, 
    550 F.3d 180
    , 189-90 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)
    (emphasis omitted). Thus, “[f]or a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, a
    District Court must make an individualized assessment when determining
    whether to impose a special condition of supervised release, and . . . state on the
    record the reason for imposing it.” Eaglin, 
    913 F.3d at 94
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted); see United States v. Coplan, 
    703 F.3d 46
    , 92 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A
    district court commits procedural error where it . . . fails to adequately explain
    the chosen sentence.”).
    Accordingly, we have held that “[a] district court is required to make an
    individualized assessment when determining whether to impose a special
    condition of supervised release, and to state on the record the reason for
    imposing it.”2 United States v. Betts, 
    886 F.3d 198
    , 202 (2d Cir. 2018); see Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 123
     (“[A]ny condition that affects a significant liberty interest . . . must be
    2
    This is consistent with our approach to sentencing more generally. See United
    States v. Brooks, 
    889 F.3d 95
    , 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Sentences for violations of
    supervised release are reviewed under the same standard as for sentencing
    generally . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have long recognized
    that a remand may be warranted either by a district court’s failure to sufficiently
    explain its reasoning, see, e.g., United States v. Genao, 
    869 F.3d 136
    , 141-42 (2d Cir.
    2017), or by its flawed explanation for imposing a given sentence, see, e.g., United
    States v. Park, 
    758 F.3d 193
    , 199 (2d Cir. 2014).
    16
    imposed by the district court and supported by particularized findings that it
    does not constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to
    accomplish the goals of sentencing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Crucially, though, we have also been careful to qualify that while “the failure to
    do so” is generally “error,” we may nonetheless affirm “if the district court’s
    reasoning is self-evident in the record.” Betts, 
    886 F.3d at 202
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    That carve-out looms large here. Kunz is correct that the immediate
    explanation offered by the district court in the moment – and reiterated when
    pressed by defense counsel – was simply that these were the “conditions that
    we’re ordering now.” App’x 60; see also id. at 62 (“It’s the condition that we’ve
    been ordering in all these kind[s] of cases.”). Under other circumstances, a
    similarly brusque and generalized explanation might indeed amount to
    procedural error.
    But under the circumstances of this case, the rationale for monitoring
    Kunz’s computer access was “self-evident,” Betts, 
    886 F.3d at 202
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted), not just from the details of his original child
    pornography conviction, but also from his prolific record of supervised release
    17
    violations since then (including several alleged violations of his computer
    monitoring restrictions). This was the sixth time in ten years that the same judge
    was tasked with sentencing the same defendant for violating conditions of
    supervised release arising from the same underlying conviction. The shorthand
    and familiar tone permeating the sentencing transcript reflects that shared
    context: all participants understood why they were in the room; all understood
    that they had been there many times before; and, for the most part, all agreed
    about what needed to be done next. The reimposition of computer monitoring as
    a special condition of supervised release, which had been part of the conditions
    since the original judgment of conviction in 2005, was thus a foregone conclusion.
    The court was under no obligation to recite that context pro forma, or to pick
    through every condition and explain, point-by-point, how each was responsive to
    the offending conduct. We have never required district judges to perform the
    obvious.3 We see no reason to start now.
    3
    See, e.g., United States v. Forney, 
    797 F. App’x 31
    , 33 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary
    order) (although the district court did not explain why it imposed a condition
    requiring defendant to abstain from alcohol, the justification was “self-evident”
    where the defendant had pled guilty to driving impaired while on pretrial release
    (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Lopez, No. 21-1450, 
    2022 WL 1572995
    , at *2 (2d Cir. May 19, 2022) (summary order) (similar, with respect to a
    18
    To the extent Kunz argues that the district court failed to adequately justify
    the differences between prior iterations of his computer monitoring restrictions
    (which Kunz did not appeal when imposed, and still takes no issue with), and
    the purportedly more exacting restrictions ordered this time around, we again
    disagree. On appeal, Kunz highlights just three differences between his prior,
    apparently unobjected-to, special conditions and the current special conditions:
    (1) the language conditioning his internet access on compliance with the CIMP
    terms; (2) the requirement that Kunz himself “pay the cost of monitoring
    services”; and (3) the provision ordering that, “as much as possible,” Probation’s
    monitoring of Kunz’s computer activity be designed to avoid “reading any
    privileged information or any private material that is not illegal or reasonably
    likely to lead to illegal material or evidence related to illegal activity.”
    condition restricting access to services that provide child pornography, because
    even though the defendant had never purchased child pornography, he had
    “repeatedly” taken other actions “intending to engage in criminal sexual conduct
    with minors”); United States v. Deverso, No. 21-2815, 
    2022 WL 16753115
    , at *1 (2d
    Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) (summary order) (similar, with respect to a condition barring
    the defendant from viewing pornography where “the record shows that websites
    containing pornographic content helped to facilitate [the defendant’s] sexual
    contact with minors”); cf. United States v. Smith, 
    949 F.3d 60
    , 66 (2d Cir. 2020)
    (“[W]e do not require district courts to engage in the utterance of ‘robotic
    incantations’ when imposing sentences . . . .”).
    19
    Appellant’s Br. 19-20. Kunz is correct that the district court did not offer any
    specific on-the-record justification for those changes.
    Conspicuously, though, Kunz has neglected to demonstrate how any of
    those changes meaningfully burdened a “significant liberty interest” and
    therefore needed to be “supported by particularized findings.” Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 123
     (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to the newly imposed CIMP
    terms, while the record does not illuminate precisely how the current monitoring
    program compares as a practical matter with Probation’s past monitoring of
    Kunz himself, defense counsel conceded at oral argument that prior generations
    of the monitoring program enforced against other supervisees in the Western
    District of New York included at least some identical restrictions, even as the
    program appeared to have evolved in other respects. See, e.g., App’x 122-23,
    United States v. Browder, 
    866 F.3d 504
     (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1322) (prohibiting the
    supervisee from altering his operating system or using encryption without prior
    approval, among other similar restrictions). More importantly, Kunz has not
    identified any meaningful difference between his own former computer
    monitoring regime and this new one. Any contention that the new CIMP
    obligations themselves impose a heightened burden on Kunz’s liberty is routed
    20
    through his technology-centric arguments. We address those concerns below,
    and construe the relevant CIMP terms in a manner that avoids the problematic
    implications that might be suggested by an aggressively literal reading of their
    text.
    The other two cited changes are no more objectionable. As for the new
    requirement that Kunz pay monitoring costs, Kunz does not even attempt to
    articulate any impact on his liberty. Apart from (literally) highlighting (in yellow)
    the relevant language from the judgment as newly imposed provision to which
    he objects, his brief devotes no discussion to the issue whatsoever, and the record
    is silent as to what, if any, costs Kunz will actually be forced to bear. See City of
    New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 
    645 F.3d 114
    , 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We
    ordinarily deem an argument to be forfeited where it has not been sufficiently
    argued in the briefs . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). While we can
    imagine scenarios where such a condition would impose a sufficiently onerous
    burden on a supervisee to require a specific on-the-record justification, in the
    absence of any showing that such a burden exists here, the self-evident rationale
    – shifting reasonable monitoring costs to the person whose crime made the
    monitoring necessary – provides sufficient justification. Similarly, Kunz does not
    explain why altering his special conditions to expressly prohibit Probation from
    21
    indiscriminately reviewing his privileged and private information somehow
    aggravates, rather than reduces, the burden on his liberty.
    Moreover, even were Kunz’s liberty meaningfully affected in some way by
    the changes, it is self-evident from the record that in adopting all of Probation’s
    proposed updates to Kunz’s special conditions, the district court generally
    credited Gilbert’s recommendation that Probation’s modern monitoring
    approach would be more effective than prior iterations of the monitoring
    program at aiding the rehabilitation of a defendant who was originally sentenced
    during the relative infancy of computer monitoring, see United States v. Sofsky, 
    287 F.3d 122
    , 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (collecting early computer monitoring cases from the
    late 1990s and early 2000s), who had violated his supervised release many times
    since then, and who since his most recent sentencing had now offended yet
    again.
    In sum, although “the defendant, the public, and appellate courts should
    not be required to engage in guesswork about the rationale for a particular
    sentence,” Genao, 
    869 F.3d at 142
    , it requires no “guesswork” to understand why
    the district court imposed the conditions it imposed in this case. Given the nature
    both of Kunz’s underlying offense and of his repeated violations of supervised
    release, the longstanding general computer monitoring requirement that Kunz
    22
    has never (including now) objected to, and Gilbert’s justification for the
    recommended updates, the district court’s rationale for imposing this sort of
    computer monitoring program was apparent on this record. We thus discern no
    procedural error in the sentence it imposed.
    B.    Substantive Reasonableness: Technological Issues
    Kunz’s substantive reasonableness challenge centers on his contention that
    Probation’s computer monitoring requirements are technically vague or
    unworkable. We are not convinced.
    Kunz points us to the portion of his digital forensics expert’s declaration
    describing various technical predicaments stemming from the expert’s
    interpretation of the CIMP terms. The particular terms at issue include
    restrictions requiring Kunz to notify Probation of “any alterations to
    computers(s)/connected device(s) and/or passwords/screen names prior to
    executing [the] change” and to obtain Probation’s permission prior to “alter[ing]”
    any software or operating systems. App’x 48-49. According to Kunz’s expert,
    those restrictions “would be difficult if not impossible for a user to comply with
    as they are currently worded.” App’x 52. For example, many programs and
    operating systems update automatically without the user’s intervention or
    23
    knowledge, and such “alterations to [Kunz’s] computer . . . software” thus cannot
    realistically be cleared in advance. App’x 44. Similarly, passwords for many
    services expire automatically, periodically forcing users of those services to
    immediately update their credentials upon login, making it impractical for users
    to seek prior approval. Finally, a broad reading of the provision barring the use
    of “any type of encryption” without prior approval would preclude Kunz from
    using a machine with preloaded standard encryption, or any of the countless
    websites with URLs that begin with “https,” because that prefix indicates that the
    website encrypts information as it is transferred to or from the user.
    Were we required to read the CIMP terms as broadly as Kunz’s expert
    does, we might be persuaded. Fortunately, we are not. Those terms are obviously
    and reasonably intended to preclude a defendant’s active attempts to avoid
    monitoring, not to punish a passive defendant for innocuous day-to-day
    activities that trigger changes initiated by forces outside of his control.
    Importantly, the CIMP terms themselves suggest that they should be read
    that way. All of the challenged provisions are phrased in terms of what “I”
    (Kunz, the supervisee) will or will not actively do. Thus, for example, Kunz is
    required to pledge that he shall “notify the U.S. Probation Office” of certain
    24
    changes before “executing” those changes. App’x 48 (CIMP ¶ 7). On its own
    terms, that language does not require Kunz to notify Probation of automated
    changes initiated by a vendor or developer, which are not “execut[ed]” by Kunz
    himself. 
    Id.
     Similarly, it is Kunz who is required to pre-clear “alterations” to his
    software. Id. at 49 (CIMP ¶ 16). By personalizing that obligation to Kunz, the
    CIMP language gives no indication that Probation somehow expects Kunz to
    perform “the impossible,” United States v. Johnson, 
    446 F.3d 272
    , 281 (2d Cir.
    2006), either by predicting the unpredictable, or by otherwise assuming
    responsibility for automatic, unannounced, third-party updates that he plays no
    active or intentional role in initiating. And for those updates that do require a
    user to take some active, intentional step to trigger the change, nothing prevents
    Kunz from notifying his probation officer before taking that step. Likewise,
    nothing in the CIMP terms precludes Kunz from seeking, or the probation officer
    from granting, blanket permission for Kunz to install standard program updates
    initiated by the likes of Microsoft or Apple.
    In sum, even a stubbornly literal reading of the challenged CIMP terms
    does not require the interpretation offered by Kunz’s expert. We thus construe
    the requirements to prohibit Kunz from initiating without prior permission any of
    25
    the above processes or changes;4 they do not, nor do we think they could sensibly
    be read to, compel him to seek prior approval for processes entirely outside of his
    control and of which he himself has no advance notice. See United States v. Young,
    
    910 F.3d 665
    , 671-72 (2d Cir. 2018) (construing a condition ordering mental health
    treatment as excluding “inpatient treatment,” notwithstanding that a literal
    reading might have extended that far, thereby mooting any concern that the
    district court had failed to adequately justify that “restrictive” treatment type).
    Nor do we believe that a sensible reading of the conditions requires Kunz
    to seek prior approval each time he “use[s],”5 App’x 49 (CIMP ¶ 18), common
    4
    At oral argument, Kunz’s counsel offered that the spirit of these restrictions
    could be captured by language providing that Kunz “shall not attempt to
    circumvent the monitoring software and/or hardware in any way,” followed by a
    non-exhaustive illustrative list closely mapping the current CIMP terms. Oral
    Argument 6:00. We believe our construction accomplishes the same thing while
    avoiding the potentially imprecise implications of the word “circumvent.” Under
    our reading, it does not matter what Kunz’s subjective goal may be in initiating
    the barred process – be it to deliberately evade his monitoring restrictions or not.
    What matters is only whether it is Kunz himself who actively initiates (or causes
    to be initiated) the barred process, or whether Kunz passively experiences the
    effects of a process caused by some force entirely beyond his control.
    5
    Once again, we are guided by the language in the CIMP term personalizing the
    obligation to Kunz, and attaching an active verb – “use” – to that obligation.
    While one might plausibly suggest that a computer user who purchases
    household items online through a secure payment interface in some sense
    “use[s] . . . encryption,” App’x 49 (CIMP ¶ 18), when the vendor encrypts the
    26
    electronic resources or services that happen to employ encryption in a manner
    that does not frustrate the purposes of Probation’s monitoring. We think it would
    be absurd to interpret Probation as purporting to require Kunz to ask permission
    every time he attempts to access a website whose URL happens to begin with the
    characters “https” (signifying that the website “encrypts the data as it is
    transferred,” App’x 54) or every time he uses a messaging service that encrypts
    messages while they are en route from sender to recipient,6 where that encryption
    transmitted financial information to protect it from hackers, see Mark A. Lemley,
    The Splinternet, 70 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1423 (2021), such a reading is certainly not
    compelled by that language. Nor is that even remotely the most natural reading;
    few ordinary, non-expert computer users would ever liken behavior of that sort
    to “us[ing]” encryption. Cf. United States v. Carlineo, 
    998 F.3d 533
    , 536 (2d Cir.
    2021) (supervised release restrictions must “put an ordinary person on notice of the
    prohibited conduct” (emphasis added)). Therefore, construing the provision in
    light of its evident purpose, as discussed throughout this section, we think a fair
    reading of the CIMP’s encryption restriction does not encompass such “use” that
    is effected by the vendor, invisible to the user, and inconsequential to Probation’s
    ability to monitor its supervisees’ purchasing activity.
    6
    The record is silent as to whether any of the increasingly common encrypted
    messaging services that employ “end-to-end encryption” or other “technical
    impediments to law enforcement” may stymie Probation’s monitoring efforts
    here. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 106
    (2018). In our view, Probation’s legitimate interest in restricting the use of such
    services extends only to the point where the service’s encryption interferes with
    Probation’s monitoring capabilities. At any rate, the pre-approval process
    provides Probation with the capacity to evaluate the risks of particular types of
    services.
    27
    does not thwart Probation’s ability to keep tabs on Kunz (via, for example, the
    monitoring software it has installed on Kunz’s devices). The clear intention of the
    prohibition is to prevent Kunz from hiding behind the veil of encryption any
    efforts to, for example, access child pornography, make forbidden contact with
    minors, or engage in any other illegal activity or violations of his conditions of
    supervised release. To that end, so long as no encryption is initiated by or at the
    behest of Kunz, and so long as any encryption initiated by external forces does
    not meaningfully impair Probation’s ability to monitor Kunz’s behavior
    consistent with both the special conditions and the other CIMP terms, we
    construe the encryption restrictions to allow the reasonable use of services and
    resources that happen to employ encryption in some way.
    Interpreting the contested CIMP terms this way should assuage any
    technical concerns Kunz harbors, while also preserving both the spirit and the
    efficacy of the restrictions. Interpreting them otherwise, by contrast, would run
    them headlong into our requirements that such restrictions provide an ordinary
    person with “clear notice”7 of whether a given action is prohibited or not, and not
    7
    To the extent Kunz’s technical vagueness theory doubles as a due process
    vagueness challenge, we similarly hold that the restrictions, as we construe them,
    are “sufficiently clear to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
    28
    “demand the impossible” of a supervisee. Johnson, 
    446 F.3d at 281
    ; see United
    States v. Carlineo, 
    998 F.3d 533
    , 536 (2d Cir. 2021).8
    Construed in that way, we find no procedural or substantive
    unreasonableness in Kunz’s computer monitoring obligations. We thus turn next
    to his improper delegation arguments.
    opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” United
    States v. Simmons, 
    343 F.3d 72
    , 81 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
    omitted); cf. United States v. Burdick, 
    789 F. App'x 886
    , 888-89 (2d Cir. 2019)
    (summary order) (holding that the defendant’s overbreadth and vagueness
    challenges to his CIMP terms were “unripe,” emphasizing that “[t]he district
    court retains the discretion to remedy a potential ambiguity in the language of a
    special condition”).
    8
    Separately, Kunz’s expert also declared that the CIMP term barring use of any
    service that “conceals or spoofs” his IP address could make life difficult for any
    user who works for a company that requires the use of a VPN, because that sort
    of connection would technically run afoul of that restriction. App’x 52, 54. Here,
    we need not construe to avoid anything. This is a hypothetical worry that, unlike
    the other seemingly more intrusive CIMP restrictions, would require a simple
    modification request should a change in Kunz’s employment circumstances
    warrant as much. Cf. United States v. Balon, 
    384 F.3d 38
    , 47 (2d Cir. 2004)
    (“[C]hanging computer technology is an appropriate factor to authorize a
    modification of supervised release conditions under Section 3583(e).”). That is not
    an unworkable constraint; it is merely a less convenient one than Kunz would
    understandably prefer.
    29
    III.   Delegation of Judicial Authority
    Kunz argues that the district court impermissibly delegated its authority to
    Probation in two ways: (1) by endorsing CIMP terms that, as currently written,
    leave too much to Probation’s discretion; and (2) by leaving the door ajar for
    Probation to unilaterally alter Kunz’s CIMP terms in the future. Although we are
    sensitive to Kunz’s concerns, we once again construe the language he
    underscores in a way that should, with one exception, obviate those concerns.
    “The power to impose special conditions of supervised release . . . is vested
    exclusively in the district court.” Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 122
    . By contrast, “the
    extensive supervision mission of federal probation officers includes executing the
    sentence but not imposing it.” 
    Id.
     (internal citation, quotation marks, and
    alteration omitted). Thus, we have explained, while a district court may delegate
    to Probation authority “over certain minor details of supervised release,” it may
    not delegate “decisionmaking authority which would make a defendant’s liberty
    itself contingent on a probation officer’s exercise of discretion.” United States v.
    Birkedahl, 
    973 F.3d 49
    , 54 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see,
    e.g., Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 123
     (“[T]he discretion to require either inpatient or
    outpatient drug treatment was an impermissible delegation of judicial sentencing
    30
    authority.”); United States v. Peterson, 
    248 F.3d 79
    , 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If [the
    defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention only if
    directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition constitutes
    an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation officer.”).
    While these formulas are easily recited, they are less easily applied; they
    require that we survey many gray areas and draw many subtle lines. When a
    sentencing court orders a special condition of supervised release imposing a
    particular form of treatment or supervision (such as “mental health treatment” or
    “computer monitoring”), that generic term encompasses many possible
    variations and operational components. Of course, all of those options concern, in
    the broadest sense of the word, the “details” of the required condition, and all
    affect, to some degree, the supervisee’s liberty. But assessing whether the details
    left to Probation’s discretion involve significant impositions on the supervisee’s
    liberty (like the choice between inpatient and outpatient drug treatment, see
    Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 123
    ) or matters of “minor” detail (such as the choice of a
    particular treatment provider, see Peterson, 
    248 F.3d at 85
    ) demands a careful and
    contextual analysis of both the nature of the overall condition and the relative
    importance of the specific choice to the broader intrusion upon the supervisee’s
    liberty.
    31
    A.    The CIMP Terms as Currently Written
    For the most part, Kunz’s first delegation challenge, which targets the
    CIMP terms as currently conceived, presents no great difficulties. He urges that
    by rubber-stamping CIMP terms that “demand [Probation’s] prior approval
    before . . . even commonplace and automatic computer activity” the district court
    impermissibly delegated its judicial authority. Appellant’s Br. 27. But that theory
    is really just a rejiggering of Kunz’s earlier contention that the CIMP terms are
    vague and unworkable. Having already construed them in a manner that
    neutralizes Kunz’s reasonable concerns, we disagree that the district court’s
    decision to condition his internet access on compliance with those terms
    constituted an impermissible delegation. Naturally, the various CIMP provisions
    that permit certain computer activity only with Probation’s approval delegate to
    the probation officer authority to approve or disapprove those activities. But in
    the context of the broader monitoring regime ordered by the court (again,
    without objection), those decisions are properly understood as matters of detail.
    The sentencing judge cannot reasonably be expected to compile a detailed list of
    the kinds of software updates or password changes or “use[s]” of encryption that
    do or do not interfere with Probation’s ability to monitor a supervisee’s activities
    32
    to detect illicit conduct. Once those provisions are understood in light of that
    goal, Probation is equipped with a standard of decision that constrains its
    discretion and avoids arbitrary use of its delegated authority.
    Kunz raises a different issue, however, that presents a more difficult
    question. He argues, and we agree in part, that certain of the CIMP terms
    contradict the express language of the special conditions, and therefore exceed
    the authority actually delegated by the district court. To be sure, not all of the
    language Kunz characterizes as contradictory is actually anything of the sort. For
    example, he insists that the CIMP term requiring him to “waive any expectations
    of privacy from the supervising probation officer, his or her designee, and the
    monitoring company,” App’x 48 (CIMP ¶ 1), contradicts the special condition
    providing that monitoring and examination of his devices “shall be designed to
    avoid, as much as possible, reading any privileged information or any private
    material that is not illegal or reasonably likely to lead to illegal material or
    evidence related to illegal activity,” App’x 73. But we read the two together to
    mean simply that Kunz agrees that he is entitled to no greater expectation of
    privacy than that which is implied by the special condition. Although they tread
    similar ground, those two provisions target different things. The special
    33
    condition’s text constrains the supervisors in their surveillance of Kunz by
    requiring them not to abuse their power and access; the CIMP provision instructs
    Kunz that he has no standalone expectation of privacy beyond that. Together, the
    two provisions convey to Kunz that he can expect no greater privacy from his
    supervisors than what is guaranteed to him by the special condition. Though
    they may diverge in focus and in thrust, they are not contradictory, and pose no
    delegation problems.
    Kunz’s objection to the CIMP term providing that he “may be limited to . . .
    one Internet-capable device,” however, has merit. App’x 48 (CIMP ¶ 5). That
    restriction, he argues, cannot be reconciled with the district court’s use of the
    “(s)” device at the end of terms like “computer(s), automated service(s), or
    connected device(s),” apparently allowing for the possibility that each of those
    nouns could be plural. App’x 73. Though we are skeptical that the two provisions
    are truly contradictory – Kunz’s formulation of the argument ignores the fact that
    the “(s)” also contemplates the possibility that each noun could be singular – we
    share the larger concerns lurking within his argument.
    We think a restriction limiting a supervisee to just one internet-connected
    device would pose a significant burden on his liberty, and therefore would need
    34
    to be imposed by the court and justified by particularized on-the-record findings.
    See Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 123
    . Even setting aside the proliferation of the “Internet of
    Things,” which has exploded the category of devices that could qualify as
    internet-connected, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO.
    WASH. L. REV. 783, 785 (2019), such a restriction would force Kunz to choose
    between using a computer and using a smart phone, both of which are
    “indispensable to participation in modern society.” Eaglin, 
    913 F.3d at 98
    , quoting
    Carpenter v. United States, 
    138 S. Ct. 2206
    , 2220 (2018) (discussing cell phones); see
    Peterson, 
    248 F.3d at 83
     (same for computers). We do not suggest that such a
    severe restraint on internet access could never be warranted, but rather that it
    would require particularized justification by the court. And for the same reason,
    any special condition granting Probation discretion to decide whether or not to
    restrict a supervisee to a single internet-connected device would constitute an
    impermissible delegation of the court’s judicial authority. See Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 122-23
    .
    Fortunately, the plain language of the court’s special conditions here
    avoids those traps. Neither relevant passage purports to restrict Kunz to one
    35
    internet-connected device, or to delegate to Probation the authority to determine
    how many internet-connected devices Kunz may use. The first relevant passage –
    requiring Kunz to give Probation “advance notification of any computer(s),
    automated service(s), or connected device(s) that will be used,” and authorizing
    Probation to install surveillance software on those “computer(s) or connected
    device(s)” – simply orders Kunz to proactively notify Probation of any device, or
    devices, that he intends to use while under supervision so that they may be
    outfitted with surveillance software. App’x 73. Similarly, the second passage –
    requiring Kunz to cooperate with Probation’s examinations of any “computer(s),
    connected device(s), storage media, and any internal or external peripherals” –
    simply cautions that any device, or devices, that Kunz intends to use will be
    subject to unannounced searches. 
    Id.
     In both instances, the court’s language
    implies that it is Kunz himself, not Probation, who is empowered to decide how
    many internet-connected devices he wishes to use. We therefore discern no error
    in the district court’s special condition.
    But that still leaves the language in the CIMP terms that purports to
    reserve for Probation the right to restrict Kunz to a single device. We conclude
    that this term exceeds the authority actually delegated to Probation by the district
    36
    court, and therefore may not be enforced as written. Thus, although we affirm the
    judgment of the district court, we do so with the stipulation that Probation may
    not enforce any provision of the CIMP that purports to authorize the probation
    officer to limit Kunz to one internet-connected device. See United States v.
    Villafane-Lozada, 
    973 F.3d 147
    , 153 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that where Probation
    “does overstep [its] authority,” the sentencing court may provide relief). Such a
    harsh restriction would need to be specifically imposed by the district court and
    justified by an express, case-specific rationale for imposing it. See Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 123
    . None of that happened here.
    B.     The Monitoring Policy “In Effect” by Probation
    Kunz’s next, and trickier, delegation challenge centers on language in the
    district court’s special conditions imposing restrictions “consistent with the
    computer monitoring policy in effect by the probation office.” App’x 73.
    As Kunz observes, when read literally, the “policy in effect” phrase
    appears to vest Probation with the power to unilaterally update his CIMP terms –
    a reading Kunz contends would amount to an impermissible delegation of the
    district court’s judicial authority. In essence, he argues, because the district court
    37
    reviewed and endorsed these particular CIMP terms at sentencing, surely these
    particular terms must be frozen in time, subject to tinkering by the court alone.
    Appellant’s Br. 28-29. The government counters by proclaiming without
    qualification that the terms of Kunz’s computer monitoring are “minor details,”
    apparently as a matter of law, and therefore that their modification simply would
    not “implicate the judicial decision-making duty.” Appellee’s Br. 10. We do not
    altogether agree with either party.
    We begin by acknowledging the challenges inherent in answering this
    question prospectively, before (as far as the present record reveals) Probation has
    actually endeavored to alter the CIMP terms. On the one hand, Kunz’s reasonable
    concern seems to be that by greenlighting unilateral CIMP changes, the district
    court has empowered Probation to make extrajudicial updates that may
    meaningfully restrict his liberty. That would indeed be problematic. On the other
    hand, the current record grants no insight into what those future changes might
    conceivably be, much less that any have actually occurred or even been
    contemplated. That makes it difficult to determine whether those undefined
    hypothetical changes would be better classified as the sort of minor details
    typically within Probation’s purview, or the sort of liberty-burdening changes
    38
    that pose delegation problems.
    For that reason, at first glance, this case presents something of a ripeness
    problem. The ripeness requirement “prevents a federal court from entangling
    itself in abstract disagreements over matters that are premature for review
    because the injury is merely speculative and may never occur.” United States v.
    Traficante, 
    966 F.3d 99
    , 106 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted)
    (adding that because the doctrine derives from Article III jurisdictional limits, a
    court may raise the matter sua sponte and for the first time on appeal).
    We have on occasion held that challenges to a defendant’s conditions of
    supervised release fail that requirement. For example, in United States v. Balon, we
    determined that a challenge to a condition subjecting a defendant convicted of a
    child pornography offense (whose supervised release would not begin for several
    years) to remote monitoring of his electronic communications was unripe. 
    384 F.3d 38
    , 46-47 (2d Cir. 2004). Our opinion in that case grappled with themes that
    resonate with this one: “The technology that holds the key to whether the special
    condition in this case involves a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably
    necessary is constantly and rapidly changing,” and it was therefore “impossible”
    to predict whether whatever technological tools Probation would be employing
    39
    in the future would “unnecessarily deprive[]” that defendant of his liberty. 
    Id. at 46
     (adding that “the issue here is distinctly a matter of fact beyond the prescience
    of this court”).9
    What separates this appeal from those cases is that Kunz is not challenging
    a restriction that may or may not be imposed based on unspecified developments
    at an unspecified time in the future. He is challenging a specific condition,
    imposed right now, applicable right now, and seeming to delegate authority right
    now; and it is only that presently delegated authority which can be read to
    empower Probation to make indeterminate future changes for indeterminate
    future reasons.
    1.    Already-Delegated Authority
    Insofar as Kunz challenges power that the district court has already
    9
    See also Traficante, 966 F.3d at 104, 106 (deeming unripe a vagueness challenge to
    a condition of supervised release that permitted Probation to compel the
    defendant to notify others “[i]f the court determines in consultation with your
    probation officer that, based on your criminal record, personal history and
    characteristics, and the nature and circumstances of your offense, you pose a
    risk” to third parties, reasoning that the question was “just an abstraction” as
    applied to a defendant who had not yet been found to pose such a risk); United
    States v. Rasheed, 
    981 F.3d 187
    , 200 (2d Cir. 2020) (similar); United States v. Bryant,
    
    976 F.3d 165
    , 182 (2d Cir. 2020) (similar).
    40
    delegated to Probation – here, the discretion to unilaterally update the CIMP
    terms in the future – rather than whatever Probation might do with that power in
    the future, his challenge is ripe. We said as much in Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d at
    149. There, the defendant challenged a condition of supervised release requiring
    him to “submit to a polygraph, computerized voice stress analyzer, or any other
    such testing,” arguing that this condition impermissibly delegated to Probation
    “the choice of which verification testing technology to employ, whether it be
    polygraph, computerized voice stress analysis, or something else entirely.” Id. at
    150-52. We explained that the issue was ripe for review because it constituted a
    challenge to “the already realized delegation of judicial power to a probation
    officer, not some hypothetical decision that this delegation might allow in the
    future.“ Id. (emphasis in original). And we went a step further: we distinguished
    that (ripe) delegation dispute from the defendant’s separate (unripe) attack on
    the use of future computerized voice stress analysis, which he argued had not
    been “scientifically proven” to be reliable. Id. at 151. That second issue, unlike the
    immediate delegation of authority, hinged on an uncertain question of future
    technology – that is, “what the state of computerized voice stress analysis
    41
    technology will be when [defendant] begins his term of supervision in six
    years.” Id.
    Both sides of that coin are relevant here. As in Villafane-Lozada, Kunz
    argues that the district court in this case has already delegated the challenged
    authority to Probation. “In other words, it is the probation officer’s
    already-granted authority” to unilaterally update the CIMP terms, not
    necessarily “the particular [term] that will be chosen,” that Kunz argues is
    unlawful. Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d at 151. And because that purportedly
    improper delegation has already occurred, Kunz’s challenge to that aspect of his
    sentence is ripe.
    2.    Construing the Special Condition
    But, also as in Villafane-Lozada, the shadow of uncertain technological
    change still clouds this case. On one side, the most reasonable rationale for
    Probation’s apparent wish to retain discretion to update the CIMP terms is
    because (as Kunz’s examination of the current CIMP’s potential technical snags
    itself illuminates) both the monitoring technology Probation employs and the
    means defendants may summon to evade that technology are fickle and
    42
    evolving. Probation has a legitimate interest in retaining the flexibility to respond
    to emergent technology free from the administrative headache of seeking
    individual, judicially approved modifications of conditions for every supervisee
    under its care whenever a new response to a new means of evading supervision
    is invented. On the other side, we also recognize Kunz’s interest in remaining “on
    notice as to what conduct could trigger a charge of violating the condition,”
    Carlineo, 998 F.3d at 537, and in serving out his term of supervised release free
    from the specter of extrajudicial overreach further restricting his liberty – in
    addition to the burden he and other supervisees would have to bear should the
    onus to litigate CIMP changes fall to them on the back end, rather than to the
    government on the front end.
    This tug-of-war is not entirely novel. The precise language Kunz complains
    of – “consistent with the computer monitoring policy in effect by the probation
    office,” App’x 73 – appears in special conditions imposed in scores of cases across
    the Western and Southern Districts of New York over recent years.10 It also
    10
    See, e.g., United States v. Dantz, No. 1:09-CR-00146 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2009), Dkt.
    No. 17 (judgment); United States v. Deak, No. 1:15-CR-00659-JSR-1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
    30, 2016), Dkt. No. 28 (judgment); see also, e.g., United States v. Skvarla, No.
    6:09-MJ-00546-JWF-1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009), Dkt. No. 2 (imposing this
    condition for pretrial supervision).
    43
    featured in previous iterations of Kunz’s own special conditions, none of which
    he appealed.
    On at least one occasion, we have upheld by summary order the exact
    same (verbatim) special condition in the face of the very argument Kunz now
    presents. See United States v. Vietor, 
    806 F. App’x 60
    , 63 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary
    order); Appellant’s Br. 7, Vietor, 
    806 F. App’x 60
     (No. 19-1315) (“That delegation
    of authority presumes that the Probation Office would have the authority to
    revise its computer monitoring program on its own, as it sees fit.”). In our
    summary order, we at least implicitly rejected that argument, though not
    necessarily embracing the defendant’s framing of the issue. See Vietor, 806 F.
    App’x at 63 (“While the condition at issue here delegates authority to the
    probation office to select and administer the specific monitoring program, within
    the condition’s confines, it is the district court, not the probation office, restricting
    [the defendant’s] internet access.”). And because the defendant in Vietor had not
    raised the delegation argument before the district court, we reviewed the
    judgment for plain error only, id. at 62, further dampening that already
    44
    nonbinding summary order’s persuasiveness here.11
    On at least one other occasion, we have upheld effectively identical
    language by construing it to avoid the temporal question now squarely before us.
    11
    We have also on many occasions affirmed criminal judgments from the
    Western, Northern, and Southern Districts of New York that included similar (or
    indeed often the same) language in cases where the defendants did not directly
    challenge that language on appeal. The Vietor panel itself observed that we had
    endorsed “similarly worded condition[s]” before. 806 F. App’x at 62-63. It cited
    our summary order in United States v. Savastio, where we (again applying plain
    error review) upheld special conditions of supervised release imposed by a
    district court in the Northern District of New York prohibiting a defendant from
    “us[ing] or possess[ing] any computer, data storage device, or any internet
    capable device unless you participate in [computer monitoring]” and requiring
    that he “comply with all of the rules of the program and pay the costs associated
    with the program.” 
    777 F. App’x 4
    , 7 (2d Cir. 2019). The special conditions in that
    case were also worded in a way that seemed to allow Probation to unilaterally
    alter the operative CIMP terms in the future: “Your internet use will be limited
    and/or restricted under conditions to be set by the U.S. Probation Office in
    accordance with their Computer and Internet Monitoring Program.” 
    Id. at 5
    (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Leone, 
    813 F. App’x 665
     (2d Cir.
    2020) (summary order), we affirmed a judgment containing a substantially
    identical special condition to Kunz’s; there, though, the defendant’s delegation
    argument was limited to the purported vagueness of certain computer
    restrictions as currently written. See Appellant’s Br. 19-20, Leone, 
    813 F. App’x 665
    (No. 19-1670). And those cases have plenty of company. See, e.g., United States v.
    Swartz, 
    459 F. App’x 47
    , 48 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming a judgment containing the
    exact language Kunz challenges, where that language was not at issue on
    appeal); United States v. Petix, 
    767 F. App’x 119
    , 123 (2d Cir. 2019) (same); United
    States v. Asch, 
    775 F. App’x 15
    , 19 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. DeCapua, 
    822 F. App’x 16
    , 18 (2d Cir. 2020).
    45
    Our opinion in United States v. Browder, which also concerned a defendant
    convicted of a child pornography offense, centered on an effectively identical
    special condition providing that the defendant’s “computer or computers will be
    subject to monitoring by the U.S. Probation Office, consistent with the computer
    monitoring policy then in effect by the probation office.” 
    866 F.3d at 509
     (emphasis
    added). We immediately flagged from that language the prospect that the
    condition “may be subject to challenge as an impermissible delegation of judicial
    authority to the Probation Office.” 
    Id. at 510
    . And although we ultimately upheld
    the condition, we did so with two conspicuous asterisks. First, because the
    defendant did not challenge the condition as an impermissible delegation, we
    concluded he had “waived” that issue on appeal. 
    Id.
     And second, for that reason,
    we construed the “then in effect” language to mean “whatever computer
    monitoring policy was used by the Western District’s Probation Office at [the
    defendant’s] release.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    In this case, the issue is assuredly not waived, and we therefore are not
    bound by the Browder panel’s approach. Nonetheless, we find that approach
    instructive, and adapt it to reach the outcome that we think best balances the
    interests and constraints we have laid out in this opinion.
    46
    Here, we construe the language at issue as permitting Probation to make
    future unilateral changes to the terms of Kunz’s computer monitoring, much the
    same as it may make certain unilateral changes to other aspects of his supervised
    release, but only to the extent that those changes are the sort of “minor details of
    supervised release” already within Probation’s purview. Birkedahl, 973 F.3d at 54.
    While that construction may appear circular, we think it the most sensible
    reading of the “consistent with the computer monitoring policy in effect by the
    probation office” language at the core of this dispute.12 Cf. Villafane-Lozada, 973
    F.3d at 153 (avoiding an impermissible delegation obstacle by construing a
    condition requiring periodic truth-verification testing via a seemingly open-
    ended list of potential methods as nonetheless precluding “the use of a
    verification test that is materially more restrictive on [the defendant’s] liberty
    12
    It also echoes the assumption implicit in our ripeness determination in Balon:
    that the Probation Department would select the particular means of computer
    monitoring it deemed appropriate at the time of the defendant’s release. See 
    384 F.3d at 46-47
    . While recognizing that a challenge to the restrictiveness of the
    chosen method would ripen at that time, we did not question the propriety of
    effectively delegating the choice of technology to Probation in the first instance,
    rather than reserving the selection to the court. See 
    id.
     Allowing Probation to
    select the means of monitoring at the future commencement of supervision is not
    meaningfully different from allowing it to adapt to new technology by updating
    the means it initially selected.
    47
    than” methods the court had expressly authorized); United States v. Corbett, 
    767 F. App’x 191
    , 192-93 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (similar, construing a
    seemingly open-ended condition ordering “anger management and any
    additional mental health treatment that the defendant should require,” which the
    district court had expressly linked to “the issues that were identified by [a
    doctor’s psychological evaluation],” as authorizing Probation “to ensure that [the
    defendant] receives mental health treatment to address only those issues
    identified” in his psychological evaluation).
    Surely, Kunz is correct that no one in his position can rightfully be asked to
    bear the risk of Probation imposing “significantly greater restrictions on [his]
    liberty” on its own, as a literal reading of the relevant language might suggest is
    possible. Carlineo, 998 F.3d at 537-38. That power is “reserved exclusively for the
    district court.” Id. We are thus precluded from upholding any construction of the
    complained-of language suggesting that the district court delegated any more
    than our reading of its language suggests. See Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d at 153
    (reasoning that the special condition at issue “cannot reasonably be construed” to
    subject the defendant’s liberty “to the whims of his supervising probation
    officer”).
    48
    Nor would it be reasonable to conclude that the district court delegated
    any less than our reading suggests. It certainly does not appear to have intended
    to do so; Kunz voiced his objection to the “policy in effect” language several
    times below, imploring that the court consider “at least removing the sentence
    that would incorporate by reference any future new programs with new terms
    that probation comes up with in the future.” App’x 61. The court refused.
    More importantly, Kunz – who, unlike the defendant in Browder, has
    actually raised the issue on appeal – has failed to identify any meaningful
    principle that can distinguish computer monitoring from other species of
    supervised release in this respect. We can discern no reason why sufficiently
    “minor” adjustments to his CIMP terms would be subject to fundamentally
    different rules than, say, the “start date and nightly duration” of a court-ordered
    curfew, United States v. Degroate, 
    940 F.3d 167
    , 177 (2d Cir. 2019), “the selection of
    a therapy provider and schedule” for court-ordered therapy, Peterson, 
    248 F.3d at 85
    , or the precise “type of testing” chosen to carry out court-ordered truth-
    verification testing, Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d at 153 (emphasis omitted).13 We
    13
    To the extent someone in Kunz’s position might suggest that what
    distinguishes the CIMP terms from other aspects of his supervised release is that
    they are expressly spelled out in a writing, styled here as an “Agreement,” Kunz
    49
    have held that Probation is permitted to make those kinds of changes
    unilaterally, and we are bound by those holdings here. Thus, we are left with no
    conclusion to draw other than that the district court meant what it said and said
    what it meant – that Probation may unilaterally alter the minor details of Kunz’s
    computer monitoring – and that what it meant is permissible under our
    precedents.
    3.     Future CIMP Updates
    All of that notwithstanding, however, we appreciate that Kunz’s
    misgivings may prove prescient. We expect that many future changes Probation
    might be inclined to make (like tweaks to its monitoring software) would be
    did not argue anything of the sort in his brief, and mustered only a single
    unsupported, conclusory sentence to that effect at oral argument. See Oral
    Argument 18:50 (“The problem is by codifying, they’ve frozen these . . .
    provisions.”). Thus, that argument has not been adequately presented to us and
    is therefore forfeited. See Browder, 
    866 F.3d at 510
    ; Mickalis Pawn Shop, 
    645 F.3d at 137
    . In any event, we are reticent to use the fact that Probation has memorialized
    its policies in a writing as a hook to strip its authority over the kinds of minor
    details otherwise within its purview. In particular, we are loathe to create any
    further disincentive for Probation to furnish those under its care with detailed,
    written notice of its expectations, lest we exacerbate the risk that future
    supervisees will be left to fend without a “sufficiently clear” understanding of
    exactly what is expected of them. Carlineo, 998 F.3d at 536. As Kunz’s own expert
    submission forebodes, that risk is particularly acute in the context of highly
    technical computer-based restrictions.
    50
    entirely appropriate, but it may well also be that other future changes (such as
    attempting to limit Kunz to one internet-connected device) would cross the
    threshold from minor detail into major imposition on Kunz’s liberty. Matta, 
    777 F.3d at 122
    . That is always a risk. Probation is entrusted to act unilaterally in
    many contexts, and in each of those many contexts there is some chance that it
    will outpace its discretion to “execut[e]” the court’s sentence and instead purport
    to impermissibly “impos[e]” its own. 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see
    Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d at 153 (“[I]t is always possible that a probation officer
    might find some way to abuse his delegated authority.”); see also, e.g., Degroate,
    940 F.3d at 177 (acknowledging that Probation may have “exceeded its delegated
    authority” to set the start date and duration of the defendant’s curfew “by
    imposing a total ‘lock-down’”). We take that risk seriously in all contexts, but our
    precedents provide no basis for us to treat computer monitoring differently from
    other classes of generalized conditions whose details we permit Probation to
    manage.
    That holds true even as we recognize that as a practical matter, computer
    monitoring may prove more fraught than other areas of supervised release, if for
    no other reason than the sheer ubiquity of internet-connected devices and the
    51
    “nearly essential” nature of internet access to many aspects of modern life. Eaglin,
    
    913 F.3d at 96
    . Against that backdrop, some future incremental computer
    monitoring adjustment may perhaps impose a greater burden on a defendant’s
    day-to-day existence than a superficially more jarring adjustment to a less
    omnipresent aspect of that defendant’s life.
    But that is a discussion for another day. For now, we are precluded from
    deciding such hypotheticals – not only because the parties have failed to present
    us with any particular future scenarios to evaluate, but also because even had
    they done so, we would lack jurisdiction to rule on them. Speculative future
    developments of that sort no longer concern “the already realized delegation of
    judicial power to a probation officer” that we deemed ripe for review in
    Villafane-Lozada (and again here); rather, they amount to the very “hypothetical
    decision[s] that this delegation might allow in the future” that we deemed unripe
    for our review. 973 F.3d at 147, 151 (emphasis omitted). Should Probation make
    such a decision in the future, the issue will become ripe.14 It is not today.
    14
    At that point, “if the probation officer does overstep his authority,” Kunz may
    “seek recourse before the sentencing court.” Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d at 153,
    citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 advisory committee’s notes (1979) (“(1) [T]he
    probationer should be able to obtain resolution of a dispute over an ambiguous
    term or the meaning of a condition without first having to violate it; and (2) in
    52
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Kunz’s other arguments and conclude that they are
    without merit. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
    district court, as construed in the manner set forth in this opinion, and on the
    understanding that the Probation Department may not enforce any CIMP term
    that purports to allow it to limit Kunz to a single internet-connected device.
    cases of neglect, overwork, or simply unreasonableness on the part of the
    probation officer, the probationer should have recourse to the sentencing court
    when a condition needs clarification or modification.”). Meanwhile, Kunz may at
    any time ask the court to “modify, reduce, or enlarge” a restriction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(2). See United States v. Lussier, 
    104 F.3d 32
    , 36 (2d Cir. 1997)
    (“Section 3583(e) provides the district court with retained authority to revoke,
    discharge, or modify terms and conditions of supervised release following its
    initial imposition of a supervised release term in order to account for new or
    unforeseen circumstances.”); see also Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d at 152 & n.2
    (although, generally, “the illegality of a condition of supervised release is not a
    proper ground for modification under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(2) . . . [t]here is an
    exception to this rule for new or unforeseen circumstances, which include,
    among other things, technological changes” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    53