Jin v. Garland ( 2023 )

21-6334
Jin v. Garland
BIA
Wright, IJ
A205 614 849
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 20th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT:
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ZHENGXUN JIN,
Petitioner,
v. 21-6334
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Mike P. Gao, Esq., Law Offices of Mike P. Gao,
P.C., Flushing, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
General; John S. Hogan, Assistant Director;
Christina R. Zeidan, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Zhengxun Jin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China,
seeks review of a May 17, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming an October 3, 2018 decision
of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhengxun Jin, No. A 205
614 849 (B.I.A. May 17, 2021), aff’g No. A 205 614 849 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Oct. 3,
2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of
completeness.” Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§1252(b)(4)(B); see also Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing
factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo).
An asylum applicant like petitioner, who does not allege past persecution, has the
burden to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b). An applicant must both “present credible
testimony that he subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is objectively
reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). “Objective
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reasonableness entails a showing that a reasonable person in the petitioner’s circumstances
would fear persecution if returned to his native country.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. I.N.S.,
421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2005). A “fear may be well-founded even if there is only a
slight, though discernible, chance of persecution.” Diallo v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d
Cir. 2000). But a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support in the record”
and is merely “speculative at best.” Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129.
An applicant can show either “a reasonable possibility [that] he ... would be
singled out individually for persecution” or a “pattern or practice” of persecution of a
group of similarly situated people. 8 C.F.R. §§1208.13(b)(2)(iii), (iii)(A). Applicants
claiming a fear of persecution absent evidence of past persecution “must make some
showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or
likely to become aware of his activities.” See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135,
143 (2d Cir. 2008).
The record does not compel a conclusion that petitioner’s fear is objectively
reasonable. Petitioner argues that Chinese officials will become aware of his Christian
practice because he plans to attend unregistered family churches in China, which are
subject to surveillance and raids by the government. He testified that he would be “under
supervision by Communist entity[]” in China because of his religion, but he offered no
specific evidence that he would be singled out for surveillance. Certified Admin. Record
at 100. Petitioner submitted to the IJ the U.S. State Department’s Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 2016 and International Religious Freedom Report for 2016.
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These reports mention government surveillance of bishops and pastors of Christian
churches, as well as surveillance of individuals such as human rights activists and lawyers,
former political prisoners, publishers, booksellers, and foreign correspondents, for reasons
unrelated to religion. The Human Rights report also mentions surveillance of the general
public, but indicates that this is conducted “to monitor and intimidate political dissidents.”
Certified Admin. Record at 205. Neither report discusses surveillance of ordinary church
members.
Petitioner also submitted two letters from his mother, in which she reported her own
arrest in 2012 for attending a church and alleged that she knew of one other church that
was raided in 2012. Her letters state that: (1) she was arrested by the Chinese police in June
2012 for attending a family church; (2) she was released the same day after paying a fine
and submitting a “guarantee letter” promising not to attend family church; (3) she was
required to check in monthly with local authorities, and when she did not, she would
receive calls asking questions about her life and urging her to check in; and (4) the month
after her arrest, another family church was raided by the police because one of its members
was under surveillance, and all attendees were arrested. Petitioner argues that he will be in
contact with his mother if he returns to China, and officials will learn that he attends an
unregistered church “through the surveillance of his mother.” Pet’r’s Br. at 9.
The BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner failed to establish “a reasonable
possibility” he would be singled out for persecution. 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B). The
inference that petitioner would be identified by authorities through his mother is not
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persuasive. Both the IJ and BIA considered his mother’s letters and concluded that they
did “not meet the [petitioner’s] burden to show that authorities in China would become
aware of his attending an underground church.” Certified Admin. Record at 4; see also id.at 64–65. On this record, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that petitioner’s fear of
persecution for attending a church was speculative. See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129.
Similarly, petitioner failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of
similarly situated Christians. See 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A). When persecutory acts
in the petitioner’s country of nationality vary across regions, the BIA may require evidence
specific to the petitioner’s locality. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 165–66
(2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in the agency’s requirement that an applicant demonstrate
a well-founded fear of persecution specific to his or her local area when persecutory acts
vary by locality); see also Jian Liang v. Garland, 10 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding
that applicant failed to meet burden where his evidence did not “speak[] to persecution
occurring in [his] home province of Fujian[]”). Here, petitioner has failed to show a pattern
or practice of prosecution in his locality, the Jilin Province.
Petitioner argues that the IJ failed to consider the reports’ findings that unregistered
churches are considered illegal and attendees are often arrested and detained in police raids.
In addition to the 2016 reports submitted by petitioner, the IJ took administrative notice of
the 2017 versions of the same reports. The 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom
discusses incidents involving Christians in certain provinces, but the only reference to
religious persecution in Jilin involved practitioners of Falun Gong. The agency did not err
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in concluding that the only incidents in the record occurring in Jilin -- his mother’s arrest
in 2012 and the raid of another family church in 2012 -- did not establish a pattern or
practice of persecution. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 160 (upholding BIA’s decision that
petitioner failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on unattributed
reports of forced sterilizations, absent evidence of the number or circumstances of such
sterilizations).
In sum, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his fear of persecution was
objectively reasonable because he did not provide evidence that he would be singled out or
that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians in Jilin Province. Because he
did not establish a well-founded fear as required to state an asylum claim, he necessarily
failed to meet the higher standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Lecaj
v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions
and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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