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13-3470 United States v. Braddock UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 25th day of November, two thousand fourteen. 5 6 PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 REENA RAGGI, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 12 UNITED STATES, 13 Appellee, 14 15 -v.- 13-3470 16 17 ROBERT BRADDOCK, JR., 18 Defendant-Appellant.* 19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 20 21 FOR APPELLANT: FRANK J. RICCIO, Law Offices of 22 Frank J. Riccio LLC, Bridgeport, 23 Connecticut. 24 25 FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER M. MATTEI (with Marc 26 H. Silverman, on the brief) for 27 Deirdre M. Daly, United States * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption in this case as set forth above. 1 Attorney for the District of 2 Connecticut, New Haven, 3 Connecticut. 4 5 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 6 Court for the District of Connecticut (Arterton, J.). 7 8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 9 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 10 AFFIRMED. 11 12 Robert Braddock, Jr., who was the finance director for 13 the federal congressional campaign of then-Connecticut State 14 legislator Christopher Donovan, was convicted, after a jury 15 trial in the United States District Court for the District 16 of Connecticut (Arterton, J.), of conspiracy to cause the 17 submission of false statements to the Federal Election 18 Commission (“FEC”) and to defraud the United States, 19 accepting illegal conduit contributions to a candidate for 20 federal office, and causing the submission of false 21 statements to the FEC. 22 23 Braddock’s conviction arose out of a scheme in which 24 the campaign accepted bribes from a group of Roll-Your-Own 25 smoke shops in exchange for assurance that Donovan would 26 kill any legislation arising in the Connecticut General 27 Assembly that would negatively impact the Roll-Your-Own 28 smoke shops’ favorable tax status. 29 30 On appeal, Braddock argues that the district court 31 erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal as a 32 matter of law on the ground of insufficient evidence. 33 Braddock also argues that the district court erred in 34 applying a Guidelines enhancement for the abuse of a 35 position of trust. Finally, Braddock challenges the 36 substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We assume the 37 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 38 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 39 40 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence 41 42 “The Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the 43 evidence de novo.” United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555
44 F.3d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). But a “defendant 45 challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a 2 1 criminal conviction bears a heavy burden, because this Court 2 must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 3 government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” 4 United States v. Mercado,
573 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2009) 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, “it is the task of 6 the jury, not the court, to choose among competing 7 inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” United 8 States v. Jackson,
335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003). 9 10 We agree with the district court that sufficient 11 evidence-–including recorded conversations--supported 12 Braddock’s convictions for conspiracy, accepting illegal 13 campaign contributions, and causing the submission of false 14 statements to the FEC. Braddock’s primary objection to the 15 government’s case is that it consisted largely of the 16 testimony of a cooperating witness. But, this Court must 17 “defer[] to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and 18 its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” United 19 States v. Coplan,
703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal 20 quotation marks omitted). 21 22 2. Abuse of a Position of Trust 23 24 Whether a defendant “occupied a position of trust 25 within the meaning of § 3B1.3 is considered from the 26 victim’s viewpoint and presents a question of law subject to 27 de novo review. United States v. Thorn,
446 F.3d 378, 388 28 (2d Cir. 2006). “The determination of whether a defendant 29 utilized a position of trust or special skill in a manner 30 that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment 31 of the offense is a question of fact reviewed for clear 32 error.”
Id.33 34 The abuse-of-a-position-of-trust enhancement is 35 appropriate if the defendant abused a position of trust “in 36 a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 37 concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; see United 38 States v. Nuzzo,
385 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2004). 39 Braddock’s role as finance director for Donovan’s campaign 40 was a position “characterized by professional or managerial 41 discretion,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1. Braddock was 42 responsible for, among other things, setting the campaign’s 43 fundraising goals, designing the strategy to meet those 44 goals, supervising the donor database, responding to donor 45 inquiries about FEC compliance, deciding whether to accept 3 1 contributions, managing relationships with donors, and 2 advising Donovan. As the district court reasoned, Braddock 3 performed his duties as the campaign’s finance director 4 “without significant supervision.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 20:16; see also United States v. Barrett,
178 F.3d 643, 646 6 (2d Cir. 1999). And, as the district court concluded, 7 Braddock used his position of trust to further and conceal 8 his crimes. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 23:15–25:16. For 9 example, Braddock prevented a check bearing the name of a 10 smoke shop owner from being deposited, arranged for a 11 substitute check from a straw donor, and circumvented the 12 campaign’s FEC compliance mechanism. 13 14 3. Substantive Reasonableness of Braddock’s Sentence 15 16 This Court reviews a sentence for substantive 17 reasonableness under a “particularly deferential standard.” 18 United States v. Adams,
768 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) 19 (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence 20 is substantively unreasonable only in the “rare case” when 21 allowing it to stand would “damage the administration of 22 justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, 23 shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of 24 law.” United States v. Rigas,
583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 25 2009). The district court properly considered Braddock’s 26 history and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense, 27 and the need for deterrence, and the below-Guidelines 28 sentence imposed was not “shockingly high” or “otherwise 29 unsupportable as a matter of law.” Id.; see also United 30 States v. Park,
758 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 2014) (per 31 curiam). 32 33 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 34 Braddock’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of 35 the district court. 36 37 FOR THE COURT: 38 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 39 40 41 4
Document Info
Docket Number: 13-3470
Judges: Kearse, Jacobs, Raggi
Filed Date: 11/25/2014
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024