United States v. Braddock ( 2014 )


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  •      13-3470
    United States v. Braddock
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
    SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 25th day of November, two thousand fourteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,
    7                DENNIS JACOBS,
    8                REENA RAGGI,
    9                              Circuit Judges.
    10
    11       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    12       UNITED STATES,
    13                Appellee,
    14
    15                    -v.-                                              13-3470
    16
    17       ROBERT BRADDOCK, JR.,
    18                Defendant-Appellant.*
    19       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    20
    21       FOR APPELLANT:                        FRANK J. RICCIO, Law Offices of
    22                                             Frank J. Riccio LLC, Bridgeport,
    23                                             Connecticut.
    24
    25       FOR APPELLEE:                         CHRISTOPHER M. MATTEI (with Marc
    26                                             H. Silverman, on the brief) for
    27                                             Deirdre M. Daly, United States
    *
    The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend
    the official caption in this case as set forth above.
    1                              Attorney for the District of
    2                              Connecticut, New Haven,
    3                              Connecticut.
    4
    5        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    6   Court for the District of Connecticut (Arterton, J.).
    7
    8        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    9   AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
    10   AFFIRMED.
    11
    12        Robert Braddock, Jr., who was the finance director for
    13   the federal congressional campaign of then-Connecticut State
    14   legislator Christopher Donovan, was convicted, after a jury
    15   trial in the United States District Court for the District
    16   of Connecticut (Arterton, J.), of conspiracy to cause the
    17   submission of false statements to the Federal Election
    18   Commission (“FEC”) and to defraud the United States,
    19   accepting illegal conduit contributions to a candidate for
    20   federal office, and causing the submission of false
    21   statements to the FEC.
    22
    23        Braddock’s conviction arose out of a scheme in which
    24   the campaign accepted bribes from a group of Roll-Your-Own
    25   smoke shops in exchange for assurance that Donovan would
    26   kill any legislation arising in the Connecticut General
    27   Assembly that would negatively impact the Roll-Your-Own
    28   smoke shops’ favorable tax status.
    29
    30        On appeal, Braddock argues that the district court
    31   erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal as a
    32   matter of law on the ground of insufficient evidence.
    33   Braddock also argues that the district court erred in
    34   applying a Guidelines enhancement for the abuse of a
    35   position of trust. Finally, Braddock challenges the
    36   substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We assume the
    37   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
    38   procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
    39
    40       1.   Sufficiency of the Evidence
    41
    42        “The Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the
    43   evidence de novo.” United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555
    
    44 F.3d 303
    , 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). But a “defendant
    45   challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a
    2
    1   criminal conviction bears a heavy burden, because this Court
    2   must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    3   government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
    4   United States v. Mercado, 
    573 F.3d 138
    , 140 (2d Cir. 2009)
    5   (internal quotation marks omitted). And, “it is the task of
    6   the jury, not the court, to choose among competing
    7   inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” United
    8   States v. Jackson, 
    335 F.3d 170
    , 180 (2d Cir. 2003).
    9
    10        We agree with the district court that sufficient
    11   evidence-–including recorded conversations--supported
    12   Braddock’s convictions for conspiracy, accepting illegal
    13   campaign contributions, and causing the submission of false
    14   statements to the FEC. Braddock’s primary objection to the
    15   government’s case is that it consisted largely of the
    16   testimony of a cooperating witness. But, this Court must
    17   “defer[] to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and
    18   its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” United
    19   States v. Coplan, 
    703 F.3d 46
    , 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal
    20   quotation marks omitted).
    21
    22       2.   Abuse of a Position of Trust
    23
    24        Whether a defendant “occupied a position of trust
    25   within the meaning of § 3B1.3 is considered from the
    26   victim’s viewpoint and presents a question of law subject to
    27   de novo review. United States v. Thorn, 
    446 F.3d 378
    , 388
    28   (2d Cir. 2006).   “The determination of whether a defendant
    29   utilized a position of trust or special skill in a manner
    30   that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment
    31   of the offense is a question of fact reviewed for clear
    32   error.” 
    Id.
    33
    34        The abuse-of-a-position-of-trust enhancement is
    35   appropriate if the defendant abused a position of trust “in
    36   a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or
    37   concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; see United
    38   States v. Nuzzo, 
    385 F.3d 109
    , 115 (2d Cir. 2004).
    39   Braddock’s role as finance director for Donovan’s campaign
    40   was a position “characterized by professional or managerial
    41   discretion,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1. Braddock was
    42   responsible for, among other things, setting the campaign’s
    43   fundraising goals, designing the strategy to meet those
    44   goals, supervising the donor database, responding to donor
    45   inquiries about FEC compliance, deciding whether to accept
    3
    1   contributions, managing relationships with donors, and
    2   advising Donovan. As the district court reasoned, Braddock
    3   performed his duties as the campaign’s finance director
    4   “without significant supervision.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr.
    5   20:16; see also United States v. Barrett, 
    178 F.3d 643
    , 646
    6   (2d Cir. 1999). And, as the district court concluded,
    7   Braddock used his position of trust to further and conceal
    8   his crimes. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 23:15–25:16. For
    9   example, Braddock prevented a check bearing the name of a
    10   smoke shop owner from being deposited, arranged for a
    11   substitute check from a straw donor, and circumvented the
    12   campaign’s FEC compliance mechanism.
    13
    14       3.   Substantive Reasonableness of Braddock’s Sentence
    15
    16        This Court reviews a sentence for substantive
    17   reasonableness under a “particularly deferential standard.”
    18   United States v. Adams, 
    768 F.3d 219
    , 225 (2d Cir. 2014)
    19   (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence
    20   is substantively unreasonable only in the “rare case” when
    21   allowing it to stand would “damage the administration of
    22   justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high,
    23   shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of
    24   law.” United States v. Rigas, 
    583 F.3d 108
    , 123 (2d Cir.
    25   2009). The district court properly considered Braddock’s
    26   history and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense,
    27   and the need for deterrence, and the below-Guidelines
    28   sentence imposed was not “shockingly high” or “otherwise
    29   unsupportable as a matter of law.” Id.; see also United
    30   States v. Park, 
    758 F.3d 193
    , 200 (2d Cir. 2014) (per
    31   curiam).
    32
    33        For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
    34   Braddock’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
    35   the district court.
    36
    37                              FOR THE COURT:
    38                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    39
    40
    41
    4