United States v. Marcano (Draper) ( 2009 )

07-2301-cr (Lead), 07-2366-cr (Con)
USA v. Marcano (Draper)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2008
(Argued: August 27, 2008 Decided: January 20, 2009)
Docket No. 07-2301-cr(Lead), 07-2366-cr(Con)
_____________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
– v. –
CORNEILUS DRAPER, LEDRELL HART
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________________________________
Before NEWMAN, CALABRESI, and
SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
Defendants-appellants Ledrell Hart and Corneilus Draper appeal from judgments of
conviction entered on May 23, 2007 and May 24, 2007, respectively, following a jury trial in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Dearie, J.) on firearm,
narcotics, and witness retaliation and tampering charges. The Court finds plain error in the
proceedings below because the jury was improperly charged on the retaliation counts and the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict on those counts. The Court thus
REVERSES the retaliation convictions and REMANDS to the district court for resentencing.
1
ELIZABETH GEDDES, Assistant United States Attorney
(Susan Corkery, of counsel) for Benton J. Campbell, United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, New
York, for Appellee.
MICHAEL GOLD, New York, New York, for Defendant-
Appellant Corneilus Draper; HARRY C. BATCHELDER,
JR., New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellant
Ledrell Hart.
SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge.
Defendants-appellants Ledrell Hart (“Hart”) and Corneilus Draper (“Draper”) appeal
from judgments of conviction entered on May 23, 2007 and May 24, 2007, respectively,
following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Dearie, J.) on the following witness retaliation, witness tampering, narcotics, and firearm
charges: conspiracy to retaliate against a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2), (f);
retaliating against a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2); conspiracy to tamper with a
witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(C), (k); tampering with a witness, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(C); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 846; possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii); and possession of a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). In this opinion
we address only Hart’s and Draper’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the witness
retaliation convictions and to the applicability of the firearm convictions in calculating their
Criminal History Categories. In a companion summary order we consider, and reject, their
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the firearm, narcotics, and witness
tampering charges.
2
Hart and Draper argue that the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain the witness
retaliation charges under § 1513(b)(2) and (f) because the government did not show that the
witness had adequate contacts with federal authorities prior to being attacked. Additionally, Hart
and Draper assert that this Court’s recent decision in United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150 (2d
Cir. 2008), precludes imposition of a mandatory five-year consecutive sentence under § 924
(c)(1)(A)(i) because they are already subject to a “greater minimum sentence” provided by
another “provision of law.”
Because we conclude that the jury was improperly charged on the witness retaliation
counts and that the evidence was insufficient to convict Hart and Draper of those offenses, we
find plain error and REVERSE the retaliation convictions. We thus REMAND for resentencing
and bring Whitley to the district court’s attention so that it may consider in the first instance the
decision’s application to non-firearm offenses and advise us if the sentences it imposes are
affected by this issue.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
A. Lincoln Road Productions
As established at trial,1 Hart and Draper were members of Lincoln Road Productions
(“LRP”), a narcotics gang that dealt in crack cocaine in the Lincoln Road and Flatbush Avenue
area of Brooklyn, New York. LRP maintained exclusive dominion over the neighborhood the
group claimed as its territory, and members pledged to “keep the block pumping” with drugs.
1
Unless otherwise noted, we recount the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the
government, “the part[y] in whose favor the jury returned . . . its verdict” on the charges
considered in this opinion. Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found., 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir.
2006).
3
LRP members also retaliated against and punished those who aided police investigations of the
group’s activities; the LRP credo was “all informants should be killed.”
The attack that led to the applicable convictions stemmed from the police investigation of
the murder of Wesley Thomas, who was shot during a robbery at his apartment on July 9, 2001.
Hart and Draper were not involved in the murder, but other members of the LRP gang were,
including Cory Marcano (“Marcano”) and Clinton Davy (“Davy”).
B. Witness Clinton Davy’s Involvement with Local and Federal Authorities and
the Three Assaults
On July 13, 2001, four days after Wesley Thomas’s murder, Davy was first “picked up by
detectives” and brought to the 71st Precinct in the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office. In the
early morning hours of July 14, 2001, Davy implicated two “imaginary people” in Thomas’s
death in a taped statement. Later that day, Davy spoke with Marcano and related the false story
he had given police. Hoping Davy would identify the (imaginary) suspects in mug shots, police
contacted Davy many times in the weeks that followed. During that time, Marcano became
fearful that Davy was cooperating with the police investigation of the Thomas murder. Indeed,
Marcano confronted Davy about his frequent police contacts, fearing that Davy was going to
“give him up.” Marcano also communicated his fear to other LRP members. On August 2,
2001, Davy met with unnamed “police officers,” ended his ruse, and advised them that Marcano
was involved in the robbery and murder of Wesley Thomas.
On May 8, 2002, approximately nine months after the murder, Davy made another
statement to unnamed “police” at the 71st Precinct, again implicating Marcano. On December 7,
2002, after Davy was arrested for an unrelated robbery, Davy gave New York City Police
Detective Pete Margraf information allowing him to obtain a search warrant for an apartment
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used by Marcano. On December 8, 2002, local law enforcement executed the search warrant,
and based on the results of the search, Marcano and fellow LRP member Rohan McCrea were
arrested and taken to the 71st Precinct.
On December 9, 2002, Marcano was interviewed by a number of city, state, and federal
agents: Detective Margraf; New York City Police Department Detective John Lindner, a
member of the “Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Strike Force,” which coordinated with the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, the Internal Revenue Service, the New York City Police, and the New
York State Police; Immigration Special Agent Chris Quinn; and FBI Special Agent DeMartino.
During his interview, Marcano admitted he sold crack cocaine for Jermaine Dixon, a member of
the Patio Crew (the predecessor gang to LRP). Detective Lindner asked Marcano about the
Thomas murder, and Marcano replied that he believed that Davy had implicated him in Thomas’s
death.
Davy was subsequently assaulted on three separate occasions. The first assault occurred
on February 3, 2003, when Davy was robbed of money he owed to a drug dealer. One of his
assailants told him he was lucky Marcano had not already killed him for snitching. The second
assault took place one month later, in March 2003, when Davy met with various LRP members
in his mother’s restaurant in an effort to resolve differences. Again, his assailants called him a
snitch and stated the beating was in retaliation for providing law enforcement with information
about Marcano. Hart and Draper were not involved in either of these assaults.
The third and final incident, most relevant here, occurred on April 8, 2003. According to
Davy, Hart came to the door of his girlfriend’s apartment, where Davy was “laying low.” Hart
entered the apartment ostensibly to retrieve a video game. When Davy was distracted, Hart
5
opened the door to let Draper and LRP members Andrew Edwards and Zakee Campbell into the
apartment. Davy was then brutally assaulted with a clothing iron, electrical cords, and bleach. In
addition to demanding money, Davy’s assailants derided him for snitching on Marcano. One of
the attackers suggested Davy be shot. The police arrived, however, before he was killed. Davy
then informed the authorities that he had been a victim of a robbery.
On April 10, 2003, at the direction of the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, Davy met
federal agents at the state court house. He was then brought to the United States Attorney’s
Office, where he met with federal prosecutors. April 10, 2003 was the first time Davy spoke to
the federal agent and prosecutor in a statement.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case was tried before a jury from March 7, 2005 to March 24, 2005. After closing
arguments, Hart and Draper each made a Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal. As to the
retaliation counts, both argued that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient, and Draper
asserted that the key witness, Davy, was “incredible on his [sic] face.” The district court later
denied both motions.
In its jury charge for the retaliation counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1513, the district court
instructed the jury that the government was required to prove the following elements:
First, that the defendant engaged in conduct causing bodily injury to a [sic]
Clinton Davy; and
Second, that the defendant acted knowingly and with specific intent to retaliate
against Davy for information . . . given relating to the commission or possible of [sic]
commission of a federal offense to a law enforcement officer.
The court then expanded upon the second element:
The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that
the defendant acted knowingly and with the specific intent to retaliate against a
person for information given to a law enforcement officer relating to the
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commission of a federal offense. An act is done knowingly if it is done
voluntarily and purposefully and not by accident or mistake. By specific intent, I
mean that the defendant must have acted knowingly and with the unlawful intent
to retaliate against a person, Clinton Davy, for information Davy gave to a law
enforcement officer relating to the commission of a federal offense. In order to
satisfy this element, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the
defendant knew he was breaking any particular law.
At the charging conference, neither Hart nor Draper objected to the jury instructions for
the retaliation counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1513. After the jury’s verdict, Draper was sentenced
principally to a total of 22 years’ imprisonment: 10 years on the conspiracy and substantive
witness retaliation charges; 17 years on the conspiracy and substantive cocaine possession and
witness tampering charges, running concurrently with the retaliation charges; and 5 years on the
firearm possession in relation to a drug trafficking offense, running consecutively to the other
charges. Hart was sentenced principally to a total of 17 years’ imprisonment: 10 years on the
conspiracy and substantive witness retaliation and cocaine possession charges; 12 years on the
conspiracy and substantive witness tampering charges, running concurrently with the witness
retaliation and cocaine charges; and 5 years on the possession of a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking offense, running consecutively to the other charges.
On their initial appeal, Hart and Draper conceded that they participated in the attack on
Davy. Both, however, asserted that the evidence against them was insufficient to support the
witness retaliation charges because it did not establish that they had the specific intent to retaliate
against Davy for providing information about a federal offense to law enforcement. See
§ 1513(b)(2). Rather, they claimed they were motivated by money, and Davy’s beating was only
a robbery.
Following oral argument, this Court directed further briefing as to whether § 1513(b)(2)
and (f), which criminalize retaliation against witnesses, require the government to show that the
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witness actually cooperated with federal law enforcement prior to the retaliation, and if so,
whether the trial evidence supported a finding of such cooperation in this case.
Post-argument briefing was also directed in connection with United States v. Whitley, 529
F.3d 150, 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2008), to determine if the logic of its holding, which excludes
defendants subject to certain mandatory minimum sentences from a consecutive mandatory
minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), extends to the narcotics convictions in this
case.
DISCUSSION
I. WITNESS RETALIATION
A. Standard of Review
Because Hart and Draper did not object below or in their initial appeal briefs to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the witness retaliation element that was the subject of the
supplemental briefing, we review that issue for plain error.2 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United
States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 484 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[B]ecause Defendant failed to object . . . ,
our review is for plain error.”); Keppler, 2 F.3d at 23–24 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting issues not raised
in the district court are waived on appeal absent a showing that the district court committed plain
error).
2
“Ordinarily,” arguments not raised on appeal are “deemed abandoned.” United States v.
Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1992). “However, Fed. R.App. P. 2 gives a Court of Appeals
the discretion to overlook such failure if a manifest injustice otherwise would result.” United
States v. Allen, 127 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we
have held that a finding of plain error implicates a “manifest injustice,” it is appropriate for us to
proceed with such review. See United States v. Keppler, 2 F.3d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that
plain errors “affect . . . substantial rights . . . the violation of which would result in manifest
injustice.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). See also United States v.
Quintana, 300 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002) (equating manifest injustice with the plain error
standard of review).
8
For an error to be plain, “it must be a clear or obvious deviation from current law that
affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401,
415 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). A plain error should be
remedied by a reviewing court only “if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
B. The Witness Retaliation Standard
Hart and Draper were convicted of federal witness retaliation under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b),
which states, in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to
another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to
do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for . . . any information relating to
the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . given by a person
to a law enforcement officer [shall be guilty of a crime].
18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4), “law enforcement officer” is defined specifically as one
employed by the federal, rather than state or local, government:
[T]he term “law enforcement officer” means an officer or employee of the Federal
Government, or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal
Government or serving the Federal Government as an advisor or consultant . . .
authorized under law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection,
investigation, or prosecution of an offense . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4).
We have previously held that to sustain a witness retaliation charge, the government must
establish three elements: One, the defendant engaged in conduct that caused or threatened a
witness with bodily injury; two, the defendant acted knowingly, with the specific intent to
retaliate against the witness for information the witness divulged to law enforcement authorities
about a federal offense; and three, the officials to which the witness divulged information were
9
federal agents. See United States v. Brown, 937 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1991).3
Only the third element—the subject of the supplement briefing—is at issue in this case.
Under this element, it is immaterial whether the witness actually initiated contact with federal
authorities. Id. Instead, where the witness initially had contacts with state authorities, the
government must provide sufficient evidence that the witness’s “contact with law enforcement
officials extended beyond her initial contacts with the local police, and involved federal officers.”
Id. In Brown, for example, sufficient evidence of the witness’s contacts with federal authorities
was adduced at trial when the witness was threatened after communicating directly with officials
from the FBI, the United States Customs Bureau, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, and those federal agents also searched and entered the witness’s home to install a
phone monitoring device. Id. at 34, 36.
C. Plain Error Analysis
1. Error
The first step of plain error review requires a determination that “error” in fact occurred.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). “Error” for this purpose is defined as a
“[d]eviation from a legal rule.” Id. at 732–33. In this case, the jury instructions were in error.
The district court instructed the jury that the government was required to prove the defendants
specifically intended to retaliate against Davy for information “given relating to the . . .
commission of a federal offense to a law enforcement officer.” The court expanded on the
meaning of specific intent, but it failed to set out what the statute and this Circuit’s case law
clearly require the government to also prove: that at least one of the law enforcement officials
3
While in Brown we described the charge as requiring two elements, we also made clear
that “the government officials referred to [in element two] must be federally employed,” a
requirement we now explicitly describe as a third element of the offense. 937 F.2d at 36.
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contacted was “an officer or employee of the Federal Government.” § 1515(a)(4). In the absence
of such a clarification, the jury charge did not explain one of the elements necessary to sustain a
§ 1513(b) witness retaliation charge. It was thus in error. See Japan Airlines v. Port Auth. of
New York & New Jersey, 178 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A jury instruction is erroneous if it
misleads the jury or does not adequately inform the jury on the law.”).
2. Plain
The second step of plain error review requires a determination that the error was “plain.”
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. “Plain” for this purpose is defined as “clear” or “obvious.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting that “the error must be so plain that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in
countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Because in this case the district court omitted an element of the
witness retaliation offense in its charge to the jury, the error was clear and obvious and therefore
plain. Indeed, without awareness of the government’s burden to prove that Davy had been in
contact with federal authorities prior to being attacked, the jury may have quite reasonably
convicted Hart and Draper pursuant to Davy’s numerous contacts with the local police.
3. Affected Substantial Rights and the Fairness, Integrity, or Public
Reputation of Judicial Proceedings
Although the jury instructions were in error, and the error was plain, the plain error
standard is not met unless the error “affect[ed] substantial rights.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734(internal quotation marks omitted). This means the error was “prejudicial” in that it “affected the
outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. Even then, however, we retain the discretion to
decline to correct an error even if it affects substantial rights. Id. at 735. The standard applied in
making this determination is whether “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
11
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted).
In this matter, for example, had the government adduced sufficient evidence that Davy
did, in fact, have contacts with federal agents prior to the beating, the inadequate jury charge
might not have affected the defendants’ substantial rights, nor would the fairness of the judicial
proceedings necessarily be called into question. In contrast, this Circuit has previously held that
the “failure by the [g]overnment to adduce sufficient evidence . . . is a defect affecting substantial
rights which we may notice under F.R.Cr.P. 52(b).” United States v. Kaplan, 586 F.2d 980, 982
n.4 (2d Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Muniz, 60 F.3d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1995) rev’d on
reconsideration, on other grounds, 184 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A convicted defendant who
fails to raise the issue of insufficient evidence in the trial court cannot prevail on that ground on
appeal unless it was plain error for the trial court not to dismiss on its own motion.”).
Thus, we must consider whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain
the witness retaliation charges. As already noted, we need not focus on the first two elements of
the § 1513(b) retaliation charge. On appeal, Hart and Draper did not contest that they caused
Davy bodily injury. Contrary to appellants’ contentions, ample trial evidence—LRP’s anti-
snitching motto, Marcano’s stated belief that Davy had implicated him in the Thomas murder,
accusations of snitching expressed during the Davy assault, and the sheer brutality of Davy’s
beating—indicates that a reasonable jury could have found that Davy’s assailants acted with the
intent to retaliate for his cooperation with the law enforcement authorities. See United States v.
Vasquez, 267 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A conviction challenged on sufficiency grounds will
be affirmed if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
reviewing court finds that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
At issue is the third element of the witness retaliation charges—whether the witness had
sufficient contacts with federal agents prior to being attacked. We have not previously had the
opportunity to define what constitutes adequate contact with federal agents under this element of
the retaliation statute. In Brown the contacts were adequate where the witness was interviewed
directly by federal agents. 937 F.2d at 34. Presumably adequate contact might also be
established if the witness provides information to a person the witness intends (or perhaps
reasonably believes) will pass the information on to federal officials.
In this case, the government argues that because Davy provided information to local
authorities, which led to Marcano’s arrest, and because federal agents were present during
Marcano’s subsequent interview, where he accused Davy of implicating him in the murder, “it is
only logical to infer that prior to this interview (or at worst, immediately thereafter), the federal
authorities learned of Davy’s statements implicating Marcano.”
But this sequence merely shows that Marcano had contact with federal officers. Only
through a tortured reading of the statute could one find Davy to have “given” information to a
federal officer because Marcano later told federal officers that he believed Davy had implicated
him in the Thomas murder. It would be a similarly incorrect reading of the statute and our
precedent to argue that a witness’s interactions with local authorities, which just happen to be
eventually reported to federal authorities, provide the requisite federal contacts under the statute.
Rather, the statute is clear that the retaliation must be for information “given by a person to a law
enforcement officer,” and that the officer must be federal. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2).
Davy’s contacts with federal agents prior to the attack were inadequate to meet that
13
standard. In fact, at trial, Davy testified that his first contact with federal agents occurred on
April 10, 2003, two days after the relevant attack, and nothing in the record suggests that he had
anticipated such a meeting. Without evidence to the contrary, there is simply nothing to show
that, prior to being beaten, Davy had any interaction with federal authorities or passed on any
information to someone he believed would inform federal authorities. The evidence was
therefore insufficient to sustain the witness retaliation charges.
Because Hart and Draper were convicted based on jury instructions that omitted an
element of the offense, the government’s failure to present any evidence to support that element
plainly affected Hart’s and Draper’s substantial rights. Indeed, had the jury been charged with
parsing the government’s evidence to ensure that Davy’s contacts were explicitly federal, the jury
would not reasonably have returned a conviction on the retaliation counts, given that there was
no such evidence to parse. Thus, there exists “a reasonable probability that, but for [the error
claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different,” a finding that implicates
substantial rights under the plain error test. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74,
81–82 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We also believe, again under these circumstances and for the same reasons, that the error
“seriously affect[ed] the fairness” of the proceeding below and exercise our discretion to correct
it, having found the error to satisfy the plain error test. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736.
D. The Witness Retaliation Convictions are Reversed
Having found plain error, we reverse Hart’s and Draper’s convictions on the witness
retaliation counts (Counts Five and Six) and order dismissal of these counts. See United States v.
Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1141 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that if there was a failure to instruct on an
14
element of an offense, but “there was sufficient evidence in the record to permit the jury to find
the element proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the appropriate remedy is vacation of the
conviction and remand for a new trial,” while if “the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove
that element, we must reverse and order dismissal of that count”).
II. UNITED STATES V. WHITLEY
Section 924(c)(1)(A) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides for mandatory
sentencing enhancements where firearms are possessed, brandished, or discharged during the
commission of a violent or drug trafficking crime. An introductory clause—known as the
“except” clause—allows for defendants to escape the mandatory enhancements where “a greater
minimum sentence is otherwise provided . . . by any other provision of law.” Id.In United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008), this Court considered the
“except” clause and suggested that it was properly “read literally.” Id. at 158. The Court also
acknowledged, however, that limiting the except clause to higher mandatory minimums in other
firearm offenses might eliminate certain sentencing and grammatical anomalies identified by the
government. Id. at 153–55. Ultimately, the defendant in Whitley was exempted from a
mandatory ten-year consecutive minimum sentence for discharging a firearm during a violent
crime under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) because he was already subject to a higher mandatory fifteen-year
minimum armed career criminal provision. Id. at 151.
Whitley was decided after Hart’s and Draper’s sentencing and briefing. Hart and Draper
received both a mandatory ten-year minimum for narcotics offenses and a mandatory consecutive
five-year minimum for firearm possession under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Consequently, if Whitley’s
logic extends to non-firearm convictions, Hart and Draper would not be subject to the latter
mandatory consecutive minimum. See id. at 155.
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In their post-argument briefs on this issue, Hart and Draper assert that, given the Whitley
court’s literal reading of the phrase, “any other provision of law,” there is no ground for
confining the decision to only certain types of offenses. See id. at 156–58 (giving the “except
clause” its literal meaning). Because Hart and Draper are already subject to mandatory
minimums for their narcotics offenses that are greater than the mandatory minimums for their
firearms offenses, they argue remand is appropriate.
The government, in contrast, urges us to deem the “except clause” limited to firearm
offenses, eliminating any need for remand. In the alternative, the government suggests that,
because the district court imposed sentences below the Guidelines but above the statutory
minimum, Hart’s and Draper’s sentences were not affected by § 924(c)(1)(A) no matter how far
Whitley’s reasoning extends, thus again making remand unnecessary.
It is premature for us to delve into these issues. The meaning of § 924(c)(1)(A), in light
of Whitley, is pending before this Court in United States v. Williams, No. 07-2436. Moreover,
because we are reversing the witness retaliation convictions, de novo resentencing is required and
we are compelled to remand this matter to the district court in any event. See United States v.
Barresi, 361 F.3d 666, 672 (2d Cir. 2004) (resentencing should usually be de novo when an
appellate court reverses one or more convictions); United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217,
1228 (2d Cir. 2002) (same).
We note that with respect to sentences issued prior to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005), which changed the nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, we commonly
remanded to the district court where we could not “know whether a correct perception of the law
would have produced a different sentence.” United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 118 (2d Cir.
2005). For sentences rendered pre-Whitley, the same procedure may be warranted. In this case,
16
resentencing will provide the district court with the opportunity to reexamine the defendants’
original sentencing for the open Whitley question, as well as to identify how each new sentence it
imposes is or is not affected by the issue.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we REVERSE the convictions on Counts Five and Six for
conspiracy to retaliate against a witness and for retaliating against a witness and order these
counts dismissed; AFFIRM the convictions on Counts Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven
relating to the witness tampering, narcotics, and firearm charges; and REMAND for
resentencing. Judgments REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.
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