United States v. Davis ( 2023 )

21-1782
United States v. Davis
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2022
(Argued: September 14, 2022 Decided: September 21, 2023)
Docket No. 21-1782
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
BRANDEN L. DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SACK and PARK, Circuit Judges. *
Defendant-appellant Branden Davis pleaded guilty in the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York to unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition after previously having been convicted of a felony in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court (Frank P.
Geraci, Jr., J.) determined that Davis’s recommended range of imprisonment
under the Sentencing Guidelines was 15 to 21 months. On July 7, 2021, the court
nevertheless sentenced Davis principally to an above-Guidelines sentence of 48
months of imprisonment. Davis argues that his sentence was both procedurally
and substantively unreasonable because, inter alia, the district court failed to
adequately explain its rationale for Davis’s sentence and because the district
court’s stated justifications were insufficient to support the sentence imposed.
For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. We therefore
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
*Judge Rosemary S. Pooler, who was a member of the original panel in this case, died before
this opinion issued. This appeal is decided by the two remaining members of the panel, who
are in agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b).
21-1782
United States v. Davis
TIMOTHY P. MURPHY, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, for Marianne Mariano,
Federal Public Defender for the Western
District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for
Defendant-Appellant;
SEAN C. ELDRIDGE, Assistant United States
Attorney, for Trini E. Ross, United States
Attorney for the Western District of New
York, Rochester, NY, for Appellee.
SACK, Circuit Judge:
On March 1, 2021, defendant-appellant Branden Davis pleaded guilty in
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York to unlawful
possession of a firearm and ammunition after previously having been convicted
of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court
(Frank P. Geraci, Jr., J.) determined that Davis’s recommended range of
imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines was 15 to 21 months. On July 7,
2021, the court nevertheless sentenced Davis principally to an above-Guidelines
sentence of 48 months of imprisonment. Davis argues that his sentence was both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because, inter alia, the district court
failed to adequately explain its rationale for the sentence it imposed on Davis
and because the district court’s stated justifications were insufficient to support
the sentence imposed. We disagree with Davis and conclude that the district
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court appropriately exercised its substantial discretion when determining his
sentence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
On August 6, 2020, defendant-appellant Branden Davis was driving a
vehicle in a residential area of Rochester, New York. Officers with the Rochester
Police Department attempted to conduct a traffic stop of Davis’s vehicle, but he
pulled onto a curb, exited his vehicle, and fled. While running away, Davis
discarded a black handbag that police then seized. The police apprehended
Davis and took him into custody. They later determined that the black bag
contained, among other things, a loaded 9mm semi-automatic handgun and
marijuana.
This was not Davis’s first encounter with law enforcement. In 2005, the
United States District Court for the Western District of New York sentenced
Davis to 70 months of imprisonment after convicting him of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After his release in
2010, Davis twice violated his conditions of supervised release and was
sentenced to 18 months of incarceration in 2012. Davis’s record also reflects
various other prior convictions, including multiple convictions for possession of
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controlled substances, namely cocaine and marijuana; a conviction for driving
while ability impaired; and several convictions for driving without a license.
With respect to the instant offense, Davis agreed to waive indictment and
was charged via information in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York with one count of unlawfully possessing a semi-automatic
handgun after having been convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Davis pleaded guilty to this offense on March 1, 2021.
His plea agreement recognized that the maximum possible sentence for his crime
included an imprisonment term of 10 years. The plea agreement also reflected
Davis’s and the government’s understanding that, depending on whether the
district court decided that specific adjustments applied, the Sentencing
Guidelines would recommend an imprisonment sentence of either 15 to 21
months or 18 to 24 months. But both Davis and the government agreed that the
district court would “not [be] bound by the Sentencing Guidelines” when
determining Davis’s sentence. App’x at 13.
The district court held Davis’s sentencing hearing on July 7, 2021. The
government asked the court to sentence Davis to an above-Guidelines sentence
of at least 70 months of imprisonment. It noted that when Davis was convicted
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of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in 2005—the same statute he pleaded guilty to
violating in this case—he received a sentence of 70 months of imprisonment.
App’x at 76 (arguing that “a sentence that is at least in line with the sentence he
received 17 years ago for the exact same crime is both appropriate and
necessary”). The government also discussed the rising danger of guns in
Rochester. See id. (“The gun violence in the city is on the increase, and both this
community and this defendant need to know that illegal gun possession simply
won’t be tolerated.”). The government did not discuss this rise in local crime in
its presentencing memorandum.
Davis, through counsel, proposed on the other hand a sentence of 15
months of imprisonment. Davis admitted that gun crimes were “on the rise in
the city and elsewhere” and agreed that “the Court does certainly need to take
that into consideration.” App’x at 78. However, he contended that “the recent
spike in gun crimes and the violence in the city” occurred several months after
his criminal conduct. Id. Davis also argued that the 70 months of incarceration
that he received in 2005 were “draconian” and did “more harm than good.” Id.at 78–79.
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After considering the parties’ arguments, the district court held that the
lower Guidelines range—15 to 21 months of imprisonment instead of 18 to 24—
applied to Davis’s case. The district court reached this conclusion after
determining that the reckless-endangerment-during-flight enhancement
described in Chapter 3, Part C, Section 1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual
was inapplicable to Davis’s case because Davis’s actions did not pose an
imminent and immediate threat to others. App’x at 69 (“[Davis’s flight from the
police] was clearly a dangerous situation, but I do not believe it rises to the level
of reckless endangerment in which a two level increase should apply for reckless
endangerment during flight . . . .”). The court then discussed Davis’s “long”
criminal history and the “concerning” fact that Davis had already been convicted
of violating the same statute. Id. at 85. In part because of Davis’s criminal
history and the nature of his offense, the district court concluded that a
Guidelines sentence of 15 to 21 months of incarceration was inadequate.
The district court further justified its decision to deviate from the
Guidelines, commenting:
And also I think deterrence is now probably even [a] stronger
[consideration] than it was in the past. You can’t pick up the
newspaper or turn on the TV in this community without somebody
running around with a gun and shooting somebody.
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And the word has to get out there that if you decide to be in the city
with a loaded gun and run around the city, there’s consequences to
that and there’s serious consequence to that.
App’x at 86.
The district court expressed particular concern about what it described as a
recent “spike in violence in the city.” App’x at 86. The court agreed with Davis’s
counsel that Davis’s conduct “occurred probably prior to” the “spike.” Id.Nevertheless, the court said that it had “to be very, very serious and send a very
clear message that [the recent violence would not] be tolerated.” Id. The court
then sentenced Davis to an above-Guidelines sentence of 48 months of
imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.
On July 21, 2021, Davis timely appealed the district court’s judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the sentences that district courts impose for
“reasonableness.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). This standard is “‘a particularly deferential form of abuse-of-
discretion review’ that we apply both to the procedures used to arrive at the
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sentence (procedural reasonableness) and to the length of the sentence
(substantive reasonableness).” Id. (citation omitted).
II. Analysis
Davis contends that the sentence the district court imposed was both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Neither claim has merit.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Davis argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing an
imprisonment sentence above the Guidelines’ recommendation. A district
court’s failure to adequately explain its chosen sentence can render the sentence
procedurally unreasonable. United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam). Indeed, a district court must, “at the time of sentencing,” “state in
open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c).
But we have noted that “the ‘statement’ requirement of § 3553(c) sets a low
threshold.” United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2020). A district court
“need not engage in a prolonged discussion of its reasoning.” United States v.
Robinson, 799 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2015). A district court is also not required “to
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engage in the utterance of ‘robotic incantations’” in order for the court’s sentence
to be procedurally reasonable. United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir.
2020) (citation omitted). Instead, “a brief statement of reasons will generally
suffice where the parties have addressed only ‘straightforward, conceptually
simple arguments’ to the sentencing judge.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180,
193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). “The appropriateness of brevity or
length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon
circumstances.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Determining what
is required in any particular case is a matter firmly committed to the district
court’s discretion. See id. (“[T]he law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s
own professional judgment.”).
Moreover, when a defendant fails to object to an alleged sentencing error
before the district court, we will ordinarily consider any later objections forfeited
on appeal unless the defendant can meet the plain-error standard. United States
v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2007). This rule applies to a district court’s
alleged failure to adequately explain its reasons for imposing a particular
sentence and to the related claim that a district court did not comply with section
3553(c)’s statement requirement. Rosa, 957 F.3d at 117; Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 211.
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Accordingly, if a defendant fails to raise these objections at sentencing, we may
deem the objections forfeited unless the defendant can demonstrate plain error.
See Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 207. To meet the plain-error standard, a defendant
must establish four elements:
(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject
to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial
rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Rosa, 957 F.3d at 117–18 (citation omitted).
We understand Davis to advance two arguments in support of his
contention that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons when
determining his sentence. Davis’s first argument is that the court failed to spend
sufficient time “substantively analyzing” its reasons for selecting an above-
Guidelines sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 11; see also id. (“[N]one of [the district
court’s reasons for selecting Davis’s sentence were] adequately explained at
sentencing.”). Davis also claims that the district court erred by increasing his
sentence in response to a perceived rise in local crime in part because the district
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court did not inform the parties in advance that the court thought that the rise in
crime was relevant to Davis’s case. 1
Davis did not raise either of these objections at sentencing. And although
he now argues that he “made it clear” that the court failed to afford him
sufficient advance notice of the court’s intention to consider local crime rates
when sentencing Davis, Reply Br. at 4–5, the record shows otherwise. At
sentencing, the government argued that the court should sentence Davis to 70
months of imprisonment in part because of rising local crime rates, and the court
then granted Davis the opportunity to respond. Not only did Davis, through
counsel, agree “that gun crimes [we]re on the rise in the city and elsewhere,”
Davis also agreed that “the Court d[id] certainly need to take that into
consideration” when determining his sentence. App’x at 78. Davis never
objected that the court failed to grant him sufficient advance notice of the court’s
intention to consider the crime data. Hence, to the extent that Davis raised any
objection to the district court’s consideration of the crime data, Davis failed to
raise his procedural objection with sufficient specificity to preserve his claim for
1Davis further asserts that the district court gave the purported rise in local crime “too much
weight” when determining his sentence, which resulted in the sentence being substantively
unreasonable. Appellant’s Br. at 13. We consider this separate argument in the next section.
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appellate review. Cf. United States v. Jenkins, 43 F.4th 300, 302 (2d Cir. 2022)
(explaining, in the context of jury instructions, that an objection must be
sufficiently specific to preserve a claim); Jacquin v. Stenzil, 886 F.2d 506, 508 (2d
Cir. 1989) (“Specificity in an evidentiary objection is also required in federal
courts to preserve an issue for appeal.”). We will accordingly review both of
Davis’s objections to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence under the
plain-error standard of review.
Both of Davis’s claimed procedural errors—that the district court’s
reasoning for its sentence was too cursory and that the district court did not give
him sufficient advance notice of its intention to consider local crime data when
determining his sentence—fail under the plain-error standard because neither
error, assuming the district court did err, “is clear or obvious.” Rosa, 957 F.3d at
117 (citation omitted).
Regarding the first, as explained above, the district court possessed
substantial discretion when determining how much elaboration was needed to
sufficiently explain the reasons for Davis’s sentence. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.
While Davis faults the district court for failing to “substantively analyz[e]” the
district court’s reasons for sentencing Davis principally to an above-Guidelines
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sentence of 48 months of imprisonment, Appellant’s Br. at 11, a review of the
record refutes Davis’s argument. At sentencing, the district court engaged in a
thorough discussion of what Davis’s recommended sentence under the
Guidelines should be; extensively reviewed Davis’s “long” and “concerning”
criminal history, App’x at 84–85; adopted Davis’s Presentence Investigation
Report; and explained which sentencing factors in particular required the district
court, in its opinion, to sentence Davis to an above-Guidelines imprisonment
term. It is not “clear or obvious” to us that further elaboration was required.
Rosa, 957 F.3d at 117 (citation omitted).
Second, the district court did not clearly err by failing to give Davis
advance notice of its intention to consider local crime data when determining an
appropriate sentence. Davis relies on Cavera for his claim that advance notice
was required. There, we considered whether a district court erred by imposing
an above-Guidelines sentence upon a defendant convicted of a firearms-
trafficking offense in part because of the court’s “finding that the Sentencing
Guidelines failed to take into account the need to punish more severely those
who illegally transport guns into areas like New York City.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at
184. Before sentencing, the district court informed the parties that it was
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considering an above-Guidelines sentence, referred the parties to articles on local
variation in federal sentencing, and adjourned the proceedings so that the parties
could prepare appropriate submissions. Id. at 185, 194. In Davis’s case, however,
the district court merely permitted the parties to discuss at sentencing the issues
they thought were relevant, including the rise in local crime, and did not offer
the parties any prior notice that the court itself considered the rise relevant.
Although the district court admittedly afforded Davis less advance notice
of the factors that the district court found relevant when sentencing Davis than
the defendant received in Cavera, Davis has nonetheless failed to show that the
district court thereby committed clear procedural error. As an initial matter,
while Davis claims that the district court failed to comply with “the Cavera
standard,” Reply Br. at 5, the Cavera court did not hold that the district court’s
actions set any standard for procedural reasonableness. The Cavera court did
conclude that the district court’s actions were sufficient to render the defendant’s
sentence procedurally reasonable, see Cavera, 550 F.3d at 194, but that is not
equivalent to a holding that the district court’s actions were necessary.
It is also important that the district court’s decision to sentence Davis to an
above-Guidelines imprisonment term was a variance from the Guidelines’
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recommendation, not a departure. “[A] variance is a modification of the
applicable Guidelines sentence” that a district court imposes based upon its
consideration of the Guidelines factors. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 137
n.32 (2d Cir. 2009). A departure, on the other hand, “is a term of art under the
Guidelines” that refers to a non-Guidelines sentence that a district court imposes
in accordance with a policy statement outlined in the Sentencing Guidelines. Id.(citation omitted); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 1 (2023),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2023_Primer_Depa
rture_Variance.pdf (“Departures are sentences outside of the guideline range
authorized by specific policy statements in the Guidelines Manual. . . . Variances
are sentences outside of the guideline range that are not imposed within the
guidelines framework.”). Because Davis’s above-Guidelines sentence was a
variance, not a departure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not
require the district court to give the parties reasonable notice of its intent to
impose it. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) (“Before the court may depart from the
applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the
presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the
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parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure.” (emphasis
added)); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008) (“[R]ule [32(h)] does not
apply to . . . variances by its terms.”); United States v. Sealed Defendant One, 49
F.4th 690, 697 (2d Cir. 2022) (explaining that the “upshot” of the distinction
between departures and variances is that under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a “district court ha[s] no duty to give advance notice of [its intent to
impose a] variance”).
Moreover, even if due process or some related component of our
procedural reasonableness requirement entitled Davis to reasonable notice of the
district court’s intent to vary from the Guidelines’ recommendation based on its
consideration of the recent rise in gun violence in Davis’s community,2 the notice
that Davis received in this case was sufficient. As explained above, the district
court did not impose Davis’s sentence until after giving him an opportunity to
2 We need not and do not decide that issue today. Cf. Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 715 (stating that
“[s]ound practice dictates that judges in all cases should make sure that the information
provided to the parties in advance of the hearing, and in the hearing itself, has given them an
adequate opportunity to confront and debate the relevant issues” without expressly holding
that due process requires such a practice); United States v. Hatcher, 947 F.3d 383, 391 (6th Cir.
2020) (“One way in which a sentence may be procedurally unreasonable is when ‘the facts or
issues on which the district court relied to impose a variance came as a surprise and [the
defendant’s] presentation to the court was prejudiced by the surprise.’” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 377–78 (7th Cir. 2015) (suggesting
that Irizarry described a “‘best practice,’ which is different from a required practice”).
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respond to the government’s arguments at sentencing, including the
government’s new argument that the district court should impose a stricter
sentence due to rising local crime rates. Davis attempted to rebut the
government’s claim by arguing that the spike in crime occurred after his criminal
conduct, an argument with which the district court partially agreed. The record
thus demonstrates that Davis both had an adequate opportunity to respond to
the government’s new argument and, indeed, made an effective response. Davis
has also not satisfactorily identified what additional contentions he would have
made in response to the government’s argument about rising crime rates had he
received additional notice that the court found the argument persuasive. Cf.
App’x at 78 (Davis agreeing “that gun crimes are on the rise in the city and
elsewhere, and the Court does certainly need to take that into consideration”). In
light of these facts, and sentencing’s “fluid and dynamic” nature, Irizarry, 553
U.S. at 715 (citation omitted), where the district “court itself may not know until
the end whether a variance will be adopted, let alone on what grounds,” id.(citation omitted), we conclude that Davis has not shown that the district court
committed clear procedural error by not giving the parties advance notice of its
intent to consider rising local crime rates when determining Davis’s sentence.
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In sum, because Davis did not raise either of his claimed procedural errors
at sentencing and has not shown that the district court plainly erred, he has
forfeited his objections to his sentence’s procedural reasonableness.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Davis contends, moreover, that the 48-month imprisonment sentence that
the district court imposed was substantively unreasonable. This argument also
fails.
“A district court errs substantively if its sentence ‘cannot be located within
the range of permissible decisions.’” Chu, 714 F.3d at 746 (citation omitted). We
do not review a sentence’s substantive reasonableness to “substitute our own
judgment for the district court’s on the question of what is sufficient to meet the
§ 3553(a) considerations in any particular case.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. Instead,
we will vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness “only in exceptional
cases.” Id. These “few cases” include those where the sentence may be
procedurally correct but affirming it “would nonetheless damage the
administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high,
shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v.
Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). “In other words, our review of a criminal
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sentence ‘amounts to review for abuse of discretion.’” Chu, 714 F.3d at 746(citation omitted).
Davis argues that the district court’s sentence was substantively
unreasonable for two reasons. First, Davis claims that the district court’s
decision that Davis’s actions did not constitute reckless endangerment during
flight “directly contradicted” the district court’s concerns about the dangers
Davis’s actions posed to the community and the district court’s ultimate decision
to impose an above-Guidelines sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 12–13. Second, Davis
argues that the district court gave rising rates of local crime “too much weight”
when determining his sentence. Id. at 13.
Davis’s first argument is easily refuted. The Sentencing Guidelines
Manual instructs district courts to enhance a defendant’s offense level by two if
“the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.”
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021). The district
court determined that Davis’s actions did not justify this enhancement because,
inter alia, Davis fled from the police at a time late at night in which no civilian
bystanders were around and the police quickly apprehended him. As the district
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court’s reasoning makes clear, the issue of whether Davis’s flight from the police
justified the reckless-endangerment enhancement is distinct from the issue of
whether Davis’s sentence for his firearms offense was appropriate. The former
question is resolved by analyzing Davis’s conduct on the night of his arrest
whereas the latter question requires balancing the various sentencing factors and
considering Davis’s “long” criminal history, including the “concerning” fact that
Davis had previously been convicted of exactly the same crime. App’x at 85. In
short, nothing about the district court’s decision not to apply the reckless-
endangerment enhancement to Davis’s case suggests that the district court acted
unreasonably by sentencing Davis to an above-Guidelines imprisonment term.
The refutation of Davis’s second argument is more complicated. Davis
argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying too heavily on the
need to deter a recent rise in local gun violence. See Appellant’s Br. at 23 (“The
concept of general deterrence (under § 3553(a)(2)(B)) is a thin reed that does not
support a sentence double the recommended Guidelines range.”). Davis argues
that two related aspects of the court’s reasoning were particularly problematic.
Davis’s first concern is that the court agreed that the rise in crime occurred after
his criminal conduct. See id. at 13 (“Considering circumstances occurring
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subsequent to the offense conduct flies in the face of imposing a sentence that is
sufficient but no greater than necessary to achieve the otherwise legitimate goals
of § 3553(a)(2).”). Davis also objects to the fact that the court’s consideration of
local crime rates arguably increased his sentence as a result of the actions of
others with which he was not involved. See id. at 24 (“Davis accepted a guilty
plea based on an acknowledgement of his own wrong doing [sic] but then was
sentenced based on other’s misconduct.” (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in
original)).
Before addressing Davis’s arguments more directly, three observations:
First, although Davis’s briefs contain many statements that implicitly
question the accuracy of the district court’s determination that local gun violence
rates were rising in Davis’s community, see, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 12 (criticizing
the court for relying too heavily on “anecdotal information”), Davis never
explicitly argues that the district court’s conclusion about crime rates was
mistaken. Moreover, during sentencing, Davis agreed that “gun crimes [we]re
on the rise in the city and elsewhere.” App’x at 78. Davis has therefore waived
any argument to the contrary. See United States v. Miller, 328 F. App’x 33, 36 (2d
Cir. 2009) (summary order) (defendant waived ability to challenge on appeal loss
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calculation in presentence report by stating at sentencing that all parties agreed
on the loss calculation); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385 (2010)
(“[T]he law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of his
or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a
deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.”).
Second, for the same reasons, Davis has waived the ability to argue that
the rise in local crime could not play any role in the district court’s determination
of Davis’s sentence. Davis agreed that the court needed to take the rise “into
consideration.” App’x at 78. The issue here is whether the district court abused
its discretion by giving the local crime spike “too much weight,” Appellant’s Br.
at 13, not whether the court was precluded from considering the increase
altogether.
There is in any event nothing inherently impermissible about considering
the need to deter local crime when determining an appropriate sentence. See
Cavera, 550 F.3d at 195 (“The environment in which a crime was perpetrated
may, in principle, inform a district court’s judgment as to the appropriate
punishment in any number of ways.”); United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 71–72
(1st Cir. 2008) (affirming an above-Guidelines sentence that the district court
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imposed partly in response to what the district court called “an epidemic of
handgun violence in communities within this district” (citation omitted)). 3 The
court was also not precluded from factoring the spike in local crime into its
sentencing calculus because it occurred after Davis was arrested. The Guidelines
suggest that courts should consider the sentencing factors “in effect on the date
the defendant is sentenced,” not the date the defendant committed his or her
crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). Moreover, it was “established long before
the advent of the Guidelines that [a] sentencing court [may] properly take into
account . . . information known to it so long as the defendant ha[s] an
opportunity to respond in order that the court not rely on misinformation.”
United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 387–88 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal citation
omitted). Davis was given an opportunity to respond to the government’s
3We also note that the district court’s concern with rising rates of gun violence in Davis’s
community is different from the Cavera district court’s view that the Guidelines understated the
harms of trafficking firearms into urban areas like New York City. See Cavera, 550 F.3d at 185–
86. The Cavera district court increased the defendant’s sentence as a result of a more general
policy disagreement with how the Guidelines applied to urban areas. See id. at 185 (noting that
the district court concluded that “the Guidelines range did not adequately meet the ‘crying
need to do what can be done to deter gun trafficking into the large metropolitan area[s] of this
country.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). The district court in this case, however,
increased Davis’s sentence in part in response to a change in the specific community where
Davis committed his crime.
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argument about rising local crime rates and agreed that the rates were rising and
that the court needed to take that into consideration.
And while the district court’s recognition of the crime spike did arguably
result in Davis receiving a more serious sentence due to others’ misdeeds, that
does not mean that Davis’s sentence was inherently unreasonable. The
Guidelines require district courts to consider the need for their sentences “to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). This
requirement in turn requires courts to factor in the need for a sentence to provide
adequate general deterrent value. Politano, 522 F.3d at 74 (“The § 3553(a) factors
expressly provide for consideration of general deterrence . . . .”). General
deterrence, which Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[a] goal of criminal law
generally, or of a specific conviction and sentence, to discourage people from
committing crimes,” Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), “is
about preventing criminal behavior by the population at large and, therefore,
incorporates some consideration of persons beyond the defendant,” Politano, 522
F.3d at 74. Thus, not only was the district court permitted to consider the actions
of others when sentencing Davis; the Guidelines arguably required it to do so.
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United States v. Davis
But concluding that the district court did not act improperly by referencing
local crime rates when sentencing Davis is not the same as concluding that
Davis’s sentence was ultimately reasonable. Our review of a sentence’s
substantive reasonableness “take[s] into account the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The imprisonment sentence in this case, 48 months,
is more than double the length of the Guidelines’ high-end recommendation of
21 months. While the fact that a sentence deviates from the Guidelines’
recommendations does not create any presumption of unreasonableness, id., a
district court must support its decision to deviate from the Guidelines with a
justification that “is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the
variance,” id. at 50.
Third, although Davis implies that the district court sentenced him to an
above-Guidelines sentence solely in order to attempt to deter local crime, see, e.g.,
Appellant’s Br. at 15 (“[T]he prison term was more than doubled, based not on
the appellant’s dangerousness, but on that of others.” (emphasis in original)), the
district court’s reasoning was more multi-faceted and nuanced. When
determining his sentence, the district court considered, among other things, the
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United States v. Davis
seriousness of Davis’s offense and the fact that he “fled from the police and
discarded a loaded weapon on the city street,” App’x at 84–85; many aspects of
Davis’s criminal record, including the fact that Davis was convicted of the same
crime in 2005; and Davis’s history of substance abuse problems. Contrary to
Davis’s suggestions, Davis was not sentenced to an above-Guidelines sentence
solely because of the district court’s desire to deter a local spike in crime.
Thus, Davis objects to the extent to which the district court emphasized the
need to deter others from committing crimes when determining his sentence.
But the district court relied mostly on other considerations, and “[t]he weight to
be afforded any sentencing factor ‘is a matter firmly committed to the discretion
of the sentencing judge and is beyond our review, so long as the sentence
ultimately imposed is reasonable.’” United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 42 (2d Cir.
2019) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Roberts, 269 F. App’x
121, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (“[Defendant] argues that the district
court erred by . . . placing too much emphasis on general deterrence. The record
shows, however, that . . . the weight it gave to deterrence of similar crimes was
well within its discretion.”).
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United States v. Davis
To hold that Davis’s sentence was not ultimately reasonable, we would
need to conclude that the sentence he received was “shockingly high.” Rigas, 583
F.3d at 123. Davis argues that his sentence meets that standard because, inter alia,
he had a difficult upbringing, completed many rehabilitative program hours
while in prison, and does not have a lengthy history of violence. 4 These facts
weigh in Davis’s favor and likely were part of the district court’s reasons for not
sentencing Davis to a 70-month imprisonment term as the government requested
and as Davis received when he was convicted of the same offense in 2005. But
they are not strong enough to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion when sentencing Davis to a 48-month imprisonment term. See
Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289 (explaining that the “particular weight to be afforded
aggravating and mitigating factors ‘is a matter firmly committed to the discretion
of the sentencing judge’” (citation omitted)). Davis’s past conduct—particularly
the fact that he had previously been convicted of the same offense—and the
district court’s need to impose a sentence that was sufficient but not greater than
necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing justify the sentence imposed here.
4Many of the facts supporting these arguments were noted in Davis’s Presentence Investigation
Report, which the district court adopted at sentencing.
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United States v. Davis
See United States v. Feaster, 833 F. App’x 494, 496, 498 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary
order) (affirming a 60-month imprisonment sentence even though the Guidelines
recommended only 27–33 months of imprisonment for a defendant who, like
Davis, violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)).
In sum, because the district court did not commit any plain procedural
error when imposing Davis’s sentence and because Davis’s sentence does not
represent one of those “exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot
be located within the range of permissible decisions,’” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189(citation omitted), Davis’s appeal fails.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Davis’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude
that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
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