Seabrook v. United States ( 2023 )


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  • 22-841-pr
    Seabrook v. United States
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
    CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
    2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
    WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS
    COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
    A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
    ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 13th day of November, two thousand twenty-three.
    PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
    BETH ROBINSON,
    Circuit Judges.
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    NORMAN SEABROOK,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                        No. 22-841
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------
    FOR APPELLANT:                                  ROGER B. ADLER, Roger Bennet
    Adler, P.C., New York, NY
    FOR APPELLEE:                                   JARROD L. SCHAEFFER, (Lara
    Pomerantz, David
    Abramowicz, on the brief),
    Assistant United States
    Attorneys, for Damian
    Williams, United States
    Attorney for the Southern
    District of New York, New
    York, NY
    Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of New York (Alvin K. Hellerstein, Judge).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
    Plaintiff Norman Seabrook appeals from a March 9, 2022 order of the
    District Court (Hellerstein, J.) denying his habeas petition under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    and his motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure. We granted a certificate of appealability with respect to one of
    Seabrook’s claims for relief: that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
    because his attorney failed to consult with him about the trial court’s disclosed
    2
    potential conflicts of interest. 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as
    necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
    Seabrook, the former president of the Correction Officers Benevolent
    Association (“COBA”), was convicted after a jury trial of honest services wire
    fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud stemming from a kickback scheme
    involving a hedge fund, Platinum Partners. During a pretrial conference at
    which Seabrook was present with trial counsel, Judge Hellerstein disclosed that
    he had three relationships that presented potential conflicts of interest in the
    case: first, with a prosecution witness who had interned for him almost twenty
    years earlier; second, with the wife of Seabrook’s co-defendant, whose parents
    Judge Hellerstein knew; and third, with Andrew Kaplan, a defendant in a
    pending Eastern District of New York criminal case and former Platinum
    Partners executive, with whom Judge Hellerstein and his family had a close
    friendship. After disclosing these potential conflicts, Judge Hellerstein asked
    counsel to inform him if they did not want him to preside over the trial.
    1 Seabrook’s appeal of the denial of his motion for a new trial does not require a
    certificate of appealability.
    3
    Seabrook’s attorney responded, “we’re comfortable having you as the trial
    judge.” Appellee’s Add. 13.
    Seabrook brought a habeas petition, contending that his trial counsel’s
    failure to consult with him before declining to seek Judge Hellerstein’s recusal
    constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Seabrook also brought a motion for
    a new trial based on what he claims is new evidence material to his defense. On
    appeal, Seabrook challenges the dismissal of his habeas petition on the merits,
    Judge Hellerstein’s failure to hold a hearing or provide Seabrook notice before
    dismissing the petition, and the denial of his motion for a new trial.
    I.      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    “To demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a defendant
    must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness and that he was prejudiced as a result.” Lee v. United States, 
    582 U.S. 357
    , 363 (2017) (quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to this Court’s limited
    certificate of appealability, Seabrook argues that his trial counsel’s failure to
    consult with him before declining to move for Judge Hellerstein’s recusal fell
    below an objective standard of reasonableness because it undermined Seabrook’s
    Sixth Amendment right of autonomy.
    4
    We disagree. We have previously described the “nature of counsel’s
    choice not to move for recusal in a timely fashion” as “strategic.” United States v.
    Bayless, 
    201 F.3d 116
    , 130 (2d Cir. 2000). In general, it is not a decision that
    implicates a defendant’s “fundamental choices about his own defense.” McCoy
    v. Louisiana, 
    138 S. Ct. 1500
    , 1508, 1510–11 (2018); see United States v. Rosemond,
    
    958 F.3d 111
    , 119–21 (2d Cir. 2020). For that reason, we reject Seabrook’s
    argument that counsel’s failure to consult with him before declining to seek
    recusal of the District Court judge violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Cf.
    Florida v. Nixon, 
    543 U.S. 175
    , 187 (2004) (“An attorney . . . has a duty to consult
    with the client regarding important decisions. . . . That obligation, however, does
    not require counsel to obtain the defendant’s consent to every tactical decision.”)
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Having concluded that counsel’s failure to consult with Seabrook did not
    impair his Sixth Amendment rights, we need not and do not reach the question
    of whether Seabrook can show that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s
    failure to confer with him before declining to move for Judge Hellerstein’s
    recusal.
    5
    II.      Failure to Hold a Hearing
    Seabrook next argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his habeas
    petition without holding a hearing or notifying Seabrook. We review the District
    Court’s decision not to grant a hearing for abuse of discretion, Gonzalez v. United
    States, 
    722 F.3d 118
    , 131 (2d Cir. 2013), and its decision to dismiss Seabrook’s
    habeas petition without providing advance notice de novo, Ethridge v. Bell, 
    49 F.4th 674
    , 682 (2d Cir. 2022).
    Section 2255(b) provides that a district court “shall . . . grant a prompt
    hearing” upon receiving a habeas petition “[u]nless the motion and the files and
    records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (b). So “‘if it plainly appears from the motion, any attached
    exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled
    to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion.’” Puglisi v. United States, 
    586 F.3d 209
    , 213 (2d Cir. 2009) (brackets omitted) (quoting Rule 4(b) of the Rules
    Governing Section 2255 Proceedings). “[A] district court has the power to
    dismiss the petition on the merits without prior notice” if it is clear “that the
    petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Ethridge, 49 F.4th at 682 (quotation marks
    omitted) (emphasis added); see also Femia v. United States, 
    47 F.3d 519
    , 524 (2d Cir.
    6
    1995) (affirming dismissal without prior notice of a Section 2255 petition where
    the dismissal was based on the petition’s lack of merit), superseded by statute on
    other grounds, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–
    132, 
    110 Stat. 1214
    .
    Here, the material facts relating to trial counsel’s decision not to consult
    with Seabrook before deciding not to seek Judge Hellerstein’s recusal are
    undisputed. Because counsel was not obligated to confer with Seabrook before
    deciding whether to seek the recusal, for the reasons set forth above, Seabrook is
    not entitled to relief. The District Court dismissed Seabrook’s habeas petition
    because it plainly lacked merit. We therefore conclude that the District Court did
    not err in forgoing a hearing and dismissing Seabrook’s habeas petition without
    prior notice.
    III.   Motion for a New Trial
    Finally, Seabrook challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion for a
    new trial based on newly discovered evidence: a state civil lawsuit brought by
    Platinum Partners’ investors two years after Seabrook’s trial, alleging that they
    were deceived by Platinum Partners and its outside auditors. See Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 33. Upon review of the District Court’s denial of Seabrook’s Rule 33 motion
    7
    for a new trial for abuse of discretion, United States v. James, 
    712 F.3d 79
    , 107 (2d
    Cir. 2013), we reject Seabrook’s challenge.
    As an initial matter, Platinum Partners’ alleged fraud is not “newly
    discovered” evidence, as several Platinum Partners executives were indicted for
    fraud well before Seabrook’s trial took place. See United States v. Landesman, 
    17 F.4th 298
    , 317 (2d Cir. 2021) (noting that the grand jury returned an eight-count
    indictment in December 2016). And shortly after the indictment was filed, the
    Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint that alleged similar
    fraudulent schemes as the indictment. Compl., SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC,
    No. 16-cv-6848 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016).
    Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the evidence of the lawsuit is
    material to Seabrook’s conviction. The jury convicted Seabrook based on his
    intent to deprive COBA of honest services by taking bribes. Evidence of
    Platinum Partners’ efforts to conceal its separate and independent fraud,
    however, does not “directly contradict the government’s case” against Seabrook
    and thus does not “justify the grant of a new trial.” United States v. Jones, 965
    
    8 F.3d 149
    , 164–65 (2d Cir. 2020). 2
    We have considered Seabrook’s remaining arguments and conclude that
    they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court
    is AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    2Seabrook also contends that the evidence would have a material impact on his
    sentence because it would show that he did not intend for COBA to lose all $19 million,
    reducing the amount of restitution imposed. But because this issue was not raised
    before the District Court, we decline to consider it on appeal. Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of
    City of N.Y., 
    16 F.4th 1070
    , 1078 (2d Cir. 2021).
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-841

Filed Date: 11/13/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2023