Kling Realty Co. v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Texaco, Inc.) , 505 F. App'x 77 ( 2012 )


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  • 11-4587-bk
    Kling Realty Co. v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Texaco, Inc.)
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
    CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
    EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY
    ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
    York, on the 19th day of December, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:    ROBERT D. SACK,
    DENNY CHIN,
    RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    Circuit Judges,
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    IN RE TEXACO, INC.,
    Debtor.
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    KLING REALTY COMPANY, INC., WALET
    PLANTING COMPANY, KATHLEEN WALET
    MEITKAMP, DEANNA CECIL WALET GONDRON,
    MERLIN P. WALET, JR., HERMAN CHARLES
    WALET, CAROLYN MARIE WALET, ARTHUR
    STERN, J.D. MIER, SALLY A. MIER,                              11-4587-bk
    MURIEL O. LEVINSON, ANN C. MARTINEZ,
    KATHRYN S. CEJA, BRENDA S. BUXH,
    DAVID L. STERN, MICHAEL L. SNUR, CARY
    S. SOLOMON, AMY F. TILLEY, WILLIAM A.
    SNUR, DREW M. LERNER, DOUGLAS P.
    LERNER, REID S. LERNER, J. LIONEL
    KLING TRUST,
    Appellants,
    -v.-
    TEXACO, INC.,
    Appellee.*
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    FOR APPELLANTS:                                                     William E. Steffes, Steffes,
    Vingiello & McKenzie, LLC, Baton
    Rouge, Louisiana, Edward P. Landry,
    Landry, Watkins, Repaske & Breaux,
    New Iberia, Louisiana, J. Michael
    Veron, Alonzo P. Wilson, Turner D.
    Brumby, Veron Bice Palermo &
    Wilson, LLC, Lake Charles,
    Louisiana.
    FOR APPELLEE:                                                       Martin J. Bienenstock, Philip
    Abelson, Proskauer Rose LLP, New
    York, New York.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Appellants Kling Realty Company, Walet Planting
    Company, and others ("Kling") appeal from the October 6, 2011
    judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of New York (Seibel, J.) affirming the August 3, 2010
    order of the United States Bankruptcy Court (Drain, J.), which
    (1) found that all claims asserted by Kling against Texaco, Inc.
    ("Texaco") in a certain action in Louisiana state court (the
    "Louisiana Action") were discharged by the bankruptcy court's
    March 23, 1988 order confirming Texaco's Chapter 11 second
    amended joint plan of reorganization (the "Confirmation Order");
    (2) directed Kling to dismiss all such claims; and (3) enjoined
    *
    The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official
    caption to conform with the above.
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    Kling from pursuing those claims.                                               We assume the parties'
    familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
    the case, and the issues presented for review.
    In essence, Kling argues on appeal that the bankruptcy
    court erred by dismissing its claims and enjoining it from
    pursuing claims that Texaco engaged in tortious conduct by
    spreading contaminated mud and fluids around the portion of
    Kling's property known as Section 27, both after the date
    Texaco's bankruptcy petition was filed (the "Petition Date") and
    after the date its plan of reorganization was confirmed (the
    1
    "Confirmation Date").                                               Kling also contends that the bankruptcy
    court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss its claims
    arising after the Confirmation Date.
    In an appeal from a district court's review of a
    bankruptcy court's order, this Court reviews the bankruptcy
    court's factual findings for clear error and its legal
    conclusions de novo.                                               Browning v. MCI, Inc. (In re WorldCom,
    Inc.), 
    546 F.3d 211
    , 216 (2d Cir. 2008).                                               Pursuant to the
    Bankruptcy Code, the confirmation of a plan of reorganization
    "discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date
    of such confirmation."                                               
    11 U.S.C. § 1141
    (d)(1)(A) (2010).
    1
    Kling does not challenge the dismissal of its contract
    claims, and therefore those claims are abandoned on appeal.
    Moreover, to the extent that Kling asserted contract claims
    below, the bankruptcy court and district court properly concluded
    that they arose before the Petition Date, as the lease was both
    executed and terminated prior to that date. See Ogle v. Fid. &
    Deposit Co. of Md., 
    586 F.3d 143
    , 146 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Under
    contract law, a right to payment based on a written
    indemnification contract arises at the time the indemnification
    agreement is executed.") (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
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    For substantially the reasons articulated by the
    district court, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err
    in concluding that Kling's tort claims for restoration of Section
    27 arose before the Petition Date and were discharged by the
    Confirmation Order.    See Kling Realty Co. v. Texaco, Inc. (In re
    Texaco, Inc.), No. 10-CV-8151 (CS), 
    2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111533
    (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011).
    To the extent Kling now asserts that Texaco's post-
    Petition and post-Confirmation clean-up operations on Section 27
    caused damage "separate and distinct from any damage caused by
    contamination deposited on the property prior to the Petition
    Date," Amended Br. for Appellants at 26, that argument also
    fails.    First, Kling forfeited this argument by failing to argue
    to the district court that Texaco had caused additional damage to
    Section 27 after the Petition Date or after the Confirmation
    Date.    On the contrary, in its district court brief, Kling framed
    Texaco's tortious activity as a failure to restore the property
    to its original condition.    See Br. of Appellants at 37-41, Kling
    Realty Co. v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Texaco, Inc.), No. 10-CV-8151
    (CS), 
    2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111533
     (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011).
    Indeed, rather than alleging separate damage to the property,
    Kling characterized Texaco's post-Petition and post-Confirmation
    clean-up operations as "inadequate and superficial," and alleged
    that Texaco had merely attempted "to bury the contamination left
    from its operations."    
    Id. at 48, 18
    .   By failing to raise its
    claims of post-Petition and post-Confirmation damage to the
    district court, Kling did not preserve that issue for review by
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    either the district court or this Court.   See Asbestosis
    Claimants v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (In re
    Prudential Lines Inc.), 
    533 F.3d 151
    , 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing
    Nostas Assocs. v. Costich (In re Klein Sleep Prods., Inc.), 
    78 F.3d 18
    , 29 (2d Cir. 1996)).
    Second, even if Kling had not forfeited the issue, we
    conclude that Kling's tort claims based on Texaco's clean-up
    operations arose prior to the Petition Date, and therefore were
    necessarily discharged by the subsequent Confirmation Order.     "A
    common law claim for damages to property from contamination
    arises when '[a]ll of the physical events required to establish
    the elements of . . . such claims occurred.'"   Goldman, Sachs &
    Co. v. Esso Virgin Islands, Inc. (In re Duplan Corp.), 
    212 F.3d 144
    , 157 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Sanders (In re
    Texaco, Inc.), 
    182 B.R. 937
    , 951 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)).      Kling
    contends that "Texaco's 'clean-up' operations consisted of
    removing the toxic waste and mud in certain pits [associated with
    oil and gas wells in Section 27], and spreading it across the
    Kling property."   Amended Br. for Appellants at 16.   Kling
    further alleges that these clean-up operations spread "drilling
    fluids used during oil and gas operations (which are hazardous
    and toxic)."   Amended Reply Br. for Appellants at 17.   Even
    assuming Kling's allegations are true, the contaminated mud and
    fluids that Kling alleges Texaco spread around Section 27 after
    the Petition Date and after the Confirmation Date were already on
    the property at the latest by the time Texaco (a) ceased its oil
    and gas production on Section 27, (b) plugged and abandoned its
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    wells on Section 27, and (c) released all its rights to Section
    27 -- all of which occurred before the Petition Date.      Thus,
    because all the physical events required to establish the
    elements of Kling's tort claims based on contamination of Section
    27 occurred prior to the Petition Date, those claims arose before
    the Confirmation Date and were discharged by the Confirmation
    Order.    Similarly, because Kling's tort claims arose before the
    Petition Date, those claims do not constitute administrative
    expenses under Reading Co. v. Brown, 
    391 U.S. 471
     (1968).
    Finally, we reject Kling's claim that the bankruptcy
    court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss all its
    claims in the Louisiana Action and enjoin it from pursuing those
    claims.    "A bankruptcy court retains post-confirmation
    jurisdiction in a chapter 11 proceeding only to the extent
    provided in the plan of reorganization."    Hosp. & Univ. Prop.
    Damage Claimants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville
    Corp.), 
    7 F.3d 32
    , 34 (2d Cir. 1993).    Here, the plan of
    reorganization provided that the bankruptcy court retained
    jurisdiction, inter alia, to take any action to resolve any
    disputes arising out of or relating to any claim, and to construe
    and to take any action to enforce the plan.    Insofar as the
    bankruptcy court concluded that all of Kling's claims in the
    Louisiana Action arose prior to the Petition Date and were
    discharged by the Confirmation Order, the bankruptcy court was
    well within its jurisdiction to take action to enforce the plan.
    Kling's assertion that it should have the opportunity to amend
    its complaint in the Louisiana Action to assert post-Confirmation
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    claims merely serves to support the bankruptcy court's conclusion
    that all the claims actually asserted in the Louisiana Action
    arose prior to the Petition Date and were discharged by the
    Confirmation Order.
    We have considered Kling's remaining arguments and find
    them to be without merit.   Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of
    the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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