United States v. Edmond Gaudelli, Jr. , 688 F. App'x 115 ( 2017 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 16-4026
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
EDMOND N. GAUDELLI, JR.,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. No. 2-02-cr-00275-001)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 31, 2017
______________
Before: VANASKIE, KRAUSE and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 1, 2017)
______________
OPINION *
______________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Edmond Gaudelli files this appeal from the District Court’s denial of his
petition for writ of coram nobis. We will affirm.
I
In 2003, a federal jury convicted Gaudelli of perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, based
upon Gaudelli’s false testimony in a civil deposition. On direct appeal of Gaudelli’s
perjury conviction, this Court summarized the factual history as follows:
In June 1999, Gaudelli, a police officer with the City of
Pittsburgh, filed a civil action against his employer and
several police officers in his department alleging that after he
had responded to a domestic violence call at the home of
Chief of Police Robert McNeilly, he was told by his superiors
to expunge the call from his records. Gaudelli claimed that
when he tried to “[speak] out about police misconduct and
harassment and other matters of public concern,” the
department and its officers retaliated against him in violation
of his First Amendment right to free speech.
At his deposition in the case, Gaudelli elaborately detailed
responding to a domestic violence call at the McNeilly
residence on September 28, 1996. He stated that a fellow
officer instructed him not to log the response in his record and
that other officers confided with him about similar encounters
at the McNeilly home. Evidence was produced, however,
contradicting Gaudelli’s claims. McNeilly provided
documentation that on the day of the alleged call, he and his
family were vacationing in Florida. Several officers that
Gaudelli referenced in his story denied his allegations. There
was no record of such an event in the department’s record-
keeping system, and the individual who created the system
stated that a record could not have been expunged from it. In
light of this evidence, Gaudelli voluntarily dismissed the case.
Subsequently, Gaudelli was tried for perjury in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1621. At trial, the government presented
evidence that the statements Gaudelli made during his
2
deposition were false. McNeilly testified that he was in
Florida on the day that Gaudelli claimed to have responded to
a call at his home. Several officers testified that Gaudelli had
fabricated conversations he had alleged in his deposition
testimony. Gaudelli presented several officers and dispatchers
who testified that a call did come from the McNeilly
residence on some unknown date. Ultimately, the jury
convicted Gaudelli.
United States v. Gaudelli, 134 F. App’x 565, 566-67 (3d Cir. 2005).
Gaudelli was sentenced to twelve months’ incarceration followed by two years of
supervised release. Id. at 566. Thereafter, we remanded for resentencing under United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Id. Gaudelli was resentenced to twelve months
and one day of incarceration and two years of supervised release. In 2007, the District
Court granted Gaudelli’s motion to terminate his supervised release.
More than seven years later, in 2014, Gaudelli filed the instant petition for a writ
of coram nobis. Gaudelli contends that newly-discovered witnesses would prove that he
did not commit perjury. Gaudelli also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, including
the claim that his criminal trial attorney labored under a conflict of interest because he
was seeking an elected position as a judge.
The District Court denied coram nobis relief on two grounds. First, the District
Court found that Gaudelli failed to prove that he suffers “continuing consequences” of an
allegedly invalid conviction, as required by United States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105
(3d Cir. 1989). Second, the District Court held that Gaudelli did not establish “sound
reasons” for his substantial delay in seeking relief under Stoneman. Id. at 106 (quoting
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954)). This timely appeal followed.
3
II
“The District Court had jurisdiction over the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), in
aid of its jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.” Mendoza v. United States, 690 F.3d
157, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. United States v.
Rhines, 640 F.3d 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). We review de novo legal errors
arising from the denial of a writ of coram nobis. Id.III
The authority to grant a writ of coram nobis arises under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a). Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 105 (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506). A
petition for coram nobis “is used to attack allegedly invalid convictions which have
continuing consequences, when the petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer ‘in
custody’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.” Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 105-06. The
remedy of coram nobis is “extraordinary,” and the error must be “of ‘the most
fundamental kind.’” Id. at 106 (quoting United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d
Cir. 1963)); see also United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911 (2009). “Earlier
proceedings are presumptively correct and the petitioner bears the burden to show
otherwise.” Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106 (citation omitted). The petitioner must also
establish that “there was no remedy available at the time of trial” and that “‘sound
reasons’ exist for failing to seek relief earlier.” Id. (quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512).
For example, coram nobis relief has been granted based upon extraordinary, newly-
discovered evidence, which could not have been discovered through due diligence.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting coram nobis
4
petition based upon suppressed military report regarding Japanese exclusion orders
during World War II).
As to Gaudelli, we will assume without deciding that he suffers “continuing
consequences” of his perjury conviction. Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106. 1 Nevertheless, we
agree with the District Court that there are no sound reasons for his delay in seeking
relief. The “‘sound reason’ standard is even stricter than that used to evaluate” federal
habeas petitions, Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159, and the availability of the writ is limited to
“extraordinary” cases so that the finality of judgments is not at risk, Denedo, 556 U.S. at
911. Gaudelli’s purported reason for the late filing of his coram nobis petition amounts
to no more than repetition of the same attacks on Police Chief McNeilly that he has
pursued since filing his civil lawsuit in 1999. Gaudelli’s argument is circular. He alleges
that McNeilly retaliated against him. It follows, Gaudelli argues, that his witnesses
would reasonably fear coming forward to assist him. Therefore, Gaudelli concludes, it
took years of investigation for him to prove that his retaliation claims were not perjured.
1
The Circuits are split as to whether a court may presume the existence of
collateral consequences from the fact of a conviction for the purposes of a coram nobis
petition. See United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 254 (1st Cir. 2012) (collecting
cases). This Court has not definitively ruled on this issue, which we addressed in dicta in
United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1060 (3d Cir. 1988) (declining to presume for
coram nobis purposes that collateral consequences follow a conviction, but noting that
the issue was undisputed by the parties). We need not resolve this issue, as we reject
Gaudelli’s petition on other grounds.
5
The mere repetition of Gaudelli’s debunked allegations does not justify his delay in
seeking relief. 2 As such, his coram nobis petition was properly denied.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
2
The District Court also noted, and Gaudelli does not dispute, that McNeilly’s
term as Police Chief ended on January 2, 2006. This was more than eight years before
Gaudelli filed his coram nobis petition.
6