Angelo Clark v. Robert Coupe ( 2022 )


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  •                                        PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 21-2310
    __________________________
    *ANTOINE CLARK, as personal representative for Angelo
    Clark,
    Appellant
    v.
    ROBERT COUPE, DOC Commissioner; PERRY PHELPS;
    DAVID PIERCE; MAJOR JEFFREY CARROTHERS;
    CAPTAIN BURTON; CAPTAIN RISPOLI;
    CAPTAIN WILLY; DR. WILLIAM RAY LYNCH; DR.
    PAOLA MUNOZ; DR. DAVID YUNIS; RHONDA
    MONTGOMERY; SUSAN MUMFORD; STEPHANIE D.
    JOHNSON; CONNECTIONS COMMUNITY SUPPORT
    PROGRAMS INC; STEFANIE STREETS; STEPHANIE
    EVANS-MITCHELL; CAROL VODVARKA; CAROL
    VANDRUNEN; LEZLEY SEXTON
    *(Amended pursuant to Clerk's Order dated 2/1/22)
    ______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (D.C. No. 1-17-cv-00066)
    District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
    _____________
    Argued: March 30, 2022
    ______________
    Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: November 28, 2022)
    Dwayne J. Bensing [ARGUED]
    Susan L. Burke
    American Civil Liberties Union
    100 West 10th Street
    Suite 706
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Chad S.C. Stover
    Barnes & Thornburg
    222 Delaware Avenue
    Suite 1200
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Counsel for Appellant
    Ryan T. Costa [ARGUED]
    Kenneth L. Wan
    Office of Attorney General of Delaware
    Delaware Department of Justice
    6th Floor
    820 North French Street
    Carvel Office Building
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Counsel for Appellee
    Peter M. Slocum
    Lowenstein Sandler
    One Lowenstein Drive
    Roseland, NJ 07068
    Counsel for Amicus Appellant National Disability Rights
    Network
    Daniel Greenfield
    Northwestern Pritzker School of Law
    MacArthur Justice Center
    375 East Chicago Avenue
    Chicago, IL 60611
    Counsel for Amicus Appellant Roderick & Solange
    MacArthur Justice Center
    Laura L. Rovner
    Tempest Cantrell (law student)
    Chris Nafekh (law student)
    Katie Scruggs (law student)
    University of Denver
    2
    Civil Rights Clinic
    2255 East Evans Avenue
    Suite 335
    Denver, CO 80208
    Counsel for Amicus Appellants Richard Morgan and Dan
    Pacholke
    Brian Biggs
    DLA Piper
    1201 North Market Street
    Suite 2100
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Counsel for Amicus Appellant Professors and Practitioners of
    Psychiatry Psychology and Medicine
    _______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ______________
    RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
    Angelo Clark, a prisoner diagnosed with manic
    depression and paranoid schizophrenia, brought an as-applied
    claim alleging his months-long placement in solitary
    confinement violated his constitutional rights.1 The District
    Court dismissed the claim on qualified immunity grounds,
    finding Clark failed to allege the violation of a clearly
    established right. We must disagree. Clark alleged prison
    officials imposed conditions they knew carried a risk of
    substantial harm and caused him to suffer debilitating pain that
    served no penological purpose. Because these allegations
    trigger established Eighth Amendment protection, we will
    reverse the grant of qualified immunity and remand for further
    proceedings.
    I.
    1
    This Court received notice of Angelo Clark’s death on
    January 21, 2022. His personal representative, Antoine
    Clark, was named appellant that same day.
    3
    A.     Factual Allegations
    The District Court dismissed Clark’s conditions of
    confinement claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6). In reviewing the dismissal, we accept all sufficiently
    pled allegations as true. Mammana v. Federal Bureau of
    Prisons, 
    934 F.3d 368
    , 372 (3d Cir. 2019). Clark’s allegations
    are summarized as follows:
    While an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional
    Center (JTVCC) in Delaware, Clark was placed in solitary
    confinement on or around January 22, 2016. Following an
    incident at mealtime involving another inmate, prison officials
    moved Clark to the Secure Housing Unit (SHU). App. 66, ¶
    50. By 2016, Clark had been treated for schizophrenia and
    bipolar disorder at the prison for at least ten years, a fact of
    which the prison officials were aware. App. 59, ¶ 5. Despite
    having few disciplinary “points” on his record and no security
    classification meriting solitary confinement, Clark remained in
    the SHU for seven months. App. 66, ¶ ¶ 50, 51.
    Inside the SHU, Clark was alone in his cell except for
    three one-hour intervals per week. The SHU cells are
    approximately eleven by eight feet with solid doors and two
    four-inch-wide windows, one of which faced the hallway.
    App. 64, ¶ 39. The cell lights were on from approximately 6
    a.m. to 11:30 p.m., which meant they were off for
    approximately six hours a day. Meals were delivered without
    human contact through a slot in the door. App. 59, ¶ 8.
    Solitary confinement meant Clark was deprived of all
    opportunities to engage in “normal” human interaction; he was
    not allowed to work and prohibited from participating in
    educational programs or religious services. Id., ¶ 7. He was
    permitted only four phone calls and four visitors per month.
    App. 64, ¶ 40.
    The JTVCC’s policy regarding inmates in the SHU is
    that they must “earn their way out” by exhibiting appropriate
    behavior. App. 69, ¶ 68. While in isolation, Clark would “yell
    and bang on the door to get the attention of the [Department of
    Corrections] officials.” Id., ¶ 69. Prison officials considered
    these outbursts and Clark’s inability to “calm[ ] down” to be
    4
    disciplinary incidents and would punish him by extending his
    stay in the SHU. When Clark would question why he remained
    in the SHU for “months and months,” prison officials would
    put him in the “naked room,” an isolation cell where he was
    given an open smock for clothing. App. 67, ¶ 57.
    For the seven months, Clark was trapped in a “vicious
    cycle” where his mental illness would cause behavior that was
    punished by conditions that furthered his mental deterioration.
    App. 61, ¶ 13. Clark’s extended stay in the SHU worsened his
    mental illness and caused lasting harm. As a result of the
    isolation, Clark experienced “increased hallucinations,
    paranoia, self-mutilation, sleeplessness, and nightmares.”
    App. 60, ¶ 12.
    Commissioner of the Delaware Department of
    Corrections (DOC) Richard Coupe authorized Clark’s
    placement in the SHU. JTVCC Warden David Pierce, who had
    the authority to veto and re-classify an inmate’s housing status,
    kept Clark in the SHU for seven months despite knowing of his
    mental illness. According to the complaint, the DOC Policy
    Manual requires prison officials to “identify those prisoners
    whose conditions would be contrary to confinement in
    segregations, including prisoners with serious mental illness.”
    App. 69-70, ¶ 72. Clark posits Commissioner Coupe and
    Warden Pierce failed to abide by the Manual’s requirement to
    consider his mental illness in determining the cause of “the
    alleged rule violations” or the “appropriateness of sanction or
    the conditions or duration of the sanctions.”
    2 App. 70
    , ¶ 73.
    Clark further alleges defendants Commissioner Coupe
    and Warden Pierce knew of the American Correctional
    Association (ACA) study on the effects of solitary confinement
    on seriously mentally ill inmates, the results of which were
    published in March 2016— two months after Clark entered the
    SHU and five months before he was released. The ACA
    2
    Clark also alleged the DOC defendants “deliberately
    underbid [their] contract with [the] DOC with conscious
    disregard for the severe impact its lack of funding has on the
    health of Mr. Clark and other prisoners with [serious mental
    illness].” App. 78, ¶ 107(g).
    5
    recommended prisons implement measures to ensure the
    isolation would not exacerbate an inmate’s mental illness.
    3 App. 72
    , ¶ 84. Warden Pierce participated in the ACA study
    in 2015. The study’s report singled out Warden Pierce, stating
    that he is not “open to change in regards to restrictive housing
    objective and classification regarding the mentally ill,” and
    cited his authority “to over-ride decision[s] on classification
    and/or mentally ill treatment decisions.” App. 75, ¶ 94.
    The complaint avers the ACA study, the “other prior
    lawsuits” against the JTVCC, and the prisons officials’
    “familiarity with their own policy and practice” provided the
    DOC defendants with direct notice of the “extreme adverse
    effects” of holding seriously mentally ill inmates like Clark in
    solitary confinement.
    4 App. 73
    , ¶ 86.
    B. District Court Proceedings
    Clark sued JTVCC prison officials, including
    Commissioner Coupe and Warden Pierce, under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . He alleged numerous constitutional violations that
    purportedly arose from his seven-month stay in the SHU. He
    3
    Clark claimed the DOC defendants were made aware of the
    study because in 2015 Delaware State Representative J. J.
    Johnson, head of Delaware’s House of Representatives
    Corrections Committee, introduced legislation to reform the
    DOC’s use of solitary confinement. To prevent having
    Johnson advocate for such legislation, the DOC agreed to
    allow the ACA to conduct the study in Delaware’s prisons. Id.
    ¶¶ 82, 83.
    4
    Clark’s other alleged sources of notice are the standards
    published by the National Commission on Correctional Health
    in 2008 that warned of the deterioration mentally ill inmates
    can experience if confined to conditions of “extreme isolation.”
    App. 65, ¶ 44. Also, the American Psychiatric Association’s
    position statement on solitary confinement for prisoners with
    mental illness opined that prolonged segregation should be
    avoided in light of the potential for harm. Id. ¶ 45. In 2012,
    the Association defined prolonged segregation as three to four
    weeks. App. 73, ¶ 87.
    6
    accused the defendants of inflicting cruel and unusual
    punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, providing
    inadequate medical care also in violation of the Eighth
    Amendment, conspiring to and engaging in retaliation against
    his mental illness in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
    rights, and placing him in solitary confinement in violation of
    his due process rights. The prison officials moved to dismiss
    Clark’s claims.
    5 App. 78
    –83.
    Parsing the Eighth Amendment claims, the District
    Court permitted Clark to proceed on allegations that the prison
    officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
    needs while he was in solitary confinement and that his
    placement in the SHU was in retaliation for being mentally ill.
    After discovery, these claims went to trial and the jury reached
    a verdict in favor of the defendants. According to the verdict
    form, Clark failed to prove he was deprived of adequate
    medical care while in solitary confinement or that he was put
    there “because of” his mental illness. App. 723.
    The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to
    dismiss the conditions of confinement claim that we address
    now. In his initial complaint, Clark alleged that—as a mentally
    ill inmate—the conditions of solitary confinement placed him
    at risk for serious substantial harm, and the prison’s practice of
    placing inmates with known mental illness in the SHU is done
    with deliberate indifference to the “serious mental health
    implications of long term confinement in isolation.” App. 79,
    ¶ 113. Given the enhanced risk of substantial harm, Clark
    alleged this practice as applied to him constituted cruel and
    unusual punishment.
    Following the magistrate’s recommendation, the
    District Court dismissed the conditions of confinement claim
    on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded the law
    did not support Clark’s claim “that housing a mentally ill
    inmate in solitary confinement for long periods of time violates
    5 The State argues that claims regarding Clark’s stays in the
    SHU prior to January 23, 2015—two years before he filed his
    complaint in District Court—are barred by the statute of
    limitations. We agree and will therefore only address the
    seven-month SHU stay starting in 2016.
    7
    a clearly established Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
    and unusual punishment.” App. 4 (citing App. 108).
    Accordingly, it ruled the prison officials were immune from
    suit. This appeal addresses that ruling.
    II.
    Before addressing the propriety of the dismissal,
    however, we must address whether Clark is legally barred from
    raising this claim given the jury verdict deciding his other
    Eighth Amendment claims.6 The State broadly argues the
    instant appeal “is barred by the law of the case doctrine,
    collateral estoppel, and res judicata.” Appellee Br., 26. We
    disagree.7
    First, we must determine which of these doctrines
    provides the appropriate framework for addressing the
    reviewability of the instant appeal. Here, the District Court
    allowed two of Clark’s three Eighth Amendment claims to
    proceed to trial; the third claim, the conditions of confinement
    claim before us now, was dismissed. After the jury’s verdict
    deciding the two claims, the District Court entered a single
    judgment for the defendants on all claims.8 This appeal
    followed that judgment.
    6 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     and 1343. We have appellate
    jurisdiction over District Courts’ final orders pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    7
    Clark never addressed this issue of collateral estoppel in his
    opening brief because he never disclosed that the two other
    Eighth Amendment claims went to trial and were decided in
    the defendants’ favor. The absolute omission regarding the
    outcome of his other claims was at best unhelpful and at worse
    obfuscation. We note Clark appealed the judgment but does
    not challenge the adjudication of his other claims. App. 21.
    The District Court’s judgment as to those claims is therefore
    affirmed. App. 20.
    8
    After deciding defendants’ motion to dismiss the first
    amended complaint, the District Court granted Clark’s motion
    to reconsider and allowed him to proceed with his retaliation
    8
    Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion,
    addresses the effect a prior adjudication in a different case has
    on a current case; “it doesn’t often have much to say about the
    preclusive effects of rulings within the framework of a
    continuing action.” Currier v. Virginia, 
    138 S. Ct. 2144
    , 2154
    (2018) (plurality decision) (internal citation and quotation
    marks omitted). Therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply
    when two rulings are made at different stages within the same
    proceeding. United States v. Briseno, 
    843 F.3d 264
    , 270 (7th
    Cir. 2016). Instead, the “[r]elitigation of issues previously
    determined in the same litigation is controlled by principles of
    the law of the case doctrine rather than collateral estoppel.”
    Hull v. Freeman, 
    991 F.2d 86
    , 90 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation
    omitted). See also United States v. Reyes-Romero, 
    959 F.3d 80
    , 93 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, Clark’s three Eighth Amendment
    claims arose from the same complaint and were ultimately
    resolved by the same judgment. Under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 54(b), the District Court could have revisited its
    decision to dismiss Clark’s conditions of confinement claim
    prior to issuing the final judgment. See Filebark v. U.S. Dept.
    of Transp., 
    555 F.3d 1009
    , 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 18B Charles
    Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL
    PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4478.1, at 660, 667 (3d ed.
    2019). Accordingly, the dismissal of the conditions claim
    occurred at a different stage within the same proceeding. See
    Brisneo, 843 F.3d at 270. As a result, any binding effect the
    District Court’s dismissal has on this appeal is controlled by
    the law of the case doctrine. See Reyes-Romero, 959 F.3d at
    93.
    claim, that he was placed in solitary confinement because of
    his mental illness. App. 16. In so doing, the Court reiterated
    its earlier ruling dismissing the instant conditions of
    confinement claim because “no clearly established law
    supports finding that housing a mentally ill inmate in solitary
    confinement is per se a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”
    Id. at 13, 16. Post-trial, on June 10, 2021, the District Court
    entered a judgment dismissing the claims raised in the second
    amended complaint. Clark’s notice of appeal, contesting the
    dismissal of the conditions of confinement claim, was filed
    July 9, 2021.
    9
    But the law of the case doctrine does not bar an
    appellate court from reviewing the propriety of the District
    Court’s ruling. Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 
    924 F.2d 689
    , 690 (7th Cir. 1991). Instead, it is this Court’s function to
    review the decisions of the District Court. Reyes-Romero, 959
    F.3d at 93 (citing Musacchio v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 709
    ,
    716 (2016)). We are not bound by the District Court’s decision
    to dismiss Clark’s conditions of confinement claim and “owe
    no deference” to its findings beyond what the standard of
    review demands. Id. at 93.
    Even if issue preclusion did apply, it would only bar the
    re-litigation of findings “truly essential” to the jury’s verdict
    deciding Clark’s other Eighth Amendment claims. See Caver
    v. City of Trenton, 
    420 F.3d 243
    , 259 (3d Cir. 2005). The jury’s
    verdict was predicated on findings that Clark was not deprived
    of adequate medical care while in solitary confinement and was
    not placed in the SHU because of his mental illness. App. 723–
    24. The conditions of confinement claim, or what the District
    Court deemed the “per se” solitary confinement claim, exists
    independently of those decided at trial. The State’s arguments
    to the contrary are not persuasive.            Citing Porter v.
    Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, it argues the
    subjective element of a conditions of confinement claim, which
    requires proof that prison officials were deliberately indifferent
    “to inmate health or safety,” necessarily involves re-litigating
    the issue of whether Clark received adequate mental health
    treatment in solitary confinement. 
    974 F.3d 431
    , 441 (3d Cir.
    2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 834 (1994)).
    Under the State’s theory, adequate medical care is an essential
    element of Clark’s conditions of confinement claim, which
    means the jury’s finding that he received such care precludes
    review of the conditions claim’s dismissal on appeal.
    Such a finding would run contrary to this Court’s
    precedent, which treats conditions of confinement claims as
    separate and distinct from challenges addressing access to
    medical care. In Porter, we recognized the viability of a claim
    alleging the “substantial risk of serious psychological and
    physical harm” posed by solitary confinement without
    identifying the absence of mental health treatment as a
    necessary element. 874 F.3d at 441-42 (citing Williams v.
    Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs., 
    848 F.3d 549
    , 566–68 (3d
    10
    Cir. 2017)). In Palakovic v. Wetzel, we held allegations that
    solitary confinement was “inhuman for [Palakovic] in light of
    his mental illness” averred a viable conditions of confinement
    claim without discussing his access to mental health treatment.
    
    854 F.3d 209
    , 226 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we conclude
    that the jury’s verdict does not preclude our review of Clark’s
    “per se” solitary confinement claim.9
    Finally, “issue preclusion ‘cannot apply when the party
    against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full
    and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.’” Reyes-Romero, 959
    F.3d at 93 (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC,
    
    923 F.3d 308
    , 316 (3d Cir. 2019)). Clark’s conditions of
    confinement claim was denied on qualified immunity grounds;
    the District Court concluded there was no clearly established
    right preventing the placement of a mentally ill inmate in
    solitary confinement for an extended period of time. Clark
    appealed this ruling at the first possible instance, after final
    judgment was entered dismissing his case. Given that he has
    not had a “full and fair adjudication” of this issue, he cannot be
    estopped from pursuing the conditions of confinement claim
    on appeal. 
    Id.
     (quoting 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments
    § 28(5)).
    For these reasons, we reject the State’s argument that
    the jury’s verdict prevents this Court from reviewing the
    dismissal of his conditions of confinement claim. We now
    turn to whether that dismissal was proper as a matter of law.
    9
    Although not discussed by the State in its issue preclusion
    argument, the jury also determined that Clark was not placed
    in solitary confinement because he was mentally ill. As with
    the finding that he was not denied mental health care, we
    conclude this determination does not preclude this Court from
    addressing Clark’s conditions of confinement claim. Why a
    prisoner is placed in solitary confinement is not an element in
    challenging that condition. This Court did not address the
    reasons behind Palakovic’s thirty-day stints in solitary in
    finding that there was a viable Eighth Amendment claim. See
    Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225–26. The jury’s findings regarding
    why Clark was sent to the SHU does not preclude this Court
    from addressing the constitutionality of the conditions and
    length of his stay.
    11
    III.
    We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim
    based on the defense of qualified immunity because it involves
    a pure question of law. Walker v. Coffey, 
    905 F.3d 138
    , 143
    (3d Cir. 2018) (citing McLaughlin v. Watson, 
    271 F.3d 566
    ,
    570 (3d Cir. 2001)). Applying the same standard of a district
    court, a claim should survive a motion to dismiss if it contains
    sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a
    claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” Mammana, 
    934 F.3d at 372
     (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    570 (2007)). “A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff
    pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009)). In assessing the claims, we must construe
    the complaint liberally and assume the veracity of all “well-
    pleaded factual allegations.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 679.
    IV.
    Clark alleges his prolonged stay in solitary
    confinement, imposed by prison officials who knew he was
    mentally ill, caused him to suffer mental deterioration for no
    justifiable reason in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
    The District Court dismissed Clark’s claim on the grounds of
    qualified immunity, concluding that the prison officials were
    shielded from liability because there was no clearly established
    law prohibiting a months-long placement of a seriously
    mentally ill inmate in solitary confinement. Viewing the
    specific allegations through the proper lens, however, leads us
    to a different conclusion. Established law at the time of Clark’s
    SHU stay prohibited prison officials from imposing conditions
    that threatened a substantial risk of serious harm and inflicted
    such harm for no penological reason. Clark’s allegations,
    liberally construed, give rise to a plausible claim that the
    circumstances surrounding his months-long stay in the SHU
    violated this established law. Accordingly, the District Court’s
    Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the conditions of confinement claim
    was premature. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
    12
    A.     Qualified Immunity
    “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials
    from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate
    clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
    reasonable person would have known.” Peroza-Benitez v.
    Smith, 
    994 F.3d 157
    , 165 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 
    577 U.S. 7
    , 11
    (2015)) (per curiam). In assessing whether qualified immunity
    was properly granted, we engage in a two-part analysis: (1)
    whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a right had been
    violated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established
    when it was allegedly violated to the extent “that it would have
    been clear to a reasonable person that his conduct was
    unlawful.” Williams, 848 F.3d at 557.
    The District Court dismissed Clark’s conditions of
    confinement claim based on the second part, finding no clearly
    established right, without addressing whether he sufficiently
    alleged a constitutional violation. We will do so now. Clark
    raised an as-applied challenge, alleging the particular
    conditions of his confinement violated his right to be free from
    cruel and unusual punishment. In defining the right allegedly
    violated, we assess whether Clark’s allegations show the
    conditions he endured were cruel and unusual, rather than
    determine if he succeeded in alleging a broader claim that
    solitary confinement of a mentally ill inmate violates the
    Eighth Amendment.
    B.     Constitutional Violation
    “The Eighth Amendment ‘prohibits any punishment
    which violates civilized standards and concepts of humanity
    and decency.’” Thomas v. Tice, 
    948 F.3d 133
    , 138 (3d Cir.
    2020) (quoting Young v. Quinlan, 
    960 F.2d 351
    , 359 (3d Cir.
    1992)). The Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition as
    “impos[ing] affirmative duties on prison officials ‘to provide
    humane conditions of confinement.’” Young v. Martin, 
    801 F.3d 172
    , 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 832
    ). To sufficiently allege prison officials violated his Eighth
    Amendment rights by imposing inhumane conditions, Clark’s
    13
    complaint had to allege facts showing (1) the deprivation he
    endured was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the prison officials
    had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Thomas, 948 F.3d
    at 138 (quoting Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 834
    ).
    The deprivation element is adequately pled when the
    allegations depict conditions where the inmate is denied “the
    minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v.
    Seiter, 
    501 U.S. 294
    , 299 (1991). The benchmark for alleging
    such deprivation is not that the inmate was merely
    uncomfortable; he or she must show they are “incarcerated
    under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”
    Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 834
    . Showing a substantial risk of harm
    is a less demanding standard than alleging conditions posing
    “a probable risk of harm.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep’t
    of Corr., 
    806 F.3d 210
    , 227 (3d Cir. 2015).
    The second element is subjective and requires an inmate
    to sufficiently plead prison officials acted with deliberate
    indifference. Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 834
     (citations omitted).
    Deliberate indifference is effectively alleged where an inmate
    shows officials knew of, but disregarded, that the prison
    conditions posed “an excessive risk to inmate health and
    safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 
    256 F.3d 120
    , 133 (3d Cir.
    2001).
    As to the first element, this Court has previously held
    that factual allegations comparable to Clark’s were sufficient
    to allege conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm.
    In Palakovic, a young man “diagnosed with a number of
    serious mental disorders” was repeatedly placed in solitary
    confinement for “30-day stints” during the thirteen months he
    spent in a Pennsylvania prison. 854 F.3d at 217, 225. Like
    Clark, Palakovic was severely isolated with limited
    opportunity for any social interaction during these stays. Id. at
    217. Palakovic’s parents, who brought the claim on their son’s
    behalf, alleged prison officials knew the conditions of
    confinement “were inhumane for him in light of his mental
    illness” because the majority of the self-harm incidents
    occurred in the prison’s solitary confinement cells. Id. at 225.
    Palakovic ultimately committed suicide in one of these cells.
    Id. at 217. This Court held Palakovic’s parents sufficiently
    pled an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging prison officials
    14
    imposed conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious
    harm to their mentally ill son. Id. at 225-26.
    In so holding, the Palakovic Court acknowledged “the
    robust body of legal and scientific authority recognizing the
    devastating mental health consequences caused by long-term
    isolation.” Id. at 225. Citing our decision in Williams, the
    Palakovic Court recognized “a growing consensus” that
    solitary confinement conditions can cause “severe and
    traumatic psychological damage” that in turn leads to high
    rates of self-harm or suicide in inmates who had spent time in
    solitary confinement. Id. It is “[a]gainst this backdrop of
    extremely serious and potentially dire consequences of lengthy
    exposure to the conditions of solitary confinement” that this
    Court assesses allegations of prison officials’ deliberate
    indifference towards placing inmates with known mental
    illnesses in conditions of extreme isolation for extended
    periods of time. Id. at 226. Given this backdrop, Clark’s
    allegations—that he was kept in conditions of almost complete
    isolation for seven months by officials who knew him to be
    seriously mentally ill—are sufficient to allege the requisite
    deprivation.
    This brings us to the second element of a conditions of
    confinement claim, whether Clark sufficiently alleged the
    prison officials possessed a culpable state of mind. We
    conclude that he did. Clark claimed the DOC defendants were
    “well aware” that he was seriously mentally ill, given that he
    had been treated for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder at the
    prison for over ten years. App. 59, ¶ 5. He alleged they knew
    that placing him in solitary confinement would cause him to be
    “severely and adversely affected.” Id. ¶ 6. According to
    Clark’s complaint, the prison officials acted in complete
    disregard for their own policies and procedures, which require
    seriously mentally ill inmates to be closely assessed and
    evaluated before being placed in solitary confinement. App.
    69-70, ¶¶ 72, 73. Clark further alleged these particular officials
    were made aware of the unjustifiable risk posed by their
    conduct by the ACA’s investigation into the JTVCC’s use of
    solitary confinement for mentally ill inmates. As noted, the
    investigation’s results, published while Clark was in the SHU,
    directly criticized defendant Warden Pierce’s practices and
    recommended fundamental changes to the conditions of
    15
    solitary confinement to alleviate any potential harm. App. 72,
    75, ¶¶ 84, 94. Despite this purported awareness of his mental
    illness and the risk of serious harm, Clark alleged prison
    officials disregarded his pleas to leave the SHU and
    unnecessarily kept him there for seven months, causing his
    mental health to deteriorate. Clark alleged the months in
    isolation caused him to experience “increased hallucinations,
    panic attacks, paranoia, nightmares and self-mutilation.” App.
    75-76, ¶ 97.
    Again, the Palakovic decision is illustrative. In both
    cases, the plaintiffs alleged the prison officials knew the
    inmates were mentally ill and that prolonged isolation posed a
    substantial risk of harm. In Palakovic, officials were provided
    notice by the prior incidents of self-harm that occurred in
    segregated housing and their knowledge of a pending
    investigation by the Department of Justice into the prison’s use
    of solitary confinement. 854 F.3d at 217. Here, the alleged
    notice to prison officials was far more direct: the DOC’s own
    internal policies required they consider Clark’s mental illness
    in determining both the appropriateness and length of time
    spent in solitary confinement, and the results of a completed
    investigation concluded that defendant Warden Pierce and the
    JTVCC’s use of isolation threatened the health of mentally ill
    inmates. Moreover, Clark alleged his symptoms were
    noticeably exacerbated by the isolation and prison officials
    responded by keeping him in the damaging conditions for
    seven months. Following Palakovic, we hold these allegations
    are sufficient to plead the DOC defendants possessed a
    culpable state of mind.
    This Court has recognized “the increasingly obvious
    reality that extended stays in solitary confinement can cause
    serious damage to mental health.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 226.
    See also Porter, 974 F.3d at 441 (“It is well established in both
    case law and scientific and medical research that prolonged
    solitary confinement . . . poses a substantial risk of serious
    psychological and physical harm.”); Williams, 848 F.3d at
    567–68 (citations omitted) (citing studies of inmates in solitary
    confinement documenting high rates of suicide and self-
    mutilation, which are “believed to be maladaptive mechanisms
    for dealing with the psychological suffering that comes with
    isolation.”). Viewing Clark’s complaint with this reality in
    16
    mind, we conclude his allegations that he was kept in solitary
    confinement by prison officials who were deliberately
    indifferent to the effects of prolonged isolation on his already
    severely compromised mental health are sufficient to raise a
    viable Eighth Amendment claim.
    V.
    Having held Clark sufficiently alleged a violation of his
    Eighth Amendment right due to the conditions of his
    confinement, we must now determine whether qualified
    immunity was properly awarded. This entails deciding if the
    particular right outlined in Clark’s complaint was clearly
    established at the time of his stint in the SHU. The District
    Court ruled no established law was violated. We hold now that
    ruling was premature given the nature of his allegations.
    Because Clark sufficiently alleges the circumstances of his
    time spent in solitary confinement violated rights long
    protected by Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, we will
    reverse the grant of immunity and remand for further
    proceedings.
    “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly
    established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct,
    the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every
    reasonable official would have understood that what he is
    doing violates that right.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 
    836 F.3d 235
    , 248 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 741 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
    ultimate question is whether the state of the law when the
    offense occurred” gave the prison officials “fair warning” that
    their conduct violated Clark’s Eighth Amendment right. Id. at
    247 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 
    536 U.S. 730
    , 741 (2002)).
    To determine whether such “fair warning” existed, we
    search first for “factually analogous” cases in the Supreme
    Court, and then turn our inquiry to whether “binding opinions
    from our own Court” were in existence. Peroza-Benitez, 994
    F.3d at 165 (citing Fields v. City of Phila., 
    862 F.3d 353
    , 361
    (3d Cir. 2017)). If neither source provides relevant caselaw,
    we consider whether “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive
    authority in the Court of Appeals could clearly establish a right
    for purposes of qualified immunity.” L. R., 836 F.3d at 248.
    17
    Finally, “[w]e may also take into account district court cases,
    from within the Third Circuit or elsewhere.” Peroza-Benitez,
    994 F.3d at 166 (citing L.R., 836 F.3d at 248).
    Before searching for relevant caselaw, however, we
    must first identify the specific right Clark alleged was violated.
    Defining the contours of the right is critical to determining
    whether it was clearly established; we must define the right “at
    the appropriate level of specificity.” Sharp v. Johnson, 
    669 F.3d 144
    , 159 (3d Cir. 2012). “This requires us to frame the
    right ‘in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
    general proposition.’” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165
    (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 201 (2001)). We
    define the right with specificity because only then can we
    determine whether “the violative nature of the [officials’]
    particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna,
    
    136 S. Ct. 305
    , 308 (2015) (per curium). We turn then to the
    complaint and the specific facts surrounding the alleged
    violation.
    The District Court defined Clark’s alleged right as
    prohibiting prison officials from “housing a mentally ill inmate
    in solitary confinement for long periods of time.” App., 4. As
    so defined, the court held the complaint did not allege a
    violation of a clearly established Eighth Amendment right and
    dismissed the claim. But, given the facts averred in Clark’s
    complaint, we find this characterization of the alleged right
    insufficiently specific. In defining the alleged right, the
    circumstances surrounding Clark’s confinement in the SHU
    matters. The particularities of the prison officials’ alleged
    conduct in imposing the seven-month stay must be considered
    when deciding whether qualified immunity was appropriate.
    Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (“The dispositive question is whether
    the violative nature of the particular conduct is clearly
    established.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Based on the allegations in the complaint, the particular
    conduct at issue was prison officials keeping Clark in solitary
    confinement for seven months despite knowing of his serious
    mental illness. He alleged these DOC defendants had been
    made aware of the devastating effects of the JTVCC’s solitary
    confinement units and had direct notice that extended stays in
    the SHU “exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness for
    18
    prisoners and result in further deterioration of their mental
    health.” App. 69, ¶ 67. He claimed he was kept in the SHU
    because the manifestations of his mental illness would be
    treated as “prison rule infractions,” which resulted in increased
    punishment and additional time in the SHU. App. 60, ¶ 12;
    App. 69, ¶ 70. As noted earlier, Clark alleged complaining
    about his prolonged stay in isolation would result in his being
    sent to the “naked room,” an isolation cell where he received
    only an open smock for clothing. App. 67, ¶ 57.               His
    allegations included the assertion that the DOC defendants had
    the “authority and ability” to change their practices but
    deliberately did not do so, choosing instead to intentionally
    inflict “extreme emotional and mental distress” on him. App.
    78, ¶¶ 108-09. Viewing these allegations in their totality, we
    modify the District Court’s enunciation of the alleged right to:
    the right of a prisoner known to be seriously mentally ill to not
    be placed in solitary confinement for an extended period of
    time by prison officials who were aware of, but disregarded,
    the risk of lasting harm posed by such conditions.
    In determining whether this articulated right was clearly
    established at the time of Clark’s seven-month stay in the SHU,
    we broaden the scope beyond determining whether “the very
    action in question has been held unlawful.” Anderson v.
    Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 640 (1987). The Supreme Court does
    not require that earlier cases share the same or even similar
    facts for a right to be deemed clearly established; it is enough
    that the prior cases are “factually analogous.” Peroza-Benitez,
    994 F.3d at 165 (citing Fields, 862 F.3d at 361). Further, we
    must look at analogous cases with the understanding that this
    Court takes a “broad view of what constitutes an established
    right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at
    166 (internal citations omitted). As a result, state officials can
    still receive fair warning that their conduct is violative even in
    “novel factual circumstances” never previously addressed in
    caselaw. Hope, 
    536 U.S. at 741
    . See also al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. at 741
     (“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing
    precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
    question beyond debate.”).
    Here, Clark alleged facts that put the officials’ conduct
    squarely in the purview of established Eighth Amendment law.
    By alleging prison officials imposed solitary confinement for
    19
    months, knowing the isolation carried a substantial risk of
    exacerbating his mental illnesses but keeping him there until
    he suffered serious harm, Clark alleged conduct that no
    reasonable corrections officer could conclude was
    constitutionally permissible. Two decades ago, this Court held
    prison conditions “may not be so brutal or unhealthy as to be
    in itself a punishment.” Young v. Quinlan, 
    960 F.2d 351
    , 359
    (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as
    stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 
    204 F.3d 65
    , 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000).
    In assessing the conditions of segregated housing units, “[t]he
    touchstone is the health of the inmate.” Id. at 364. While the
    law recognizes that prison officials are authorized to punish for
    disciplinary infractions, the Constitution forbids them to do so
    “in a manner that threatens the physical and mental health of
    the prisoners.” Id. In Young, this Court recognized that
    determining the constitutionality of prison conditions is a
    heavily fact-specific inquiry, where the particular
    characteristics of the prisoner raising the challenge are taken
    into consideration. Id. at 365 (noting fact that prisoner was
    HIV-positive made unsanitary conditions “all the more
    revolting” given that he is “more susceptible to infection and
    disease”). Clark alleges months in the SHU were particularly
    dangerous for him because his mental illnesses made the
    extreme and prolonged isolation an inhumane condition, given
    his susceptibility to serious psychological injury. App. 78-79,
    ¶¶ 108, 112. See also Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225 (holding
    conditions of solitary confinement were inhumane for
    Palakovic “in light of his mental illness”).
    Despite the threat of harm posed by isolation, we
    recognize that solitary confinement does not per se violate the
    Constitution “as long as the conditions of confinement are not
    foul, inhuman or totally without penological justification.”
    Young, 
    960 F.2d at
    364 (citing Ford v. Bd. of Managers of New
    Jersey State Prison, 
    407 F.2d 937
    , 940 (3d Cir. 1969)). But
    Clark alleges conditions that contravene those requirements.
    Even assuming Clark was initially placed in the SHU for a
    justified penological purpose, the “pronounced worsening” of
    his mental illness symptoms resulting from months in isolation
    was wholly pointless and unjustified. App. 58, ¶ 1; App. 79, ¶
    114. No penological purpose was served by irrevocably
    damaging Clark’s already severely compromised mental
    health; the increased incidents of hallucinations or self-
    20
    mutilation resulting from the exacerbation of his schizophrenia
    and bi-polar disorder cannot be deemed a legitimate “part of
    his penalty” for committing a disciplinary infraction. Rhodes
    v. Chapman, 
    452 U.S. 337
    , 347 (1981). We hold Clark’s
    allegations give rise to the reasonable inference that prison
    officials imposed conditions resulting in the “gratuitous
    infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 
    428 U.S. 153
    , 183
    (1976). At the time of Clark’s stay in the SHU, imposing
    conditions that cause the “wanton and unnecessary infliction
    of pain” had long violated the Eighth Amendment prohibitions
    against cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes, 
    452 U.S. at 347
    .
    To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, however,
    the wanton and unnecessary infliction pain must be done
    knowingly. Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court
    established that prison conditions do not violate the Eighth
    Amendment unless officials act with deliberate indifference in
    subjecting a prisoner to the risk of serious harm. See Wilson,
    
    501 U.S. at 299
     (holding violation of Eighth Amendment
    requires “obduracy and wantonness” rather than “inadvertence
    or error in good faith”) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 
    475 U.S. 312
    , 319 (1986)). Thus, to allege the violation of a clearly
    established right, Clark had to have sufficiently alleged the
    DOC defendants “recklessly disregard[ed]” the risk that his
    months in solitary confinement were inhumane in light of his
    serious mental illness. Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 836
    . Clark alleged
    the officials knew the risks the SHU posed to him as a mentally
    ill inmate but did not respond reasonably to ensure his safety.
    Such unexplained inaction in the face of a known risk has long
    been held violative of the Eighth Amendment. 
    Id. at 845
    . See
    also Whitley, 
    475 U.S. at 320-321
     (holding prison measures
    that inflict unnecessary and wanton pain on prisoners, when no
    plausible explanation for such measures is provided, violate
    Eighth Amendment).
    There is no indication in the complaint that prison
    officials imposed the prolonged term of solitary confinement
    for legitimate non-punishment reasons, such as for Clark’s own
    protection or out of administrative necessity. See, e.g., Gibson
    v. Lynch, 
    652 F.2d 348
    , 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding no
    constitutional violation where three-month stay in solitary
    confinement was due to a “grave shortage of general
    21
    population cell space”) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 555 (1974)). Long before Clark’s stay in the SHU, Eighth
    Amendment law prohibited officials from recklessly imposing
    conditions carrying a known risk to a prisoner’s health for no
    justifiable reason. Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 843-45
    . See United
    States v. Lanier, 
    520 U.S. 259
    , 271 (1997) (noting a “general
    constitutional rule” prohibits the wanton and unnecessary
    infliction of cruelty on prisoners).
    Moreover, the subjective knowledge of a substantial
    risk of harm can be inferred from the objective circumstances
    of a prison’s conditions if such conditions pose an obvious
    danger to the inmates. Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 825
    . Here the risk
    was obvious because the harm inherent in conditions of solitary
    confinement has long been recognized. Indeed, the Supreme
    Court recognized the threat to prisoners’ mental health over a
    century ago:
    A considerable number of prisoners fell, after
    even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous
    condition, from which it was next to impossible
    to arouse them, and others became violently
    insane; others still, committed suicide; while
    those who stood the ordeal better were not
    generally reformed, and in most cases did not
    recover sufficient mental activity to be of any
    subsequent service to the community.
    In re Medley, 
    134 U.S. 160
    , 168 (1890). This Court has long
    held that allegations of inflicting a serious mental injury are
    sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. White
    v. Napoleon, 
    897 F.2d 103
    , 110–11 (3d Cir. 1990) (allegations
    that prison doctor’s purposeful infliction of unnecessary
    emotional harm on inmate patients raises Eighth Amendment
    cause of action). Further, there was a general consensus among
    the Courts of Appeals preceding Clark’s stay in the SHU that
    a threat of serious psychological injury invokes Eighth
    Amendment protection. See, e.g., Shakka v. Smith, 
    71 F.3d 162
    , 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (serious or significant emotional
    injury resulting from conditions of confinement satisfies
    Eighth Amendment claim); Thomas v. Farley, 
    31 F.3d 557
    ,
    559 (7th Cir. 1994) (the infliction of mental torture has been
    the basis for viable cruel and unusual punishment claims in
    22
    prisoner cases); Jordan v. Gardner, 
    986 F.2d 1521
    , 1529 (9th
    Cir. 1993) (en banc) (severe psychological pain can violate the
    Eighth Amendment); Scher v. Engelke, 
    943 F.2d 921
    , 924 (8th
    Cir. 1991) (“fear, mental anguish, and misery” can cause
    sufficient pain to violate the Eighth Amendment). Clark
    alleged his pre-existing condition of serious mental illness
    heightened the impact of solitary confinement, rendering it
    capable of inflicting severe mental trauma. By claiming the
    prison officials knowingly imposed such conditions, Clark
    sufficiently alleged the violation of a clearly established
    right.10
    In addition to violating the Eighth Amendment, Clark
    alleges the prison officials violated the Delaware DOC’s own
    policies regarding the imposition of solitary confinement.
    Clark posits prison officials disregarded the policy by failing
    to “consider sufficiently the role mental illness played in . . .
    determining the appropriateness of sanctions or the conditions
    or duration of the sanctions.” App. 70, ¶ 73. By alleging their
    indifference to prison procedure, Clark inferred the officials
    10
    Clark’s allegations that he was punished for complaining
    about the SHU by being sent to a “naked cell,” where he was
    given an open smock for clothing and a mattress on the floor,
    App. 67, ¶ 57, could raise a viable claim of cruel and unusual
    punishment in and of itself based on a consensus of Courts of
    Appeals decisions. See, e.g., Porth v. Farrier, 
    934 F.2d 154
    ,
    156 (8th Cir. 1991) (prima facie showing of Eighth
    Amendment violation where prison officials denied prisoner
    all clothing and bedding for twelve hours as a punitive
    measure); Maxwell v. Mason, 
    668 F.2d 361
    , 363 (8th Cir.
    1981) (deprivation of clothing and bedding bear no
    relationship to security measure and therefore amount to an
    unnecessary infliction of pain in violation of Constitution);
    McCray v. Burrell, 
    516 F.2d 357
    , 367 (although conditions
    were intended to observe prisoner for self-harm, two days in
    isolation cell without clothing or bedding unconstitutional);
    Wright v. McMann, 
    387 F.2d 519
    , 521 (2d Cir. 1967)
    (complaint alleging solitary confinement cell where prisoner
    was naked and denied bedding of any kind was cruel and
    unusual punishment). See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal
    Standards for Prisons and Jails, §§ 11, 14 (1980) (prisoners in
    disciplinary detention must be fully clothed).
    23
    knew but ignored the DOC’s prohibition against his seven-
    month stay in segregation. Clearly established law dictated
    that such internal governing policies are relevant in
    determining whether the officials received fair warning of a
    potential constitutional violation. See Hope, 
    536 U.S. at
    743–
    44 (recognizing Department of Corrections’ regulations are
    relevant to determining whether prison officials had fair
    warning of constitutional violation); Treats v. Morgan, 
    308 F.3d 868
    , 875 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting prison regulations that
    govern correctional officers’ conduct relevant in determining
    whether inmate’s right was clearly established).
    Allegations that the officials disregarded prison
    regulations while inflicting wanton pain provided sufficient
    grounds for the denial of qualified immunity at the complaint
    stage. See Young, 801 F.3d at 182 (in deciding whether prison
    officials were entitled to immunity on remand, district court
    instructed to determine whether punishment violated prison
    regulations). Indeed, the DOC policies become all the more
    relevant in determining whether officials had fair warning that
    their conduct “ran counter” to the Eighth Amendment given
    that few cases addressed the constitutionality of solitary
    confinement for seriously mentally ill prisoners at the time of
    Clark’s stay in the SHU. See Williams, 848 F.3d at 571 (prison
    policy relevant to qualified immunity analysis because limited
    nature of case law in existence at time of term of segregation).
    Clark alleges these officials received another warning
    that their conduct was potentially unconstitutional when they
    were sued in federal court. Two months after Clark entered
    solitary confinement, the District Court of Delaware ruled
    defendant Commissioner Coupe’s alleged conduct of placing
    mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement, without adequate
    mental health treatment and out-of-cell time, raised a viable
    constitutional claim. Cmty. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc. v. Coupe, No.
    15-688-GMS, 
    2016 WL 1055741
    , at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 16,
    2016) [hereinafter CLASI]. In that case, CLASI claimed
    Commissioner Coupe, who remained Commissioner of the
    DOC at the time of Clark’s stay in the SHU, knew the prison’s
    practice of keeping mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement
    would “exacerbate their symptoms of mental illness and cause
    serious harm to their mental and physical health.” Id. at *1.
    The district court denied Coupe’s motion to dismiss the claim,
    24
    ruling that CLASI’s allegations rendered it plausible that
    Coupe “was aware that placing mentally ill patients in solitary
    confinement could deprive inmates in a manner that is
    ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ [so] that Coupe would draw
    the inference that a ‘substantial risk of serious harm exists.’”
    Id. at *4 (internal citation omitted). While this decision did not
    create a clearly established right, Clark is correct that the
    CLASI decision provided JTVCC prison officials with direct
    notice that their conduct regarding solitary confinement
    potentially violated the Eighth Amendment. And yet,
    according to Clark, this targeted warning was disregarded, as
    evidenced by the fact he remained in solitary confinement for
    another five months.
    The CLASI decision contains additional support for
    concluding Clark alleged the violation of a clearly established
    law. In this Court, decisions from district courts are relevant
    in determining whether prison officials received fair warning
    that their conduct was violative. See Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d
    at 167 (in the absence of “actually analogous precedent” from
    the Supreme Court or this Court, relevant and timely district
    court decisions can help determine whether the law was clearly
    established). See also Doe v. Delie, 
    257 F.3d 309
    , 321 n.10
    (“[A]s our prior decisions have illustrated, district court
    opinions do play a role in the qualified immunity analysis.”).
    The district court cases cited in the CLASI opinion provide a
    robust consensus of decisions specifically addressing the
    constitutionality of assigning mentally ill prisoners to solitary
    confinement: Ind. Protection & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v.
    Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:05-cv-01317-TUP-MJD,
    
    2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974
    , at *60–61 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31,
    2012) (Indiana Department of Correction’s practice of putting
    seriously mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement threatens
    permanent injury and violates the Eighth Amendment); Jones
    “El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d. 1096, 1101–02 (W.D. Wis.
    2001) (granting injunctive relief because conditions of solitary
    confinement “can be devastating” to mentally ill prisoners
    housed in supermax prison); Madrid v. Gomez, 
    889 F. Supp. 1146
    , 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (placement of mentally ill
    inmates “in the SHU is the mental equivalent of putting an
    asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe” and therefore
    unconstitutional); Coleman v. Wilson, 
    912 F. Supp. 1282
    ,
    1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that prison’s policies and
    25
    practices regarding segregating inmates with serious mental
    disorders violates the class members’ Eighth Amendment
    rights); Casey v. Lewis, 
    834 F. Supp. 1477
    , 1549-50 (D. Ariz.
    1993) (holding that Arizona prison officials’ practice of
    assigning seriously mentally ill inmates to segregated housing
    “despite their knowledge of the harm” constitutes an
    “appalling” Eighth Amendment violation); Langley v.
    Coughlin, 
    715 F. Supp. 522
    , 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding
    viable claim that prison officials’ failure to “screen out” those
    inmates that “by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to
    be severely and adversely affected by placement there”). In
    this Court, these cases—cited in a decision ruling against the
    same Commissioner of the Delaware DOC that Clark named
    as a defendant for engaging in the same conduct Clark is
    challenging—are relevant in determining the state of the law.11
    11 In addition to those cited in the CLASI opinion, multiple
    district court decisions recognized the substantial risk of
    serious harm that faces mentally ill prisoners in solitary
    confinement and addressed the necessary changes to avoid
    such harm. See Disability Advocs., Inc. v. New York State Off.
    of Mental Health, No. 02 Civ. 4002 (GEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
    2007) (settlement reached that all seriously mentally ill
    inmates housed in isolation were entitled to, inter alia, two
    hours per day of out-of-the cell programming given allegations
    that solitary confinement gave rise to increased self-
    mutilation); Scarver v. Litscher, 
    371 F. Supp. 2d 986
    , 1003
    (W.D. Wis. 2005), aff’d, 
    434 F.3d 972
     (7th Cir. 2006) (placing
    a mentally ill inmate in solitary confinement, marked by
    “conditions so lacking in physical and social points of
    reference,” might reasonably lead to “a kind of psychological
    torture and future acts of self-harm”); Coleman v. Brown, 
    28 F. Supp. 3d 1068
    , 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (ordering prison officials
    in California not to place any mentally ill prisoner in solitary
    “unless that class member’s treating physician certifies that . .
    . the inmate’s mental illness did not preclude the inmate from
    conforming his or her conduct to the relevant institutional
    requirements . . . [and] the inmate does not face a substantial
    risk of exacerbation of his or her mental illness or
    decompensation as a result of confinement in a SHU.”).
    26
    Notice of clearly established law also came from
    Delaware’s own state legislature. Had Clark’s seven-month
    term in solitary confinement been imposed by a Delaware state
    court, it would have been illegal. Five years before Clark’s
    stint in the SHU the Delaware legislature enacted a statute
    prohibiting courts from imposing a term of solitary
    confinement longer than three months. Section 3902 of the
    Delaware Code read in relevant part:
    In every case of sentence to imprisonment for a
    term exceeding 3 months, the court may by the
    sentence direct that a certain portion of the term
    of imprisonment, not exceeding 3 months, shall
    be in solitary confinement.
    Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 § 3902 (repealed 2021). This Court has
    consistently considered relevant state statutes when
    determining if the grant of qualified immunity is appropriate.
    See Williams, 848 F.3d at 570-71 (finding a related state statute
    “bear[s] on whether Plaintiff’s due process rights were clearly
    established”). See also Kane v. Barger, 
    902 F.3d 185
    , 195 (3d
    Cir. 2018) (recognizing that officer’s conduct resembled the
    statutory crime of indecent assault in denying qualified
    immunity); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 
    269 F.3d 205
    , 211-12
    (3d Cir. 2001) (denying qualified immunity for officer who
    shot dog after acknowledging state statute defined dogs as the
    owners’ personal property). Here, the defendant prison
    officials were tasked with implementing the sentences imposed
    by Delaware state courts. Familiarity with the state’s
    sentencing structures was therefore an integral part of
    Commissioner Coupe and Warden Pierce’s responsibilities.
    The state of Delaware law at the time of Clark’s stay in the
    SHU provided reasonable prison officials with fair warning
    that seven months in isolation—which was four months past
    the limit allowed by sentencing courts in the state of
    Delaware—was unlawful.
    While these sources of notice do not, in and of
    themselves, clearly establish the law, they buttress the Eighth
    Amendment jurisprudence invoked by Clark’s allegations.
    Both Supreme Court and this Court’s precedents consider
    district court cases, prison regulations, and state statutes in
    determining whether officials received fair warning that their
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    conduct was unreasonable. Here, Clark alleged that the
    JTVCC’s officials knew his prolonged stint in isolation posed
    a substantial risk to his mental health but imposed the
    conditions anyway, despite knowing serious pain resulted and
    that such pain served no penological purpose. Established
    Eighth Amendment law prohibited this alleged wanton and
    gratuitous infliction of pain, and the law in conjunction with
    other sources of notice warned prison officials that their
    purported conduct was unlawful.
    VI.
    Given the specific conduct alleged and the warnings of
    potential misconduct provided the defendants, we conclude
    further proceedings are warranted. The District Court’s grant
    of qualified immunity was premature in light of the possible
    Eighth Amendment violation. In so holding we are mindful
    that the allegations in Clark’s complaint may be disproven
    during discovery, rendering the prison officials’ conduct
    appropriate. In allowing Clark’s claim to proceed we do not
    “assume that state legislatures and prison officials are
    insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the
    perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the
    goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system.”
    Rhodes, 
    452 U.S. at 352
    . To this end, we recognize it is
    possible there were exigent circumstances and legitimate
    penological justifications for Clark’s seven-month stint in
    solitary confinement that would lead to the conclusion that no
    clearly established right was violated. See Wilson, 
    501 U.S. at
    301–02 (1991) (approving state-of-mind inquiry to allow
    defense that prison officials lacked the subjective intent to
    punish). Allowing the claim to proceed acknowledges that
    Clark, by alleging his prolonged stay in solitary confinement
    was the result of prison officials knowingly disregarding the
    substantial risk of serious harm posed by the conditions and the
    foreseeable harm inflicted was in no way penologically
    justified, alleged the violation of a clearly established right.
    Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District
    Court dismissing this claim and remand for further
    proceedings.
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