Abner Arcos Sanchez v. Attorney General United States ( 2021 )


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  •                                         PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No: 20-1843
    _______________
    ABNER ANTONIO ARCOS SANCHEZ,
    a/k/a Abner Arcos, a/k/a Abner Sanchez,
    a/k/a Abner A. Snachez-Acros, a/k/a Abner Antonio
    Acros-Sanchez,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    _______________
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (BIA 1:A204-362-439)
    Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal
    _______________
    Argued: January 26, 2021
    Before: JORDAN, MATEY, Circuit Judges,
    and HORAN, * District Judge.
    (Filed: May 5, 2021)
    _______________
    Jerard A. Gonzalez [ARGUED]
    BASTARRIKA SOTO GONZALEZ & SOMOHANO
    3 Garret Mountain Plaza - Suite 302
    Woodland Park, NJ 07424
    Cheryl Lin
    338 Palisade Avenue - Suite 255
    Jersey City, NJ 07307
    Counsel for Petitioner
    William P. Barr
    Micah Engler
    Brendan P. Hogan [ARGUED]
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
    Office of Immigration Litigation
    P.O. Box 878
    Ben Franklin Station
    Washington, DC 20044
    Counsel for Respondent
    _______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    *
    Honorable Marilyn Horan, United States District
    Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
    designation.
    2
    _______________
    HORAN, District Judge.
    Abner Antonio Arcos Sanchez petitions for review of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) decision
    dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial
    of his application for asylum, withholding of removal under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3), and withholding of removal under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board also denied
    Arcos Sanchez’s request for remand to the IJ for administrative
    closure, which would have given time for renewal of his
    Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) status. On
    this latter issue, the Board cited then Attorney General
    Sessions’ decision in Matter of Castro-Tum, 
    27 I. & N. Dec. 271
     (A.G. 2018). The Board determined that the IJ and the
    Board did not have authority to administratively close
    proceedings, unless a “regulation or a previous judicially
    approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action” as set
    forth in Castro-Tum. A.R. 4. As such, remand for
    consideration of administrative closure, while Arcos Sanchez
    pursued DACA status renewal, was denied. For the reasons
    we discuss below, we grant Arcos Sanchez’s petition for
    review, vacate the Board’s decision, and remand for
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    I.     Facts and Procedural History
    In 2002, at the age of seven, Arcos Sanchez, a native
    and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without
    3
    inspection. In 2012, he applied for DACA 1 status, which was
    approved. The Department of Homeland Security periodically
    granted his requests for renewals. On April 8, 2019, Arcos
    Sanchez was arrested and charged in New Jersey with sexual
    assault and endangering the welfare of a child. On May 17,
    2019, based upon that arrest and those charges, the United
    States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
    revoked Arcos Sanchez’s DACA status. In June 2019, the
    1
    Since June 15, 2012, DACA has granted certain
    immigrant children and young adults deferred action, a form of
    prosecutorial discretion where the Department of Homeland
    Security (“DHS”) formally decides not to pursue removal of
    otherwise deportable non-citizens. See DHS, Memorandum
    from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Janet Napolitano, “Exercising
    Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
    Came to the United States as Children, (June 15, 2012),
    https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
    prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-
    children.pdf, Addendum A (“Napolitano Memorandum”). To
    be considered for DACA, applicants must satisfy the
    requirements set forth in the Napolitano Memorandum.
    Specifically, the applicant must: 1. Have entered the United
    States under the age of 16; 2. Have continuously resided in the
    United States since June 15, 2007; 3. Be currently enrolled in
    school, have graduated from high school, have obtained a
    general education development certificate, or have been
    honorably discharged from the U.S. Coast Guard or Armed
    Forces; 4. Have not been convicted of a felony offense, a
    significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor
    offenses, or are otherwise not a threat to national security or
    public safety; and 5. Have been under the age of 30 as of
    June 5, 2012. Napolitano Memorandum at 1.
    4
    Department of Homeland Security took Arcos Sanchez into
    custody, served him with a Notice to Appear, and charged him
    as being present without having been admitted or paroled. See
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(9)(B)(ii).
    In removal proceedings before the IJ, Arcos Sanchez
    applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief
    under CAT. The IJ denied asylum, finding that Arcos Sanchez
    failed to meet the one-year filing deadline or show
    extraordinary circumstances in the delay. The IJ denied
    withholding of removal, finding the proposed social group was
    not cognizable. Finally, the IJ denied his CAT claim, finding
    he did not demonstrate at least a fifty percent chance he would
    be tortured upon his return to Mexico. On November 6, 2019,
    the IJ issued his decision and ordered Arcos Sanchez’s removal
    to Mexico. Two weeks later, his state criminal charges were
    dismissed.
    On appeal to the Board, Arcos Sanchez challenged the
    IJ’s decision and requested the Board remand his case to the IJ
    for consideration of administrative closure. He argued that,
    because the state criminal charges were dismissed, he was
    “eligible for renewal of his DACA and re-filed with UCIS on
    January 28, 2020[,]” which would impact the disposition of his
    removal proceeding. A.R. 26. The Board denied remand,
    citing the binding precedent of then-Attorney General
    Sessions’ Castro-Tum decision, which held that, under the
    regulations governing the Executive Office of Immigration
    Review, IJs and the Board do not have the general authority to
    indefinitely    suspend     immigration      proceedings     by
    administrative closure. The Board found that, since Arcos
    Sanchez did not show that his request for remand for
    administrative closure fell within the express exceptions under
    5
    Castro-Tum, his case could not be administratively closed. 27
    I. & N. Dec. at 283. 2 Arcos-Sanchez petitioned for review of
    the Board’s decision.
    II.    Jurisdiction
    We have jurisdiction to review petitions under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a). We review legal conclusions of the Board de novo,
    subject to established rules of deference. Da Silva v. Att’y Gen.
    of the U.S., 
    948 F.3d 629
    , 633 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, we are
    presented with the question whether then Attorney General
    Sessions’ Castro-Tum decision properly concluded that 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1
    (d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) unambiguously do
    not grant IJs and the Board the general authority to
    administratively close cases. The Board denied Arcos
    Sanchez’s remand request based on the Attorney General’s
    conclusion that there is no such general authority. Arcos
    Sanchez challenges the Board’s reliance on that conclusion,
    which we will review de novo. See Da Silva, 948 F.3d at 633.
    III.   History of Administrative Closure
    A.   Pre Castro-Tum
    Since at least the 1980s, IJs and the Board have utilized
    administrative closure as a docketing tool to remove cases from
    their active dockets as a matter of “administrative
    2
    As noted below, the Department of Justice amended 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1
    (d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) for removal
    proceedings initiated after January 15, 2021. As this matter
    was initiated before January 15, 2021, the Court reviews the
    pre-amendment text.
    6
    convenience.” In re Gutierrez-Lopez, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 479
    , 480
    (B.I.A. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
    Matter of Amico, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 652
    , 654 n.1 (B.I.A. 1988)
    (“The administrative closing of a case does not result in a final
    order,” but “is merely an administrative convenience which
    allows the removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate
    situations.”). Administrative closure allows an IJ or the Board
    to “temporarily pause removal proceedings” and place the case
    on hold because of a pending alternative resolution or because
    events outside the control of either party may affect the case.
    Matter of W-Y-U-, 
    27 I. & N. Dec. 17
    , 18 (B.I.A. 2017).
    Even though IJs and the Board have used general
    administrative closure for almost three decades, the
    Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) and the
    regulations governing IJs or the Board do not expressly
    authorize the practice. See Vahora v. Holder, 
    626 F.3d 907
    ,
    917-18 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the general power to
    administratively close a case is employed by quasi-judicial
    bodies for “orderly management of the docket” and is
    reviewable by courts). Although the INA and its regulations
    do not specifically reference general administrative closure
    authority, the regulations both explicitly and implicitly confer
    broad powers on IJs and the Board to manage their dockets. As
    regards IJs’ authority, 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.10
    (b) concerns their
    “powers and duties” and states in relevant part:
    In conducting hearings under section 240 of the
    Act and such other proceedings the Attorney
    General may assign to them, immigration judges
    shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to
    them by the Act and by the Attorney General
    through regulation. In deciding the individual
    7
    cases before them, and subject to the applicable
    governing standards, immigration judges shall
    exercise their independent judgment and
    discretion and may take any action consistent
    with their authorities under the Act and
    regulations that is appropriate and necessary for
    the disposition of such cases. ... In all cases,
    immigration judges shall seek to resolve the
    questions before them in a timely and impartial
    manner consistent with the Act and regulations.
    
    Id.
     (emphases added). In addition, 
    8 C.F.R. § 1240.1
    (a)(iv)
    provides that IJs shall have the authority in any removal
    proceeding to “take any other action consistent with applicable
    law and regulations as may be appropriate.” As regards the
    Board’s authority, 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (d)(1)(ii) states that Board
    members:
    shall exercise their independent judgment and
    discretion in considering and determining the
    cases coming before the Board, and a panel or
    Board member to whom a case is assigned may
    take any action consistent with their authorities
    under the Act and the regulations as is
    appropriate and necessary for the disposition of
    the case.
    
    Id.
     (emphases added).
    Aside from regulations, Board decisions have also
    recognized the authority for IJs and the Board to
    administratively close cases, at first only if it was not “opposed
    by either of the parties.” Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N.
    8
    Dec. at 479. In Matter of Avetisyan, the Board endorsed the
    administrative closure practice and held that both 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10
    (b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) empower IJs and the Board
    to “take any action…as is appropriate and necessary for the
    disposition of [a] case.” 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 688
    , 691 (B.I.A.
    2012). The Board applied a six-factor test to determine
    whether administrative closure was appropriate, regardless of
    government opposition. See Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 696.
    It explained that, “[d]uring the course of proceedings, an [IJ]
    or the [Board] may find it necessary or, in the interests of
    justice and fairness to the parties, prudent to defer further
    action for some period of time.” Id. The Board described two
    mechanisms to defer action: continuance and administrative
    closure. “[A] continuance may be appropriately utilized to
    await additional action required of the parties that will be, or is
    expected to be, completed within a reasonably certain and brief
    amount of time.” Id. However, the Board observed in
    Avetisyan that when the parties must “await an action or event
    that is relevant to immigration proceedings but is outside the
    control of the parties or the court and may not occur for a
    significant or undetermined period of time,” removing a case
    from the docket via administrative closure may be
    “appropriate.” Id. at 692.
    In addition, as described by the Board, administrative
    closure can facilitate “efficient management of the resources
    of the immigration courts and the Board.” Id. at 695; see also
    Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 
    882 F.3d 885
    , 889-90 (9th Cir.
    2018) (citing Matter of Avetisyan as authority for
    administrative closure). Under this framework, the Board has
    issued decisions recognizing the authority for IJs to
    administratively close cases for many reasons related to the
    interests of justice or to the conservation of court resources.
    9
    See e.g. Matter of Montiel, 
    26 I. & N. Dec. 555
     (B.I.A. 2015)
    (holding administrative closure appropriate when a petitioner
    is awaiting resolution of a criminal conviction direct appeal).
    The Board reaffirmed Avetisyan in Matter of W-Y-U-, and
    clarified that “the primary consideration for an Immigration
    Judge in determining whether to administratively close or
    recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing
    administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the
    case to proceed and be resolved on the merits. 27 I. & N. Dec.
    at 20.
    B.   Castro-Tum
    On May 17, 2018, in Matter of Castro-Tum, then
    Attorney General Sessions employed administrative
    adjudication under 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (h)(1)(i), holding that IJs
    and the Board lack the authority to administratively close cases
    “except where a previous regulation or settlement agreement
    has expressly conferred it.” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 283. In that
    decision, the Attorney General overruled the contrary rulings
    from Avetisyan and W-Y-U-. This decision reversed the
    decades-old practice of administrative closure, endorsed by
    Board decisions and rooted in prior interpretations of 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10
    (b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). The Attorney General
    noted a sharp increase in administratively closed cases between
    2011 and 2017, which he linked to the more permissive
    standard established by Avetisyan. 
    Id. at 273
    . And he observed
    that no statute or regulation explicitly grants IJs a general
    power of administrative closure. In concluding that the
    regulations do not implicitly grant authority for administrative
    closure, he held that closure cannot be “appropriate and
    necessary” to the “disposition” of cases since closure is a
    suspension that delays the final resolution of a case. 
    Id. at 285
    .
    10
    He further reasoned that a general power to administratively
    close cases would conflict with the regulation’s requirement
    that IJs “timely” resolve their cases. 
    Id.
    C.   Post Castro-Tum
    Since the issuance of Castro-Tum, our sister courts of
    appeals have split on whether it was correctly decided. The
    Fourth and Seventh Circuits have ruled that the IJ and Board
    have general authority to administratively close cases. In
    Romero v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the regulations at
    issue and concluded that they “unambiguously confer upon IJs
    and the Board the general authority to administratively close
    cases[,]” but even if they are ambiguous, “the Attorney
    General’s reading of the regulations does not warrant
    deference because it amounts to an ‘unfair surprise.’” 
    937 F.3d 282
    , 294-95 (4th Cir. 2019). Similarly, in Meza Morales v.
    Barr, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Castro-Tum was
    contrary to the unambiguous meaning of the regulations and
    that IJs and the Board are “not precluded from administratively
    closing cases when appropriate.” 
    973 F.3d 656
    , 667 (7th Cir.
    2020) (Barrett, J.); see also Zelaya Diaz v. Rosen, 
    986 F.3d 687
    (7th Cir. 2021) (applying Meza-Morales). Thus, two circuits
    have concluded that the regulations at issue unambiguously
    confer general authority for administrative closure and that
    Castro-Tum was wrongly decided. On the other hand, in
    Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, the Sixth Circuit held that the
    regulations unambiguously do not authorize the general use of
    administrative closure and that Castro-Tum was correctly
    decided. 
    981 F.3d 459
     (6th Cir. 2020). That court held that
    §§ 1003.10 and 1003.1(d) do not delegate to IJs or the Board
    11
    “the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration
    proceedings by administrative closure.” 3 Id. at 462.
    IV.    Discussion
    Arcos Sanchez argues that 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10
    (b) and
    1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously grant IJs and the Board the
    general authority to administratively close cases by authorizing
    them to take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary”
    for the disposition of cases. As such, Arcos Sanchez maintains
    that Castro-Tum was wrongly decided, and that the Board’s
    decision should be vacated and remanded so that he may seek
    administrative closure before the IJ. His position reflects the
    rulings of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.
    The government, on the other hand, argues that the
    Board was correct to apply Castro-Tum, because the
    unambiguous text of the regulations does not confer general
    authority for administrative closure. This position tracks the
    ruling of the Sixth Circuit. In the alternative, the government
    argues that, if we should find the regulations are ambiguous,
    then we should defer to Castro-Tum. In either case, the
    government asks us to uphold the Board’s decision denying
    3
    On December 16, 2020, the Executive Office of
    Immigration Review within the Department of Justice issued a
    final rule, endorsing the Sixth Circuit’s position on Castro-
    Tum and codifying the Attorney General’s decision on
    administrative closure. Appellate Procedures and Decisional
    Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure,
    
    85 Fed. Reg. 81588
    -01 (December 16, 2020). This rule took
    effect on January 15, 2021 and is not retroactive to this case.
    
    Id.
    12
    Arcos Sanchez’s request for remand for administrative closure.
    We will now address the issue of the general authority of IJs
    and the Board to administratively close cases.
    Our consideration of the regulations, and in turn Castro-
    Tum, begins with review of the language of 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1
    (d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) to determine whether those
    regulations are ambiguous as regards any general authority for
    administrative closure.       “The basic tenets of statutory
    construction apply to construction of regulations.” Pa. Fed’n
    of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 
    497 F.3d 337
    , 351
    (3d Cir. 2007). “If a statute or rule is unambiguous, we must
    give effect to its plain meaning.” Consol Pa. Coal Co., LLC v.
    Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
    941 F.3d 95
    , 104
    (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 
    139 S. Ct. 2400
    , 2415
    (2019)). In Kisor, the Supreme Court admonished that “hard
    interpretive conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can
    often be solved” without “wav[ing] the ambiguity flag.” 
    139 S. Ct. at 2415
    . Indeed, a statute or rule cannot be “genuinely
    ambiguous” unless it remains unclear after we have
    “exhaust[ed] all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” 
    Id.
    Consequently, our analysis proceeds by “‘carefully
    consider[ing]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose” of the
    statute or regulation. 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    In that regard, the Fourth Circuit in Romero applied the
    standard tools of interpretation by first reading the text of the
    relevant regulations. Both regulations provide that IJs and the
    Board “may take any action ... appropriate and necessary for
    the disposition” of the case. 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1
    (d)(1)(ii) &
    1003.10(b). In assessing the word “any” for its plain meaning,
    Romero opined, “‘any action ... for the disposition of’ the case
    is read most naturally to encompass actions of whatever kind
    13
    appropriate for the resolution of a case.” 937 F.3d at 292
    (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit
    concluded, 4 and we agree, “this would plainly include docket
    management actions such as administrative closure, which
    often facilitate…case resolution.” Id. Second, Romero
    observed, and we agree, that administrative closure qualifies as
    an “action” under §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). In fact,
    the Castro-Tum decision describes administrative closure as an
    action. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 271. Third, Romero noted the only
    limitation upon “any action” within the text of §§ 1003.10(b)
    and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) “is that the circumstances be ‘appropriate
    4
    Romero v. Barr, 
    937 F.3d 282
     (4th Cir. 2019),
    bolstered its conclusion by comparing these regulations to the
    plain meaning afforded the word “any” in other statutes or
    regulations. See, e.g., Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    552 U.S. 214
    , 220 (2008) (concluding that “any…other law enforcement
    officer” means “law enforcement officers of whatever kind”);
    Massachusetts v. EPA, 
    549 U.S. 497
    , 529 (2007) (repetition of
    “any” embraced all airborne compounds); Brogan v. United
    States, 
    522 U.S. 398
    , 400 (1998) (“any” false statement
    included a false statement “of whatever kind”); United States
    v. Gonzales, 
    520 U.S. 1
    , 5 (1997) (concluding that the inclusion
    of the word “any” and the lack of restrictive language left no
    basis for limiting a provision in a sentencing statute); Harrison
    v. PPG Indus., Inc., 
    446 U.S. 578
    , 589 (1980) (concluding
    Congress intended “any” as “expansive language”); Citizens’
    Bank of La. v. Parker, 
    192 U.S. 73
    , 81, (1904) (“The word any
    excludes selection or distinction. It declares the exemption
    without limitation.”); Int’l All. of Theatrical & Stage Emps. v.
    NLRB, 
    334 F.3d 27
    , 34 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that the use of
    “any” signals that the word it modifies should receive broad
    definition).
    14
    and necessary’ for IJs and the [Board] to administratively close
    a case.” 937 F.3d at 293. Specifically, this clause requires that
    any action taken must be appropriate and necessary for the
    disposition of each case consistent with authorities under the
    Act and regulations. Precedent shows that the phrase
    “appropriate and necessary” is treated broadly. Id. (citing
    Michigan v. EPA, 
    576 U.S. 743
    , 752 (2015) (“One does not
    need to open up a dictionary in order to realize the
    capaciousness of this phrase [‘appropriate and necessary’].”);
    see also Sossamon v. Texas, 
    563 U.S. 277
    , 286 (2011) (noting
    “the word ‘appropriate’ is inherently context dependent”);
    Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 
    323 U.S. 126
    , 129-30 (1944)
    (concluding the word “necessary … has always been
    recognized as a word to be harmonized with its context”). We
    similarly conclude that the use of the phrase “disposition of …
    case” relates to the context-driven phrase “appropriate and
    necessary.” Board decisions have illustrated the many contexts
    in which administrative closure is “appropriate and
    necessary.” 5 Thus, the limiting words “appropriate and
    5
    See Matter of Avetisyan, 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 688
     (B.I.A.
    2012) (administrative closure granted pending visa petition on
    adjustment of status); Matter of Rajah, 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 127
    ,
    135 n.10 (B.I.A. 2009)(administrative closure granted pending
    prima facie approvable of visa petition); Matter of Hashmi, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 785
    , 791 n.4 (administrative closure granted
    pending application for provisional waiver ); see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 212.7
    (e)(4)(iii) (DHS regulation requiring individuals in
    removal proceedings to have the proceedings administratively
    closed prior to applying for a provisional waiver). Nothing in
    § 1003.10 or § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) suggests any limiting
    parameters on what may be considered “appropriate and
    necessary.”
    15
    necessary” instruct that any action taken by the IJ or the Board
    must consider case-specific circumstances.
    Finally, Romero noted, and we agree, that “the rest of
    the text of the relevant regulations supports the conclusion that
    IJs and the [Board] possess broad discretion in how to manage
    their cases.” 937 F.3d at 294. As for IJs, § 1003.10(b)
    concludes, “[i]n all cases, immigration judges shall seek to
    resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial
    manner consistent with the Act and regulations.” As for the
    Board, § 1003.1(d)(1) likewise provides that “[t]he Board shall
    resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely,
    impartial, and consistent with the Act and regulations.” We
    agree with Romero that “administrative closure may—contrary
    to the Attorney General’s argument in Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N.
    Dec. at 288–89—in fact facilitate the timely resolution of an
    issue or case.” 937 F.3d at 294. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit
    stated in Meza Morales, “not all mechanisms that lengthen the
    proceedings of a case prevent ‘timely’ resolution.” Meza
    Morales, 973 F.3d at 665.
    In an opinion by now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the
    Seventh Circuit concluded in Meza Morales that “the
    immigration regulations that grant immigration judges their
    general powers [are] broad enough to implicitly encompass
    that [administrative closure] authority.” Id. Meza Morales
    cited the example given by the Fourth Circuit in Romero of
    when “appropriate and necessary actions” could include
    administrative closure: “cases in which two coordinate offices
    in the executive branch are simultaneously adjudicating
    collateral applications [and] closing one proceeding might help
    advance a case toward resolution.” Id. (citing Romero, 937
    F.3d at 293). And it rejected the Government’s arguments,
    16
    such as that other regulatory provisions would be rendered
    superfluous or that delays caused by administrative closure are
    forbidden by the regulations. The opinion concludes that the
    regulatory preference for timeliness “is not a hard and fast
    deadline; some cases are more complex and simply take longer
    to resolve,” and therefore that preference “doesn’t justify
    departure from the plain text of the rule.” Id. at 665. In the
    end, “[e]xpeditiousness may be one … goal [of the
    regulations], but it is not the only goal.” Id. at 666.
    We are fully persuaded that, as discussed in Romero
    and Meza Morales, the regulations afford IJs and the Board
    authority to take any action (including administrative closure)
    as is appropriate and necessary (in the context of each case)
    for the disposition of such case to resolve questions in a timely
    and impartial manner consistent with the Act and regulations.
    After applying the standard tools of interpretation, by
    considering the text, structure, history, and purpose of 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10
    (b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), we hold that the plain
    language establishes that general administrative closure
    authority is unambiguously authorized by these regulations.
    Yet, the government argues that the very same
    regulations unambiguously do not confer general authority for
    administrative closure. 6 In Castro-Tum, the Attorney General
    6
    Our dissenting colleague similarly contends that the
    regulations do not empower IJs or the BIA to administratively
    close cases. The disagreement here, however, seems to be
    directed at how broadly those regulations were interpreted and
    applied prior to Castro-Tum, under the standard set out in
    Avetisyan, rather than at the correctness of Castro-Tum
    itself. (See Dissent at 10 (“But those phrases, broad or not, are
    17
    said as much and noted that, “[a]lthough described as a
    temporary      suspension”     of     removal     proceedings,
    “administrative closure is effectively permanent in most
    instances.” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 272. He reasoned that the
    regulations do not confer general administrative authority
    because such action effectively amounts to an indefinite
    suspension that delays or prevents the final disposition of a
    case and thus conflicts with regulations requiring IJs to timely
    resolve cases. 27 I. & N. at 285. The Sixth Circuit majority in
    Hernandez-Serrano agreed with Castro-Tum and affirmed its
    conclusion that the regulations do not confer general authority
    for administrative closure.
    not best understood to render section 1003.10(b) without
    limitation and provide IJs nearly unfettered discretion. To the
    contrary, ‘appropriate and necessary’ is itself an important
    restriction on the scope of the Attorney General’s delegation,
    and one that comes with some bite.”).) To that end, the dissent
    criticizes our example of an immigration adjudication
    prevented by the shuttling of a file back and forth between
    USCIS and the Office of Chief Counsel, calling such evidence
    “too light a breeze to propel a vast delegation of general
    administrative closure authority.” (Dissent at 15.) But the
    question before us is not whether the regulations endow IJs and
    the BIA with a “vast delegation of general administrative
    closure authority.” It is whether they entirely foreclose IJs or
    the BIA from ever exercising some degree of discretion to
    administratively close a case, as the Attorney General decided
    in Castro-Tum. Thus, the dissent’s characterization of
    “administrative closure” as “the antithesis of a final
    disposition” does not convince us that Castro-Tum was
    correctly decided. (Dissent at 7 (quoting Castro-Tum, 27 I. &
    N. Dec. at 285).
    18
    Both Castro-Tum and Hernandez-Serrano emphasize a
    concern that administrative closure leads to delay or no final
    decision in removal cases. In fact, the opening sentence of the
    Hernandez-Serrano majority opinion states: “[a] regulation
    delegating to immigration judges authority to take certain
    actions ‘[i]n deciding the individual cases before them’ does
    not delegate to them general authority not to decide those cases
    at all.” 981 F.3d at 461. That court also observed, “[t]hus the
    reality is that, in hundreds of thousands of cases, administrative
    closure has amounted to a decision not to apply the Nation's
    immigration laws at all.” Id. at 463. Concern about
    administrative closures causing widespread delay and non-
    decision appears to have motivated both the Attorney
    General’s and the Sixth Circuit’s decisions. If IJs are abusing
    their discretion, that may very well be cause for concern, but it
    does not relate to the question that Castro Tum purported to
    answer—whether the regulations confer general authority for
    administrative closure. The majority in Herandez-Serrano
    even conceded that “the ‘timely manner’ language is
    hortatory,” but concluded that “the IJ can resolve neither
    questions nor a case once it is administratively closed.” Id.
    To this same point, the dissent observed, and we agree:
    whether immigration courts have granted
    administrative closure too frequently, and have
    failed to reopen administratively closed cases too
    often, is of no significance to the question of
    whether Castro-Tum wrongly held that IJs and
    the BIA never have the discretion to decide that
    administrative closure is “appropriate and
    19
    necessary for the disposition” of immigration
    cases.
    981 F.3d at 471. The authority to administratively close cases,
    within the appropriate and necessary context of each case, can
    and does permit IJs and the Board to answer the questions
    before them in a timely and impartial manner consistent with
    the Act and the regulations. Or in other words, delay in the
    case through administrative closure does not, by definition,
    prevent the timely disposition of the case and resolution of
    questions.
    As discussed above, certain removal cases require
    resolution of questions that depend upon decisions from other
    tribunals or agencies over which neither the IJ nor the Board
    controls. The Attorney General’s Castro-Tum decision fails to
    acknowledge the fact that allowing time for the IJ or the Board
    to receive the outcome from another tribunal or agency enables
    resolution of relevant questions and thus facilitates the timely
    disposition of a removal case. Without the general authority to
    administratively close appropriate cases when necessary, the
    IJs and the Board may not have a sufficiently developed record
    and may be less effective in managing cases. Such a result is
    not contemplated by the Act or the regulations.
    That some IJs and the Board may have used, or misused,
    administrative closure to unduly delay or permanently close
    and not decide cases does not answer the legal question of
    whether IJs or the Board have the general authority to
    administratively close cases under the regulations. Improper
    use of administrative closure to attain objectives not authorized
    by the regulations is appropriately challenged and redressed
    through appropriate review, including judicial review under an
    20
    abuse-of-discretion standard. See Vahora, 
    626 F.3d at 917
    (review of administrative closure under an abuse of discretion
    standard).
    In addition, the INA grants the Attorney General
    rulemaking authority to set standards for immigration judges
    and the Board. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1103
    (g)(2). Indeed, 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.10
    (b) empowers IJs to exercise independent judgment
    and discretion in their decision making, “subject to the
    applicable governing standards” and other regulatory
    constraints. 
    Id.
     As such, concern for undue delay or non-
    decision in removal dispositions through the application of that
    discretion, to the extent not already addressed through the
    existing regulatory framework, can be redressed through
    agency rulemaking and standards. “The Attorney General may
    amend these rules through the proper procedures. But he may
    not, ‘under the guise of interpreting a regulation, ... create de
    facto a new regulation’ that contradicts the one in place.” Meza
    Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 (citation omitted). And, even if a
    regulation leads to bad policy, we “may not do the Attorney
    General’s work for him.” 7 Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at
    474 (Clay, J., dissenting).
    7
    The government submitted an argument in the
    alternative that, if the regulations were found to be ambiguous
    to the question of general administrative authority to
    administratively close immigration cases, then principles of
    agency deference should be afforded to apply the agency
    interpretation as presented in the Castro-Tum decision.
    However, this appeal is resolved by our finding that the
    regulations unambiguously grant general authority for IJs and
    the Board to administratively close immigration cases. No
    issue of any deference remains for discussion or decision.
    21
    V.     Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the
    relevant regulations confer the general authority to
    administratively close cases to IJs and the Board. We therefore
    grant the petition for review, vacate the Board’s order, and
    remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    22