Pre Settlement Finance LLC v. Theresa Ellis ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 20-3433
    __________
    PRE-SETTLEMENT FINANCE, LLC
    v.
    THERESA M. ELLIS; SCOTT A. ZUKOWSKI
    Theresa M. Ellis, Appellant
    __________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-06339)
    District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 20, 2021
    Before: JORDAN, MATEY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: May 25, 2021)
    ___________
    OPINION *
    ___________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Theresa Ellis appeals from the District Court’s orders granting summary
    judgment in favor of Pre-Settlement Finance, LLC (“PSF”), on a breach of contract claim
    and denying her motion for reconsideration. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
    In 2010, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ellis, finding her disabled and qualified
    for relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and against her former
    employer, Ethicon, Inc., for violating the ADA by failing to provide Ellis reasonable
    accommodations. See D.N.J. Civ. No. 03-05-cv-00726. After post-trial motions, the
    District Court for the District of New Jersey (“NJDC”) entered a final amended judgment
    awarding Ellis back pay and attorneys’ fees, and ordering Ethicon to reinstate her. We
    affirmed the judgment on appeal. See Ellis v. Ethicon, Inc., 529 F. App’x 310 (3d Cir.
    2013). In September 2010, while that appeal was pending, Ellis entered into an agreement
    (“the agreement”) with PSF, a New York-based consumer litigation funding company.
    Pursuant to the agreement, PSF advanced Ellis $29,000 in exchange for a portion of the
    potential proceeds from the wrongful termination suit. Repayment was contingent on Ellis
    succeeding in her suit, either by obtaining a settlement, judgment, or verdict. Ellis’s
    attorney at the time, Jill Fisher, was not a signatory to the agreement, but she signed an
    Attorney Acknowledgement agreeing that she, or her successor, would distribute any
    proceeds from the suit to PSF after attorneys’ fees and priority liens were paid. 1
    1
    Pursuant to the Acknowledgement, Fisher notified PSF in December 2010 that she and
    her firm were withdrawing as counsel for Ellis. Thereafter, amicus counsel was
    2
    After this Court affirmed the final amended judgment, Ethicon moved for relief
    from the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Thereafter, the parties signed a
    one-page, hand-written agreement, settling the wrongful termination suit.                  Ellis
    subsequently contested the settlement agreement, and, in an order entered June 2, 2014, the
    NJDC granted Ethicon’s motion to enforce it, discharging the judgment in its entirety. The
    parties cross-appealed. By order entered July 10, 2014, Ethicon was directed to deposit
    the settlement funds with the Clerk of Court pending the appeal. This Court affirmed the
    June 2, 2014 order, and our mandate issued on July 6, 2015. See Ellis v. Ethicon, 614 F.
    App’x 613 (3d Cir. 2015). Thereafter, the NJDC ordered the settlement funds disbursed –
    $14,894.14 in attorneys’ fees and costs to Barasch and the remainder to Ellis. PSF did not
    receive any of the settlement funds.
    In April 2018, PSF filed this suit asserting claims against Ellis for breach of contract,
    breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unjust enrichment,
    and several of those claims plus a claim of tortious interference with contract against
    Zukowski. 2 Ellis and Zukowski moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion was denied
    and, after discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court
    appointed to represent Ellis on appeal. In January 2014, Patricia Barasch, Esq., entered
    an appearance in the NJDC on behalf of Ellis. Throughout the litigation, however, Ellis’s
    husband, Scott Zukowski, provided periodic updates to PSF.
    2
    PSF initially filed suit against Ellis and Zukowski in the New York Supreme Court,
    Richmond County. The matter was dismissed in June 2017 based on forum non
    conveniens grounds.
    3
    granted summary judgment to PSF on the breach of contract claim against Ellis and denied
    all other claims for relief.     After the District Court denied her timely motion for
    reconsideration, Ellis filed this appeal.
    We have appellate jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Because Ellis’s timely
    appeal from the denial of her timely motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying
    judgment for review,” we will review the District Court’s summary judgment order as well
    as its order denying the motion for reconsideration. See McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 
    958 F.2d 550
    , 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992). We exercise plenary review over an order granting
    summary judgment. DeHart v. Horn, 
    390 F.3d 262
    , 267 (3d Cir. 2004). Summary
    judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue
    of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 56(c); Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 
    455 F.3d 418
    , 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). We review
    the district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Howard
    Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 
    602 F.3d 237
    , 246 (3d Cir. 2010).
    We find no error in the District Court’s determination that Ellis was liable for breach
    of contract. As a federal court sitting in diversity, the District Court was “required to apply
    the substantive law of the state whose laws govern the action,” which the parties do not
    dispute is the substantive law of New York. Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
    914 F.2d 360
    , 378 (3d Cir. 1990). The elements of a breach of contract claim under New York law
    are “[1] the existence of a contract, [2] the plaintiff's performance pursuant to the contract,
    4
    [3] the defendant's breach of his or her contractual obligations, and [4] damages resulting
    from the breach.” Neckles Builders, Inc. v. Turner, 
    986 N.Y.S.2d 494
    , 496 (N.Y. App.
    Div. 2014). These elements were met as it is also undisputed that Ellis did not meet her
    obligation under the contract to repay the funds that PFS provided her.
    Ellis argues that it is not she, but Patricia Barasch, who is liable for the breach of
    contract. Ellis maintains that she “transferred the PSF lien” and the contract payment
    responsibilities to Barasch in December 2013, and that Barasch communicated with PSF
    at that time, 3 thereby relieving Ellis of her obligations under the contract. Pro se Br. at 5;
    Reply Br. at 6-7. She further argues that it was then incumbent upon PSF “to obtain their
    funds and finalize the ‘Attorney Acknowledgement’ section of the contract.” Reply Br. at
    6-7. Ellis’s arguments are meritless. Barasch was not a party to the underlying contract,
    and the onus was not on PSF to pursue the proceeds of the litigation. Rather, pursuant to
    the Attorney Acknowledgement form, Ellis’s attorney and her successors agreed to pay
    PSF “immediately after attorney fees and any liens” and “prior to any final distribution” to
    Ellis, but “assume[d] no duties or obligations to Pre-Settlement Finance other than
    ministerial duties of disbursement . . . .” D.N.J. Civ. No. 2-18-cv-06339, ECF No. 46-5 at
    15-16. Moreover, in December 2013, the NJDC directed Ethicon to disburse only the
    3
    Ellis makes much of a statement in PSF’s summary judgment brief that Barasch notified
    it in December 2013 that she was retained to represent Ellis. See District Ct. ECF No.
    46-3 at 11. There is no evidence in the record to support Ellis’s allegations that PSF and
    Barasch had further communications in December 2013, much less that they discussed a
    strategy at that time to delay the disbursement of funds.
    5
    attorneys’ fees and costs awarded in the March 2010 Order and Amended Judgment. 4 See
    D.N.J. Civ. No. 3-05-cv-00726, ECF No. 211. Thus, contrary to Ellis’s contention, PSF
    could not have been paid at that time. It was not until July 2014, after Ellis and Ethicon
    had entered into the settlement agreement, that the NJDC directed Ethicon to deposit the
    remaining judgment funds with the Clerk of Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 67. See 
    id.
    at ECF No. 249. However, those funds were not disbursed by order of the NJDC until
    September 2015, after this Court’s mandate had issued in the final appeal. By then, Barasch
    had withdrawn as counsel pursuant to Ellis’s request. See 
    id.
     at ECF Nos. 260-61, 266-67.
    Accordingly, the remainder of the funds, after attorneys’ fees and costs, were distributed
    directly to Ellis. See 
    id.
     at ECF No. 265. Under the terms of the contract, Ellis “agree[d]
    that PSF’s Irrevocable Lien shall be paid in full before [Ellis] received money from the
    Litigation.” D.N.J. Civ. No. 2-18-cv-06339, ECF No. 46-5 at 5, ¶ 4(a). Therefore, by
    failing to first pay PSF when she received the settlement funds, Ellis breached the contract.
    Accordingly, the District Court properly granted PSF’s, and properly denied Ellis’s, motion
    for summary judgment on that claim.
    The District Court also properly denied Ellis’s motion for reconsideration of its
    ruling. For substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, Ellis’s arguments for
    reconsideration are meritless. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 
    591 F.3d 666
    , 669 (3d Cir. 2010)
    (noting that arguments previously rejected provide no basis for relief under Rule 59(e)).
    4
    This disbursement was made to Fisher’s law firm, whose representation of Ellis ended
    after the jury trial.
    6
    Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Ellis’s request
    for oral argument is denied.
    7