Jeffrey Gibson v. Attorney General Pennsylvania ( 2021 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1062
__________
JEFFREY GIBSON,
Appellant
v.
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL; UPMC PINNACLE HEALTH
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-20-cv-01362)
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 8, 2021
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 21, 2021)
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OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant Jeffrey Gibson filed a federal complaint against a healthcare center and
the Attorney General of Pennsylvania in which he alleged that the healthcare center gave
an unauthorized and deadly dosage of morphine to his mother. He claimed that the
healthcare center then refused to provide him with a certificate of death (although it did
so during the pendency of the action). As a remedy, Gibson sought money damages and
asked that the Court order the Pennsylvania Attorney General to initiate an investigation
into the operations of the healthcare center.
The District Court issued an order asking Gibson to show cause as to why the case
should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After Gibson responded,
stating only that the action “comes under the federal laws and the United States
Constitutional Bill of Rights,” the District Court dismissed the case without prejudice,
reasoning that neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction existed. This timely pro
se appeal followed.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FOCUS
v. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996).
To have subject matter jurisdiction, a District Court must be able to exercise either
federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.1 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. As
1
The District Court properly considered its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), after giving Gibson an opportunity to be heard on the issue, see
Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d 213, 216 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988).
2
the plaintiff in this case, Gibson was required to plead the grounds for jurisdiction. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1); Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 106 (3d
Cir. 2015). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), federal district courts have subject matter
jurisdiction when there is diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. To establish diversity of citizenship, “diversity must be
complete; that is, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.”
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, the District
Court concluded that all parties are citizens of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 7 at 1. Gibson has
not challenged that conclusion in his brief, and we see no basis to make such a challenge.
Nor has Gibson shown subject matter jurisdiction based on a federal question
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For federal question jurisdiction to exist, “the party
asserting jurisdiction must satisfy the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which mandates that
the grounds for jurisdiction be clear on the face of the pleading that initiates the case.”
Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2016). Gibson did
not refer to any federal law in his complaint. While Gibson claimed in his supplement
and on appeal that “federal laws on killing [were] not upheld” and that the Bill of Rights
was violated, these conclusory assertions are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Fabrica de Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., 682
F.3d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2012).2
2
It appears that Gibson sought to bring claims of wrongful death or medical malpractice,
which arise under state law. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8301 (wrongful death);
3
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Toogood v. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (medical
malpractice). And to the extent that Gibson sought to impose criminal liability on the
defendants, he lacked standing to do so. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973).
4