Lan Trinh v. Michael Trinh ( 2022 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-2336
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LAN TU TRINH,
Appellant
v.
MICHAEL TRINH
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-01945)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 1, 2022
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed February 3, 2022)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Lan Tu Trinh appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
her complaint against Michael Trinh.
Trinh’s complaint alleged that Michael Trinh “committed fraudulent acts and
participated in criminal activity to steal [her] properties in [state] court proceedings.”
Dkt. #1 at 6. The cover sheet and the complaint claim “Federal Question” jurisdiction
and state that the federal question is “investigation.” Dkt. #1 at 2, 4. For relief, Trinh
requested that the court “stop the fraudulent and criminal activities so that [she] can have
a peaceful and normal life.” Dkt. #1 at 6.
The District Court sua sponte dismissed Trinh’s complaint without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court noted that the complaint was “the third
action that Lan Trinh has filed in this Court in recent months against Michael Trinh in
connection with what appears to be a family business dispute.” Dkt. #4 at n.1. The Court
explained that Trinh had failed to allege any basis for a claim under federal law or
diversity jurisdiction, as was the case in her other actions. Trinh timely appealed.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the
District Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary. FOCUS v.
Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996).
As we explained in Trinh’s other appeals, “In order to have subject matter
jurisdiction, a District Court must be able to exercise either federal question jurisdiction
or diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332.” Trinh v. Off. of Recs. City of
Phila., 779 F. App’x 118, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Trinh v. Fineman, 784 F. App’x
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116, 117 (3d Cir. 2019). As the plaintiff in this case, Trinh was required to plead the
grounds for jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1); Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI
Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 106 (3d Cir. 2015). Pursuant to § 1332(a)(1), federal district
courts have subject matter jurisdiction when there is diversity of citizenship between the
parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. To establish diversity of
citizenship, “diversity must be complete; that is, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same
state as any of the defendants.” Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d
Cir. 1995). Here, as was the case in Trinh’s prior lawsuits, the District Court again
concluded that all parties are citizens of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 4 at 1. Trinh has not
challenged that conclusion in her brief, and we see no basis for such a challenge.
Nor has Trinh shown subject matter jurisdiction based on a federal question
pursuant to § 1331. For federal question jurisdiction to exist, “the party asserting
jurisdiction must satisfy the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which mandates that the
grounds for jurisdiction be clear on the face of the pleading that initiates the case.”
Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2016). Trinh did not
refer to any federal law in her complaint and her vague assertions concerning “fraudulent
acts” regarding a property dispute are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Fabrica de Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., 682
F.3d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2012).1
1
To the extent that Trinh sought to impose criminal liability on Michael Trinh, she
lacked standing to do so. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
3
Generally, while a District Court may sua sponte consider whether a plaintiff has
satisfied the burden of alleging facts that show that the Court has jurisdiction, the Court
should give the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before dismissing a complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Berardi v. Swanson Mem’l Lodge No. 48 of the
Fraternal Ord of Police, 920 F.2d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 1990); Neiderhiser v. Borough of
Berwick, 840 F.2d 213, 216 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988). However, in this case, we are satisfied
that providing Trinh yet another opportunity to do so would be futile. Trinh has filed
multiple lawsuits against Michael Trinh that have been dismissed for her failure to allege
any basis for federal jurisdiction. Moreover, Trinh has not raised any colorable basis for
jurisdiction in her complaint or in her brief on appeal, and she has previously failed to
respond when given additional opportunities to establish jurisdiction. See, e.g., Trinh v.
Trinh, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 18-cv-04114.
Accordingly, given the circumstances of this case, Trinh’s litigation history
against her brother, and her demonstrated failure to establish federal jurisdiction when
given additional opportunities, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4