Ibrahim Eldakroury v. Attorney General New Jersey , 601 F. App'x 156 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                              NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 13-4573
    _____________
    IBRAHIM ELDAKROURY,
    Appellant
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY;
    THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    District Court No. 2-13-cv-00321
    District Judge: The Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
    Argued November 18, 2014
    Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: February 19, 2015)
    _____________________
    OPINION
    _____________________
    Frank P. Cozzarelli
    Marlo J. Hittman           [ARGUED]
    Cozzarelli Law Firm
    727 Joralemon Street
    Belleville, NJ 07109
    Counsel for Appellant
    
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Amy Chung                  [ARGUED]
    Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
    Division of Construction,
    Transportation & Condemnation
    25 Market Street
    P.O. Box 114
    Trenton, NJ 08625
    Philip J. Espinosa
    Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
    Department of Law & Public Safety
    P.O. Box 114
    25 Market Street
    Richard J. Hughes Complex
    Trenton, NJ 08625
    Counsel for Appellees
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    Ibrahim Eldakroury appeals the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice on the
    basis of abstention pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
    (1971). At oral argument,
    Eldakroury focused on whether the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice had claim-
    preclusive effect. In doing so, Eldakroury conceded that the arguments made in his
    opening and reply briefs were immaterial if res judicata did not apply. We invited the
    parties to submit supplemental briefing as to the consequences of the with-prejudice
    dismissal in this case, including whether that outcome would have any claim-preclusive
    effect as to a later-filed suit in federal court raising the same federal claims. That briefing
    was submitted on December 1, 2014. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the
    District Court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice and direct that the dismissal be
    entered without prejudice.
    2
    I.
    Eldakroury is a door manager at Hott 22, a strip club. In September 2012,
    Eldakroury was indicted for violating N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-7. Section 2C:34-7(a)
    criminalizes the operation of a
    sexually oriented business within 1,000 feet of any existing sexually
    oriented business, or any church, synagogue, temple or other place of
    public worship, or any elementary or secondary school or any school bus
    stop, or any municipal or county playground or place of public resort and
    recreation, or any hospital or any child care center, or within 1,000 feet of
    any area zoned for residential use.
    After his indictment, Eldakroury commenced the instant case in federal court under 42
    U.S.C. § 1983. Seeking damages, an injunction barring his state prosecution, and
    declaratory relief, Eldakroury’s federal complaint urges that his prosecution violates
    several federal constitutional provisions, including the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
    Just over one month later, Eldakroury also moved to dismiss the indictment in state court
    on constitutional grounds as well as on grounds that the instructions to the grand jury as
    to § 2C:34-7 were defective. The State then moved to dismiss Eldakroury’s federal
    complaint on the basis of Younger abstention and for failure to state a claim.
    While the State’s motion to dismiss the federal complaint was pending, the
    Superior Court of New Jersey dismissed Eldakroury’s state indictment without prejudice
    on the ground that the grand jury’s instructions were defective. But that court declined to
    reach Eldakroury’s constitutional arguments, declaring them “moot at this time.” The
    State appealed that dismissal. After the dismissal of Eldakroury’s state indictment, the
    District Court dismissed his federal complaint with prejudice on the basis of Younger
    3
    abstention and because sovereign immunity barred Eldakroury’s damages claims.
    Eldakroury appeals only the dismissal with prejudice of his claims for equitable relief,
    and not the dismissal of his damages claims. While this appeal was pending, the New
    Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal without prejudice of the state indictment
    without reaching Eldakroury’s constitutional claims.
    II.
    The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
    have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Given Eldakroury’s
    concession at oral argument that a decision in his favor as to the claim-preclusive effect
    of the District Court’s dismissal would dispose of this appeal, we focus on that issue
    alone. We previously considered whether a dismissal with prejudice was the appropriate
    consequence of Younger abstention in Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment
    Establishments, 
    369 F.3d 319
    , 327 (3d Cir. 2004). We explained that “the effect of [a
    Younger abstention] order is to surrender jurisdiction of the federal action to a state
    court” and that “[b]y doing so, the Younger abstention order becomes immediately
    appealable.” 
    Id. at 325.
    We then stated that Younger abstention “requires a dismissal
    with prejudice of the federal suit.” 
    Id. at 327
    (emphasis added).
    But Lui is distinguishable. In that case, state courts had already considered “the
    exact same constitutional claims” made by the plaintiff in federal court. 
    Id. at 328.
    Accordingly, “the doctrines of res judicata on the one hand, or [the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine] on the other, would militate against our deciding the merits of the federal claim
    4
    in any event.” 
    Id. (footnotes omitted).
    Because the plaintiff had already received a
    merits-based judgment on his federal claims, there was no possibility that he would need
    to return to federal court to ensure that his federal claims were addressed in the event that
    the state courts did not reach those claims. Accordingly, a with-prejudice dismissal was
    proper.
    By contrast, no resolution of Eldakroury’s federal claims has been reached in any
    court. Nor can dismissal of Eldakroury’s federal complaint on the basis of Younger
    abstention be construed as a resolution on the merits of those claims. Indeed, where
    Younger abstention is appropriate, federal courts “have no occasion to address the merits”
    of the plaintiff’s federal claims. 
    Id. And without
    a merits-based decision, the dismissal
    of his federal case does not implicate claim preclusion or otherwise prevent Eldakroury
    from returning to federal court if his ongoing state prosecution concludes without a
    resolution of his federal claims. See United States v. 5 Unlabeled Boxes, 
    572 F.3d 169
    ,
    173 (3d Cir. 2009) (res judicata requires, inter alia, “a final judgment on the merits in a
    prior suit” (citation omitted)). Such a non-merits dismissal is by definition without
    prejudice. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
    531 U.S. 497
    , 505–06 (2001)
    (“The primary meaning of ‘dismissal without prejudice’ . . . is dismissal without barring
    the plaintiff from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.”); cf.
    N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 
    653 F.3d 234
    , 241 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011)
    (dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are “by definition without prejudice”).
    5
    For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of this case with
    prejudice and direct that dismissal be entered without prejudice. If Eldakroury’s state
    prosecution, including any direct appeals, is resolved without reaching his federal claims
    and a justiciable controversy remains, he may commence a second lawsuit in federal
    court raising the same federal claims.
    6