United States v. Carlos Vargas ( 2015 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 14-3426
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARLOS VARGAS,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-13-cr-00396-001)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 23, 2015
______________
Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 3, 2015)
______________
OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
Carlos Vargas (“Appellant”) pled guilty to one count of failing to appear to serve a
sentence, for which the District Court imposed a sentence of fourteen months’
imprisonment. Appellant now attacks both the substantive and procedural reasonableness
of that sentence. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment
of conviction.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was arrested when he received delivery of two bags of coffee, which
concealed 1,070 grams of cocaine. Following his arrest, Appellant admitted that he had
been paid to retrieve the packages and that he had done so on approximately four prior
occasions. Appellant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 500
grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He received a sentence of two
years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Following his custodial term,
while on supervised release, Appellant failed four drug tests and pled guilty to violating
the terms of his supervised release. Several months later, two additional drug tests came
back positive for cocaine. Appellant again pled guilty to violating the terms of his
supervised release and received a sentence of ten months’ imprisonment. Appellant
failed to self-surrender, as the court had ordered. As a consequence, he was charged
with, and pled guilty to, knowingly failing to surrender for service of sentence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2).
Appellant was subject to a Sentencing Guidelines range of between eight and
fourteen months based upon a total offense level of nine and a criminal history category
2
of III. Appellant did not object to the Guidelines range, but requested leniency based on
his medical condition and age. At the time of sentencing, Appellant was sixty-seven
years old and had been undergoing treatment for a degenerative eye condition. As such,
he sought a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. The Government argued for
a sentence at or above the middle of the Guidelines range because of the seriousness of
the offense, Appellant’s criminal history, including eleven prior convictions, some of
which were for violent crimes, and deterrence. The District Court sentenced Appellant to
fourteen months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to his original ten month
sentence.
II. ANALYSIS1
We review sentences “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “[W]e are to ensure that a substantively
reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.” United States v.
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).2
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2
When no objection is made in the District Court, sentencing procedure is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014)
(en banc). However, “[b]ecause defendants sentenced before the issuance of [Flores-
Mejia] had not been warned that they had a duty to object to the sentencing court’s
procedural error after sentencing, we will not apply this new rule retroactively and will,
instead, review for abuse of discretion. Applying that standard, we have held that a
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to give ‘meaningful consideration’ to an
argument advanced by the defendant.” Id. at 259. Flores-Mejia was issued on the same
3
Under our three-step sentencing framework, district courts must: (1) “calculate a
defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before [United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)],” (2) “‘formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and
stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure,’” and (3) “‘exercise[] [their]
discretion by considering the relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors’. . . in setting the
sentence they impose regardless [of] whether it varies from the sentence calculated under
the Guidelines.” United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196, 194 (3d Cir. 2006)). Under the third step, the
District Court “must ‘acknowledge and respond to any properly presented sentencing
argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.’” Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d
at 256 (quoting United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012)).
Although Appellant asserts that the District Court failed to adequately consider his
age, medical condition and history of substance abuse at sentencing, the sentencing
judge’s reasoning demonstrates proper consideration of these § 3553(a) factors. After
noting that the parties did not dispute the offense level and criminal history category, the
sentencing judge discussed the statutory factors, including Appellant’s age, criminal
history, “drug problems,” and “health problems.” (App. 59.) He also considered the
offense “a serious crime,” requiring “general deterrence” in order to “send a message to
day as Appellant’s sentencing. Because Appellant did not have notice of the new
standard prior to his sentencing, review for abuse of discretion is proper.
4
people [that] they can’t just decide on their own that they’d rather not show up in jail
when they’re supposed to be there.” (Id. at 60.) The sentencing judge invoked the “need
to protect the public,” because “[t]here[] [was] no doubt . . . that there’s a serious risk that
[Appellant is] going to commit other crimes.” (Id.) The District Court determined that
Appellant’s criminal history was the “most significant [thing] about his background,” and
concluded that “a sentence at the high end of the Guideline[s] range is necessary because
of the statutory factors.” (Id. at 59-60.). Here, the sentencing judge articulated his
reasons for weighing the factors as he did and imposed a sentence based on the proper
criminal history category.3 As such, there was no procedural error.
We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Our review of
the application of the § 3553(a) factors considers the totality of the circumstances and is
highly deferential. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Moreover, “[w]e may not substitute our judgment for the sentencing court’s.” United
States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007). Indeed, even if this Court would
have imposed a different sentence, we must not do so as long as any reasonable court
could have imposed the given sentence. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. Although Appellant
sought a split sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, the District Court properly
3
Appellant’s argument that the District Court gave improper consideration to old
or remote criminal convictions lacks merit. While the District Court stated that “Criminal
History Category III doesn’t quite capture [Appellant’s] history of crimes,” there is no
evidence in the record that the District Court improperly based its sentence on that
history. (App. 59-60.)
5
considered the statutory factors in imposing a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range.
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-59 (2007); Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196 (the
district court’s explanation must be “sufficient for us to see that the particular
circumstances of the case have been given meaningful consideration within the
parameters of § 3553(a)”). Thus, this sentence is not substantively unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction.
6