James Overly v. Chris Garman , 599 F. App'x 42 ( 2015 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1490
___________
JAMES M. OVERLY,
Appellant
v.
CHRIS GARMAN, Unit Manager; BRADLEY FISHER, Correctional Counselor;
HONSTINE, Correctional Officer; PARSON, Correctional Officer; HARPER,
Correctional Officer; CLAPPER, Correctional Officer; HAZLETT, Correctional Officer
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-00832)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 14, 2014
Before: JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 16, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant James Overly seeks review of the District Court’s order
dismissing his civil rights action. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
Overly, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983against five correctional officers, a unit manager, and a counselor at the State
Correctional Institution at Smithfield (SCI-Smithfield). Overly alleged that defendant
Fisher violated his equal protection rights by failing to promptly inform him of his
mother’s death. According to the complaint, Fisher was notified on November 7, 2011,
by the prison chaplain that Overly’s mother had died; however, he failed to inform
Overly of his mother’s passing until November 21, 2011. Overly maintains that the two-
week delay in notification was in violation of prison procedures and, as a result, he was
not afforded “equal treatment as is his right.” The complaint also alleged that the
remaining defendants violated Overly’s civil rights by harassing and retaliating against
him. Specifically, Overly maintained, inter alia, that (1) he was transferred from cell-to-
cell, which exacerbated his ill-health, and (2) his cell was repeatedly searched, and his
property was confiscated and destroyed. The defendants were sued in both their
individual and official capacities.
On defendants’ motion, the District Court dismissed the claims against the
defendants in their official capacity because they were entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim for relief. This
appeal ensued.
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a motion to
dismiss is plenary. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2004). To avoid
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” by allowing a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations
omitted).
On appeal, Overly challenges only the District Court’s dismissal of his equal
protection claim. Appellees argue that Overly has waived his right to appeal the
remaining claims because he failed to raise them in his brief; Overly did not file a reply
brief, responding to this contention. We have consistently held that issues not raised in
an opening brief are deemed waived. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.
1993) ; see also LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995)
(although “appellate courts generally do not hold pro se litigants rigidly to the formal
briefing standards . . . we need not manufacture claims of error for an appellant
proceeding pro se, especially when he has raised an issue below and elected not to pursue
it on appeal.”). We therefore limit our review to Overly’s equal protection claim. 1
We agree with the District Court that the complaint fails to properly state a claim
for the violation of Overly’s equal protection rights. The Equal Protection Clause is
1
Overly sought and was granted an extension to file a reply brief, but he did not do so.
We note that, even if we were to address his other claims, we would affirm the District
Court’s dismissal for substantially the same reasons stated in its January 31, 2014 order.
3
ordinarily applied to claims of class-based discrimination. See Engquist v. Oregon Dept.
of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (“Our equal protection jurisprudence has typically
been concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect some groups of citizens
differently than others.’”) (citation omitted). As the District Court noted, Overly has not
alleged that he is a member of a suspect class. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d
307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that prisoners are not a suspect class). He has further
failed to successfully plead a “class of one” claim. Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564 (2000). To state a claim under the “class of one” theory, Overly must show that “(1)
the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did
so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill
v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). Crucially, Overly failed to
allege that he was intentionally treated differently than similarly-situated individuals.
Indeed, he does not make allegations regarding the treatment of any other inmates. He
merely notes that he was treated differently when his stepfather passed away; at that time,
Overly was promptly informed of his stepfather’s death and was offered services. And
although he argues generally that it was prison procedure to promptly inform inmates of
family deaths, and that defendant Fisher failed to comply with that procedure in his case,
he does not argue that the failure to follow procedure was intentional. Accordingly,
dismissal of the claim was proper.
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4