Skinner v. Skinner (In Re Skinner) , 636 F. App'x 868 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 15-2590
    _____________
    In re: THOMAS SKINNER,
    Debtor
    WILLIAM SKINNER,
    Appellant
    v.
    THOMAS SKINNER; ANNA SKINNER
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    District Court No. 2-14-cv-06697
    District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson
    _____________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    February 29, 2016
    Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: March 4, 2016)
    _____________________
    OPINION
    _____________________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    Thomas Skinner and his wife, Anna Skinner, allegedly misappropriated the funds
    of Dorothy Skinner, Thomas’ mother.1 They also placed her in Saint Joseph’s Manor, an
    
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
    assisted living facility, and proceeded to misappropriate the insurance funds that were
    intended to pay for Dorothy’s care. As a result of her non-payment, Dorothy was evicted
    with an outstanding balance of $25,049.69, plus interest and fees. Saint Joseph’s Manor
    filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County against Dorothy
    Skinner, Thomas Skinner, and William Skinner, the appellant in this case and Thomas’
    brother. Saint Joseph’s Manor seeks to recover Dorothy’s outstanding balance under a
    theory of unjust enrichment and the Pennsylvania Support Law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
    4601, et seq., which obligates the children of an indigent person to care for or financially
    assist that person. The litigation against William and Dorothy is ongoing, and a default
    judgment was entered against Thomas in the amount of $32,225.56.
    Thomas subsequently filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
    Code, and William filed a bankruptcy complaint claiming that Thomas has a
    non-dischargeable obligation to reimburse him for any liability that he may owe Saint
    Joseph’s Manor. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed his complaint for lack of standing to
    challenge the dischargeability of Thomas’ debts, and the District Court affirmed. This
    timely appeal follows.2
    not constitute binding precedent.
    1
    This case comes before us on an appeal granting a motion to dismiss the amended
    complaint. Thus, we must assume that all of the facts alleged in the complaint are
    true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009).
    2
    We have appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    The District Court had jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal order
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & 1334(a). “Because the District Court sat
    2
    On appeal, William argues that he has valid claims that are non-dischargeable
    pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4) & (a)(6). He also argues that he has a valid claim
    under the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), 12 Pa. Cons. Stat.
    Ann. § 5101, et seq.
    While section 523 provides that certain claims are non-dischargeable, William
    ignores the essential prerequisite that only a party to whom a claim is owed may seek to
    make its claim non-dischargeable under section 523. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 
    523 U.S. 213
    ,
    218 (1998). A “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code “is usually referring to a right to
    payment recognized under state law.” Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas &
    Elec. Co., 
    549 U.S. 443
    , 451 (2007); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (defining a claim as
    a “right to payment”). Thus, only a party that has a valid claim under non-bankruptcy
    law has standing to challenge the dischargeability of that claim.
    The only state law that William refers to on appeal in his discussion of subsections
    (a)(4) and (a)(6) is the Support Law, and he does so only in passing. To the extent that
    William relies on the Support Law on appeal, this argument is waived, because he
    explicitly argued in the District Court that Thomas and Anna were liable to him “not
    under Pennsylvania Support Law . . . but for restitution.” App. 46; see Gass v. Virgin
    Islands Tel. Corp., 
    311 F.3d 237
    , 246 (3d Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, the District Court
    correctly concluded that the Pennsylvania Support Law does not provide the basis for
    below as an appellate court, this Court conducts the same review of the Bankruptcy
    Court’s order as did the District Court.” In re Telegroup, Inc., 
    281 F.3d 133
    , 136
    (3d Cir. 2002). The relevant facts are undisputed, and because we are presented
    with a pure question of law, our review is de novo. 
    Id. 3 William’s
    claim against Thomas and Anna because there is no right of contribution or
    indemnification under the Support Law. Instead, if a child “desire[s] to share his support-
    burden, he [is] permitted to do so by joining those individuals in [the] case [against
    him],” and the court could then apportion liability amongst the various children. Health
    Care & Ret. Corp. of Am. v. Pittas, 
    46 A.3d 719
    , 723 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
    William also does not have a valid claim under the UFTA, which allows the
    creditor of a debtor to “avoid” any fraudulent transfers made by the debtor. UFTA §
    5107(a). For purposes of the UFTA claim, William concedes that Dorothy, his mother, is
    the debtor, and he claims that Thomas and Anna are the transferees. While he argues that
    he is “[c]learly” a creditor of his mother because he has a claim against her under the
    UFTA and for unjust enrichment, we determine that it is clear that he is wrong. The
    UFTA does not make one a creditor; instead it serves as a tool for creditors to recover
    fraudulent transfers. Id; see also Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 
    34 A.3d 168
    , 174-75 (Pa.
    Super. Ct. 2011). Moreover, an unjust enrichment claim would require that Dorothy be
    “unjustly enriched at the expense of” William, which she was not. Wilson Area Sch.
    Dist. v. Skepton, 
    895 A.2d 1250
    , 1254 (Pa. 2006). Because William is not a creditor of
    Dorothy, the UFTA does not give him a valid claim. UFTA § 5107(a). Thus, because
    William does not have a valid claim against Thomas, he lacks standing to challenge the
    dischargeability of Thomas’ debts.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    4