United States v. Jerome Kelly ( 2015 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 13-3513
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JEROME LAMONT KELLY,
Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(2-08-cr-00374-012)
District Judge: Hon. Joy Flowers Conti
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 30, 2015
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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: December 4, 2015)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Jerome Lamont Kelly appeals from his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture and substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine, and fifty grams or more of a mixture and
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Kelly asserts that: (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish only a
buyer-seller relationship between him and members of the charged conspiracy, not that
Kelly was himself a member of the conspiracy; (2) the government’s drug-trafficking
expert impermissibly opined that Kelly was a conspirator; and (3) the prosecutor
committed misconduct in his closing argument. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.1
Kelly argues first that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy
conviction. As the government concedes, Kelly preserved this alleged error. We apply a
“particularly deferential standard” to challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence: “[w]e
‘review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d
Cir. 2005)). “To establish a conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable
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The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231; we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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doubt: (1) a shared unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and
(3) an agreement to work toward that goal.” United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d
186, 204–05 (3d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Brooks v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 2324 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2889 (2014). The government may prove its case by either “direct or circumstantial
evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
Kelly is correct that “a simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or
contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to
establish that the buyer was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.” United States v. Perez,
280 F.3d 318, 343 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 198 (3d
Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, “even an occasional supplier . . . can be shown to be a member
of the conspiracy by evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge that she or he was part
of a larger operation.” United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 728 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted).2
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Kelly invites us to reconsider four factors that this Circuit applies to
determine whether a defendant possessed the requisite knowledge of the conspiracy in
light of the Seventh Circuit’s determination that “most of [those] factors did not actually
distinguish conspiracies from buyer-seller relationships.” United States v. Brown, 726
F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1876 (2014). As discussed below,
we find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Kelly knew he was part
of a larger operation. We therefore do not reach the four-factor test upon which the
District Court relied.
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Although Kelly was heard on only seven of the more than 60,000 calls that the
government intercepted while investigating this conspiracy, those seven calls, together
with the explanatory testimony by government witnesses, suffice to enable a rational jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Kelly was a member of the conspiracy rather than
a mere customer. Phone records indicate that Kelly and Alford, the head of the charged
conspiracy, discussed third parties in a way that would enable a rational jury to conclude
that Kelly was aware of Alford’s transactions with drug suppliers and, by extension, of
Alford’s role within a larger operation. See J.A. at 1228–29, 1236. The phone
transcripts, as interpreted by the drug-trafficking expert who testified for the government,
also reveal that Kelly consulted Alford when Kelly encountered difficulty “cooking” the
cocaine that he had purchased to form crack, which a rational trier of fact could interpret
to demonstrate Kelly’s role as a processor and distributor of crack and as a co-conspirator
of Alford. See J.A. at 585–89, 1249–51. We therefore conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Kelly was a member of the conspiracy.
Kelly did not preserve either of his other arguments below; accordingly, we
review these claims for plain error. “For reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1)
an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) which seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States
v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d
309, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2014)). An error that “affec[ts] substantial rights . . . in most cases .
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. . means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of
the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
Kelly argues that the government’s drug-trafficking expert violated Rule 704’s
prohibition against testimony by an expert witness “about whether the defendant did or
did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged
or of a defense.” Fed. R. Evid. 704 (b). Defense counsel asked whether the expert would
agree that “two people [who] are on the phone and talking about cooking up crack,”
without any reference to the fact that “one purchased it from [the other],” were not
necessarily “conspiring to sell those drugs together.” J.A. at 960. The witness ultimately
responded: “That’s a possibility, but not the calls that we listened to. But in your
hypothetical, it’s a possibility, yes.” J.A. at 961. Kelly asserts that this response
transgressed Rule 704 through its implication that Kelly and Alford were co-conspirators
and that Kelly therefore had the mens rea necessary to support a conspiracy conviction.
We find it impossible to determine conclusively that this laconic response constitutes
anything more than an attempt to distinguish the subject call from the hypothetical posed
by defense counsel. In light of the evidence that supports Kelly’s membership in the
conspiracy, moreover, this answer does not create the prejudice necessary to demonstrate
plain error.
Kelly’s contention that the prosecutor’s closing remarks require reversal is
equally unavailing. Kelly argues that the prosecutor: (1) misstated the law by suggesting
that anyone who purchases cocaine can be convicted of conspiracy because cocaine
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necessarily comes from another country; (2) denigrated Kelly, his co-defendant Alonzo
Lamar Johnson, and defense counsel by calling their arguments “offens[ive]”; and (3)
accused the defendants of calling the government witnesses “liars.” According to Kelly,
the district court’s failure to spontaneously cure these remarks rises to the level of
reversible error.
We disagree. “When analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the key
question is whether a state prosecutor’s comments to the jury ‘so infec[ted] the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Rolan v.
Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). To answer this question, “a ‘reviewing court must
examine the prosecutor’s offensive actions in context and in light of the entire trial,
assessing the severity of the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the
quantum of evidence against the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d
95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001)). Here, we find that none of the complained-of comments call
Kelly’s conviction into question.
First, although the prosecutor did juxtapose cocaine production and distribution—
which involves many steps and therefore offers many levels of potential conspiracy—
with the growth and sale of marijuana—which could be a one-person job, J.A. at 1111–
13—he spoke much more concretely about Kelly’s co-conspirators, or those who spoke
to and about Kelly in the phone recordings, J.A. at 1118–20. Second, the prosecutor’s
statement that defense counsel made certain suggestions “unbelievably” and rhetorical
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question as to whether those suggestions “offend [the jurors’] sensibility” are permissible
attacks on Kelly’s credibility. Rolan, 680 F.3d at 324. Finally, the prosecutor’s
statements that defense counsel had labelled certain government witnesses “liar[s],” J.A.
at 1165, are not misconduct; rather, they tend to counter such remarks by the defense as
“the Government has presented to you chapter after chapter of the book of fiction that we
call this trial,” J.A. at 1124. In short, we perceive no “denial of due process” in these
alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct to which defense counsel made no
contemporaneous objection. United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 194 (3d Cir. 2010).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
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