Fred Clayworth v. County of Luzerne ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 11-4593
_____________
FRED CLAYWORTH,
individually and as parent and natural guardian of G.H.,
Appellant
v.
LUZERNE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA; LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN &
YOUTH SERVICES; FRANK CASTANO; JOSEPH KLOSS; JOHN KOSLOSKI;
TARA MCCUTCHEON; WILMA SNOPEK; and JOANNE VAN SAUN
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-11-cv-00254)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 13, 2012
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 5, 2013)
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Fred Clayworth, individually and as the parent and natural guardian of G.H.,
appeals from the District Court’s December 6, 2011 judgment, which dismissed his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 suit. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment entered by
the District Court.
I. Background
On September 8, 2011, after the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss the complaint, Clayworth filed an amended complaint against Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania (Luzerne County), Luzerne County Children & Youth Services (CYS), and
individual employees Frank Castano, Joseph Kloss, John Kosloski, Tara McCutcheon,
Wilma Snopek, and Joanne Van Saun, alleging that the defendants deprived him and his
daughter of various constitutional rights.
According to the amended complaint, G.H. was born on November 30, 2004.
Clayworth is the natural father of G.H. Clayworth and G.H.’s natural mother were not
married at the time of G.H.’s birth, nor were they ever married. Prior to G.H.’s birth,
G.H.’s natural mother informed CYS that she did not want the baby. Luzerne County
and CYS arranged an adoption. Immediately upon G.H.’s birth, G.H.’s natural mother
gave G.H. to CYS. Shortly thereafter, Clayworth learned of G.H.’s birth and
immediately told CYS that he believed he was her father. Clayworth stated that he would
take a paternity test and if the test showed he was G.H.’s father, he would raise her. On
March 3, 2005, a paternity test confirmed that Clayworth was G.H.’s father.
2
Clayworth does not have a criminal record, a history of physical abuse of children,
or a history of drug or alcohol abuse. Nevertheless, the defendants placed G.H. in foster
care. Over the next four years, Clayworth sought custody of G.H. The defendants placed
obstacles in his way, requiring Clayworth to submit to drug and alcohol testing, multiple
mental health evaluations, psychotherapy, court proceedings, parenting classes, home
study, limited and supervised access to G.H., and constant scrutiny of his interactions
with G.H. On May 29, 2009, after approximately four and a half years, Clayworth gained
permanent custody of G.H. and has raised her ever since. Clayworth contends that the
defendants’ decision to prevent him from raising his daughter was based on prejudice and
bias.
On September 16, 2011, the defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On December 6, 2011, the District Court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice.
Clayworth appealed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d
672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010). “In deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the
3
plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.” McTernan v. City of N.Y.,
577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).
III. Discussion
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must demonstrate the
defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d
Cir. 2008). Clayworth contends that the District Court erred by dismissing all counts of
the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. We address each in turn.
A. Fourteenth Amendment
To state a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
plaintiff must establish that he has a protected constitutional interest at issue and that the
defendants deprived him of it by engaging in conduct that “shocks the conscience.” See
id. at 219-20. Due process protects against arbitrary action, and “only the most egregious
official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 219.
Clayworth has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the custody, care, and
management of his child. See Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. CYS, 103 F.3d 1123, 1125
(3d Cir. 1997). This interest is not absolute, however, as the “liberty interest in familial
integrity is limited by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of children.”
Id. Although Clayworth alleged that the defendants tried to terminate his parental rights,
he failed to allege conduct sufficiently arbitrary to shock the conscience. Thus, for
substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, we agree that the Fourteenth
4
Amendment substantive due process claim should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
B. First Amendment
The First Amendment’s right of expressive association protects the ability of
individuals to gather in order to pursue “political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). As the
District Court explained, Clayworth’s First Amendment claim fails because the right he
asserts—the right to intimate association with family members—is anchored instead in
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 617-20.
C. Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S.
Const. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment does not independently provide a source of
individual constitutional rights. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir.
2007). We will, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Clayworth’s Ninth Amendment claim.
D. Qualified Immunity
“The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sharp v.
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). Because the Amended Complaint failed to
allege the deprivation of a constitutional right, we need not address the issue of qualified
immunity.
5
E. Supervisory Liability
Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead
that each government official has violated the Constitution through his own individual
actions. Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 71 (3d Cir.
2011). A supervisor can be held liable through direct supervisor action or “actual
knowledge and acquiescence” to constitutional violations. Id. at 72. For essentially the
reasons stated by the District Court, Clayworth has failed to allege a claim of supervisory
liability against Frank Castano, the Director of CYS.
F. Monell Claim
A plaintiff who seeks to impose liability on the local government under § 1983
must prove that action pursuant to official municipal policy caused the injury. Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (citing Monell v. N.Y. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). Because the Amended Complaint failed to allege a constitutional
violation, Clayworth’s Monell claim against the institutional defendants necessarily fails.
See Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 204 (3d Cir. 2008).
G. § 1983 Conspiracy
To demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff
must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a
constitutional right under color of law.” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d
685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, because Clayworth failed
6
to establish an underlying violation of his constitutional rights, his § 1983 conspiracy
claim also fails. See id.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
7