Latham v. United States , 306 F. App'x 716 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-15-2009
Latham v. USA
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-4135
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4135
___________
LARRY LATHAM,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
WARDEN JAMES F. SHERMAN; HEALTH SYSTEM
ADMINISTRATION RODNEY SMITH;
THE UTILIZATION COMMITTEE; PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT CHARLES
MONTGOMERY; DR. DENNIS OLSON, Medical Officer;
COUNSELOR NED WATSON; JOHN LAMANA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-00128E)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
DECEMBER 2, 2008
Before: MCKEE, HARDIMAN AND ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 15, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se Appellant Larry Latham appeals from the District Court’s entry of judgment
against him. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Latham, a federal prisoner, filed a civil rights action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging, among other things, that
Appellees denied him medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that he was
entitled to relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Essentially, he claimed
that he received inadequate medical care for injuries to his left foot and for urinary
problems which arose following surgery on his foot in 2004. The facts have been set out
in detail in the District Court’s opinion and, as we write only for the parties, we need not
repeat them here. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary
judgment, attaching Latham’s voluminous prison medical records along with the
Declaration of Dennis Olson, M.D., the Clinical Director of FCI-McKean. Appellees
argued that the Olson Declaration, coupled with Appellant’s medical records,
demonstrated that Appellant received “continuous and appropriate medical care” and,
therefore, that he could not satisfy the “deliberate indifference” requirement of an Eighth
Amendment claim. In ruling on Appellees’ motion, the District Court, adopting the
Report & Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, set out the standards applicable to a
motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment and, without stating which
standards it was applying, held that “Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that Plaintiff
received continual treatment and monitoring of both his left heel and his urinary
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conditions.” Based on Appellees’ submissions, the District Court concluded that
“Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against the individual
Defendants should be dismissed, as a matter of law.” Accordingly, the District Court
granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. By a previous
order, we asked the parties to address the following questions: (1) Did the District Court
dismiss Appellant’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or enter summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)?; (2) If the District Court dismissed
Appellant’s complaint, was such dismissal appropriate under Phillips v. Allegheny Cty.,
515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)?; and (3) If the District Court entered summary judgment,
did Appellant have adequate notice of the District Court’s intent to convert Appellees’
motion to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment, into a motion for summary
judgment, as outlined in Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989)?
Appellees argue that the District Court dismissed Appellant’s FTCA claim for lack
of jurisdiction, and entered summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim.
Appellant does not raise the dismissal of his FTCA claim in his appeal brief and,
accordingly, we deem it waived. See Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d
524, 535 n.11 (3d Cir. 2007). With respect to Appellant’s Eighth Amendment claim, we
agree with Appellees that the District Court clearly considered matters outside the
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pleadings in reaching its decision and, accordingly, converted the motion to dismiss into
one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.3d 331,
340 (3d Cir. 1989).
When a motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for summary judgment the
parties must be given notice of the conversion and an opportunity to present material to
the court. See id.; see also In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Secs. Litig., 184 F.3d 280,
288-89 (3d Cir. 1999). Rule 56(c) requires that the parties have at least ten days’ notice
before the court may consider the motion for summary judgment, and the opportunity to
submit pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and
affidavits. We have held that while “it would be desirable in the interest of clarity for an
order to notify expressly the parties that the court was converting a motion to dismiss into
one of ‘summary judgment’ or that the ruling would be pursuant to ‘Rule 56,’ the court
need not be so explicit so long as the order otherwise fairly apprises the parties of the
proposed conversion.” Id. at 342.
While in this case, the District Court never entered an order putting the parties on
notice that it might consider summary judgment, Appellees argue that their filing of a
motion to dismiss styled in the alternative as a motion for summary judgment was
sufficient to put Appellant on notice that summary judgment might be entered. In Hilfirty
v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 1996), we concluded that the filing of two motions to
dismiss styled in the alternative as motions for summary judgment were sufficient to
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place the parties on notice that summary judgment might be entered. See id. at 578-79.
We recognize that this case differs from Hilfirty in that Appellant is proceeding pro se,
and unlike in Hilfirty, where we noted that there was ample time for the plaintiff to object
to the entry of summary judgment, in this case, the time between Appellees’ filing of its
motion and the District Court’s granting it was brief. However, Appellant filed numerous
responsive documents in the District Court in which he set out his version of the facts as
he would if submitting an affidavit. In his opposition to Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment, Appellant explicitly addressed the standard which applies to summary
judgment motions, and argued that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case
and that he should be permitted to proceed to trial. While Appellant does address the lack
of explicit notice from the District Court in his appeal brief, at no point does he indicate
what affidavits or testimony he would have submitted in opposition to summary judgment
had he been given an opportunity to do so, nor does he pinpoint any “material” factual
dispute between his version of events and Appellees’. In light of the specific
circumstances of this case, we conclude that any failure by the District Court to explicitly
notify Appellant of its intent to treat Appellees’ motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment was harmless. See Rose, 871 F.2d at 342.
Having so concluded, we will now affirm the District Court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees. In order to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment
violation for inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he had: (i) an
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objectively serious medical need (ii) to which a prison official acted with deliberate
indifference. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d
192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). As observed by the District Court, deliberate indifference is
manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-
medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, and/or denial of reasonable
requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury. See Durmer v. O’Carroll,
991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993); Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). We do not doubt the seriousness of
Appellant’s medical conditions or the amount of pain he was in. However, we agree with
the District Court that Appellant’s medical records belie any claim that Appellees were
deliberately indifferent to his medical conditions. Nothing in any of Appellant’s filings,
either in the District Court or in this Court, would lead us to a contrary conclusion. While
Appellant may believe that a different course of action should have been taken in
response to his complaint, he does not raise any genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his medical problems.
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s entry of judgment in
favor of Appellees.
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