Solomon v. Attorney General , 308 F. App'x 644 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-30-2009
    Solomon v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-4763
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-4763
    ___________
    MARTIN SOLOMON,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    ____________________________________
    On Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A72 501 956
    Immigration Judge: Andrew Arthur
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    January 28, 2009
    Before: BARRY, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: January 30, 2009)
    ___________
    OPINION
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    Martin Solomon petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) removal
    order. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.
    Solomon is a native and citizen of Jamaica. He adjusted his immigration status to
    lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1996. In 1997 and in 1999, he was
    convicted in the New Castle County (Delaware) Superior Court of separate offenses of
    terroristic threatening, i.e., threatening to commit a crime likely to result in death or
    serious injury to person or property, in violation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 621(a)(1). In
    2006, he was placed in removal proceedings, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for
    having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. On the basis of
    the two crimes set forth above, on September 6, 2007, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found
    Solomon removable as charged and ordered him removed to Jamaica. The Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ’s decision on November 26, 2007.1
    Solomon filed a timely petition for review. On January 24, 2008, this Court denied
    Solomon’s motion for a stay of removal and referred the Government’s motion to dismiss
    to a merits panel. Solomon’s sole issue in his petition is whether the BIA erred in ruling
    that a conviction for terroristic threatening under the Delaware law cited above is a
    CIMT.
    Although the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) generally removes
    jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against certain criminal aliens, see
    1
    Earlier in the proceedings, the IJ had issued a decision and removal order, but the
    BIA remanded the record to the IJ for issuance of a more complete decision. The IJ’s
    order of September 6, 2007 is the decision on remand.
    2
    § 1252(a)(2)(C), the Act, as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, specifically grants
    jurisdiction to review a criminal alien’s “constitutional claims or questions of law.”
    § 1252(a)(2)(D). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider the legal issue raised by
    Solomon.2
    This Court determines whether a crime involves moral turpitude by examining the
    criminal statute and the alien’s record of conviction, not the alien’s specific conduct. See
    Partyka v. Attorney General, 
    417 F.3d 408
    , 411 (3d Cir. 2005). Under this categorical
    approach, the Court reads the applicable statute to ascertain the least culpable conduct
    necessary to sustain a conviction. 
    Id. Where a
    statute covers both turpitudinous and
    non-turpitudinous acts, it is divisible, and the Court looks to the record of conviction to
    determine whether the alien was convicted under that part of the statute defining a crime
    involving moral turpitude. 
    Id. Under Board
    precedent as construed by this Court, the set
    of crimes involving moral turpitude is determined by reference to the intent required for
    conviction. See 
    id. at 413.
    As a general rule, a crime involves moral turpitude if it is
    “inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the
    duties owed other persons, either individually or to society in general.” Knapik v.
    Ashcroft, 
    384 F.3d 84
    , 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The agency’s determination
    2
    The Government’s motion to dismiss is thus denied. Indeed, the Government
    acknowledges in its brief that this “Court has jurisdiction to review whether the agency
    reasonably concluded that section 621(a)(1) of title 11 of the Delaware Code defines a
    crime in which moral turpitude inheres.” Respondent’s Brief at 4.
    3
    of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is entitled to deference under Chevron,
    U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984). See 
    Knapik, 384 F.3d at 87-88
    . However, the Court reviews de novo the determination of the
    elements of a criminal statute deemed to implicate moral turpitude; for a state criminal
    statute, the Court looks to state law interpretations of the statute. See 
    id. at 88,
    91.
    The parties agree that Solomon was convicted under paragraph (a)(1) of section
    621 of the Delaware statute. Under that provision, a person is guilty of terroristic
    threatening if “[t]he person threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or in
    serious injury to person or property.” Solomon argues that section 621(a)(1) lacks an
    element of specific intent to do harm, and only requires proof of a “general intent” to
    make a threat. However, as explained by the IJ and the BIA, the Delaware Supreme
    Court recently discussed section 621(a)(1) and held that a conviction under section 621
    requires not only that the defendant uttered words that threaten serious injury or death, but
    also that the defendant had the intent to threaten or intimidate the victim with those
    words. See Andrews v. Delaware, 
    930 A.2d 846
    , 853-54 (Del. 2007). “The defendant
    need not intend to carry out the threat, but it is not enough to show only that the defendant
    merely intended to utter threatening words.” 
    Id. at 854.
    Thus, under state law, the intent
    to threaten is, indeed, an element of proving a violation of section 621.
    We defer to the BIA’s holding that “intentional transmission of threats is evidence
    of a vicious motive or a corrupt mind.” See BIA decision, A.R. 4 (citing Matter of Ajami,
    4
    22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 952 (BIA 1999). Because Solomon’s convictions involve the
    intentional transmission of threats under state law, the BIA did not err in finding that
    Solomon had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. We will therefore
    deny the petition for review.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-4763

Citation Numbers: 308 F. App'x 644

Judges: Barry, Hard, Iman, Per Curiam, Smith

Filed Date: 1/30/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024