Levi v. Holt , 193 F. App'x 172 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    9-7-2006
    Levi v. Holt
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1936
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    Recommended Citation
    "Levi v. Holt" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 470.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/470
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    BPS-271
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 06-1936
    BERNARD S. LEVI,
    Appellant
    v.
    RONALD HOLT, Warden
    ________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-01533)
    District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
    ________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    July 13, 2006
    Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed September 7, 2006)
    ______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _______________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Bernard Levi appeals from the denial of his habeas corpus petition
    under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because no substantial question is presented, we will affirm the
    order of the District Court. See L.A.R. 27.4.1
    I.
    On March 7, 2005, Levi was charged with the high severity disciplinary infraction
    of “engaging in sexual acts.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3, Code 205. It was alleged that
    Levi positioned himself in the FCI-Schuylkill education library so that he could directly
    view one of the female teachers, Mrs. Feger. Feger reported that Levi stared at her while
    he stroked his erect penis, which was protruding from his sweat pants. The act reportedly
    was almost identical to an incident in December 2004, for which Levi was disciplined,
    except that in that case he did not expose his genitalia. The matter was assigned to a
    Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) for review. Levi argued that the charges were false
    and retaliatory. He also asked to present three witnesses, but only one could be located.
    Waiving his right to present the two missing witnesses, Levi presented one witness who
    stated that he did not see what was going on. The DHO held that the greater weight of
    the evidence supported a finding that Levi had violated code 205. The DHO ordered the
    forfeiture of twenty-seven days of good-time credit, forty-five days in the special housing
    unit, and a year loss of several privileges.
    After exhausting his administrative remedies, Levi filed a habeas petition under 28
    U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his due process rights were violated because he was not
    1
    This appeal was originally listed for possible dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
    Given the extent of the proceedings in the District Court, we find that summary
    affirmance is a more appropriate method of disposing of this appeal.
    2
    permitted to call all of his witnesses, he was charged with the wrong offense, the
    sanctions were in retaliation for his filing prior lawsuits, and the sanctions were excessive
    in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also filed a motion for a preliminary
    injunction and a temporary restraining order seeking to bar Lt. Broe and other prison staff
    from taking retaliatory acts against him. A Magistrate Judge recommended denying the
    petition. Levi filed objections. The District Court rejected Levi’s motions and denied the
    petition as well as a second motion for a preliminary injunction. Levi filed an appeal
    challenging all of the District Court’s orders.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and because the issues in this
    case are purely legal, we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s denial of a §
    2241 petition. See Roussos v. Menifee, 
    122 F.3d 159
    , 161 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997); Barden v.
    Keohane, 
    921 F.2d 476
    , 479 (3d Cir. 1990). The memorandum accompanying Levi’s
    notice of appeal does not appear to directly challenge any of the District Court’s holdings.
    Rather, Levi seeks relief for what he believes to be unbearable conditions in the Special
    Housing Unit and retaliatory actions by prison staff. These issues are not cognizable for
    two reasons. First, they were not raised below, see In re Mintze, 
    434 F.3d 222
    , 232 (3d
    Cir. 2006), and second, the claims do not challenge the fact or duration of his
    3
    confinement. See Leamer v. Fauver, 
    288 F.3d 532
    , 540-42 (3d Cir. 2002).2 Assuming he
    also desires to challenge the District Court’s denial of his § 2241 petition, we address that
    below.
    Federal inmates, such as Levi, possess a liberty interest in good-time credit. See
    Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 555-57 (1974); Young v. Kann, 
    926 F.2d 1396
    , 1399
    (3d Cir. 1991). While the Due Process Clause protects against the revocation of good-
    time, it does not provide the same level of protection against the imposition of other
    forms of discipline. See Torres v. Fauver, 
    292 F.3d 141
    , 150-51 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
    Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 486 (1995)). Levi’s transfer to the Special Housing Unit
    and the loss of various privileges do not invoke the same due process protections. See
    
    Torres, 292 F.3d at 150-51
    . Additionally, these punishments cannot be challenged under
    § 2241 because in no manner do they affect the fact or length of his sentence or
    confinement. See 
    Leamer, 288 F.3d at 540-42
    . Levi’s challenge under § 2241, therefore,
    must be grounded upon the revocation of his good-time credit only.
    In order to comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process, the
    disciplinary findings must be supported by “some evidence” in the record.
    Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 
    472 U.S. 445
    , 454 (1985). After
    2
    For similar reasons, we do not address the denial of Levi’s various motions for
    injunctive relief. None of his motions affects the fact or duration of his conviction or
    sentence. The claims are more appropriately brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
    Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971).
    4
    independently reviewing the record, we agree with the District Court that Levi fails to
    present any evidence countering Mrs. Feger’s accusation or establishing that Mrs. Feger
    was falsifying her claims. We conclude that the DHO’s factual findings are supported by
    some evidence in the record, and address his remaining arguments in turn.
    A.     Meaning of the term “Sexual Acts” and Excessiveness
    This appeal comes to us alongside of Levi’s nearly identical § 2241 petition
    challenging a disciplinary sanction for a similar offense committed on December 21,
    2001. See Levi v. Holt, C.A. No. 05-5076 (3d Cir. 2006). We affirmed the District
    Court’s denial of the petition concluding that the DHO’s findings were supported by
    some evidence in the record, and that the DHO’s determination that Levi’s conduct
    constituted “sexual acts” was not clearly erroneous. We also found that the loss of less
    than a month of good-time was not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. We adhere
    to that reasoning here.
    B.     Denial of Witnesses
    Levi also claims that he was denied his due process right to call witnesses. A
    prisoner has the limited right to call witnesses who have relevant information and would
    not present a threat to penological interests. See 
    Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-67
    ; 28 C.F.R. §
    5471.17(c). Levi called one witness and he waived his right to call the remaining two.
    He argues that he originally requested five witnesses, but was allowed only one.
    However, he does not present the names of the alleged fourth and fifth witnesses. Nor
    5
    does he allege that the two waived witnesses were actually available. Finally, he does not
    present any legal basis, nor do we find any, to conclude that his right to due process was
    violated.
    For the foregoing reasons, Levi fails to establish that the District Court erred in
    denying his petition. Accordingly, we will affirm.
    6