Mark Picozzi v. ( 2012 )


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  • DLD-002                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-3444
    ___________
    IN RE: MARK PICOZZI,
    Petitioner
    ____________________________________
    On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
    United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
    (Related to 1-12-cv-03063)
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
    October 4, 2012
    Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: October 12, 2012)
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    PER CURIAM
    Mark Picozzi, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, petitions for a writ of
    mandamus compelling the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to
    reopen a civil case Picozzi initiated that was administratively terminated. Alternatively,
    Picozzi petitions for a writ of mandamus compelling the Superior Court of New Jersey
    for Atlantic County to dismiss his ongoing criminal prosecution. Picozzi also filed a
    motion seeking a temporary restraining order against the Superior Court of New Jersey.
    We will deny the petition and motion without prejudice.
    Picozzi is detained in the Atlantic County Justice Facility while his criminal
    prosecution is ongoing. In May 2012, Picozzi filed a pleading in the District Court.
    Although this pleading was docketed as a complaint, the relief requested was more
    similar to relief available through a petition for a writ of mandamus. Picozzi requested
    that the District Court intervene in the state court criminal proceeding and dismiss the
    case or, alternatively, grant him a hearing in the District Court and allow him to present
    evidence of his innocence. Picozzi sought relief from the District Court because,
    principally, his requests for a speedy trial from the Superior Court of New Jersey were
    not granted and, to a lesser extent, the prosecutor, public defender, and Superior Court
    prevented him from establishing his innocence.
    On July 5, 2012, the District Court administratively terminated Picozzi’s case
    because it determined that Picozzi, a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, did not file a
    duly certified six-month prison account statement and affidavit of poverty as required by
    the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (a). The District Court’s termination
    order provided that, if Picozzi pre-paid the $350 filing fee or filed a valid in forma
    pauperis application within thirty days of the entry of the order, the case may be
    reopened. Picozzi filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis on July 17, 2012,
    within the thirty-day period set forth in the District Court’s order. The District Court has
    not acted in Picozzi’s case since the entry of its order on July 5, 2012.
    2
    On August 31, 2012, Picozzi petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.
    Picozzi’s petition states that he complied with the District Court’s order and submitted a
    timely application to proceed in forma pauperis but the District Court has not reopened
    his case. 1 Picozzi’s petition requests that we compel the District Court to grant him a
    hearing or dismiss his state criminal prosecution. On September 17, 2012, Picozzi filed a
    motion for a temporary restraining order against the Superior Court of New Jersey due to
    alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
    Fourteenth Amendments.
    Mandamus is a drastic remedy available in extraordinary circumstances only. In
    re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 
    418 F.3d 372
    , 378 (3d Cir. 2005). A petitioner seeking
    the writ “must have no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must show
    that the right to issuance is clear and indisputable.” Madden v. Myers, 
    102 F.3d 74
    , 79
    (3d Cir. 1996). Generally, a court’s management of its docket is discretionary. In re Fine
    Paper Antitrust Litig., 
    685 F.2d 810
    , 817 (3d Cir. 2005). Consequently, there is no “clear
    and indisputable” right to have the District Court handle a case in a certain manner. See
    Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 
    449 U.S. 33
    , 36 (1980). However, mandamus may
    be warranted when a district court’s delay “is tantamount to a failure to exercise
    jurisdiction.” Madden, 
    102 F.3d at 79
    .
    1
    Picozzi’s petition to this Court and other filings with the District Court allege that he
    filed a valid informa pauperis application with the District Court attached to his May
    2012 pleading. However, that application’s prisoner account statement was not duly
    certified by the appropriate prison official, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform
    3
    In this case, Picozzi’s in forma pauperis application has been pending in the
    District Court for less than three months; this period of time is not an undue delay and
    does not warrant our intervention. See 
    id.
     (noting that a delay of approximately eight
    months did not require mandamus). Consequently, we deny Picozzi’s petition for a writ
    of mandamus compelling the District Court to grant Picozzi a hearing and express our
    confidence that the District Court will expediently address Picozzi’s in forma pauperis
    application.
    In regard to Picozzi’s petition that we compel the Superior Court of New Jersey to
    dismiss the criminal proceedings against him, he has not shown that he has a clear and
    indisputable right to that relief. See 
    id.
     Mandamus typically may be “used to confine an
    inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise
    its authority when it is its duty to do so.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 
    418 F.3d at 378
     (internal quotation marks omitted). State courts are not inferior courts of this Court,
    and, except in limited circumstances, federal courts do not have the power to compel state
    courts to act in a particular way. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
    Eng’rs, 
    398 U.S. 281
    , 286 (1970) (noting that state courts and federal courts comprise
    separate legal systems); In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 
    654 F.2d 268
    , 278-79 (3d Cir.
    1981) (explaining that generally federal courts may only issue directives to state courts to
    protect their jurisdiction or effectuate judgments). Therefore, we deny Picozzi’s petition
    Act. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (a)(2).
    4
    for a writ of mandamus compelling the Superior Court of New Jersey to dismiss the
    criminal proceedings against him.
    Similarly, we deny Picozzi’s motion for a temporary restraining order against the
    Superior Court of New Jersey. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the
    United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court” except
    where one of the three exceptions apply: (1) the injunction is “expressly authorized by
    Act of Congress”; (2) an injunction is “necessary in aid of [the federal court’s]
    jurisdiction; or (3) an injunction is necessary “to protect or effectuate [the federal court’s]
    judgments.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2283
    . Picozzi does not argue that any of these exceptions apply
    and his allegations do not support a showing that an exception is applicable; accordingly,
    we lack the authority to grant the temporary restraining order that he requests and his
    motion is denied.
    For the reasons we have given we deny Picozzi’s petition for a writ of mandamus
    and deny his motion for a temporary restraining order.
    5