Robert Zomolosky v. Ellen Kullman , 640 F. App'x 212 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 14-4006
    _____________
    ROBERT ZOMOLOSKY, derivatively on behalf of
    E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Company,
    Appellant
    v.
    ELLEN KULLMAN; LOIS D. JULIBER; CURTIS J. CRAWFORD;
    RICHARD H. BROWN; BERTRAND P. COLLOMB; ALEXANDER M. CUTLER;
    WILLIAM K. REILLY; SAMUEL W. BODMAN; JOHN T. DILLION;
    E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-00094)
    District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
    ______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    September 10, 2015
    ______________
    Before: VANASKIE, SLOVITER, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: January 15, 2016)
    _____________
    OPINION*
    _____________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
    does not constitute binding precedent.
    VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Robert Zomolosky appeals from the District Court’s Order dismissing
    his derivative action on behalf of E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Company (“DuPont”) against
    Appellees, current and former members of DuPont’s Board of Directors (“the Board”).
    He contends that the District Court incorrectly applied the test articulated in Rales v.
    Blasband, 
    634 A.2d 927
    (Del. 1993), which governs how demand futility is to be pled in
    a derivative action premised on board inaction. For the reasons discussed below, we will
    affirm.
    I.
    DuPont, a conglomerate comprised of thirteen different businesses, has a large
    stake in the development of bacteria- and insecticide-resistant crops, including corn and
    soybeans.1 Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”), a producer of rival agricultural farm
    products, holds a patent on an herbicide known as “Roundup.” To encourage farmers to
    use Roundup, Monsanto also developed a line of genetically modified “Roundup Ready”
    corn and soybean seeds that are resistant to the herbicide. Monsanto’s patent on
    Roundup-Ready products expired in 2014.
    In 1993, Monsanto and Pioneer Technologies Inc. (“Pioneer”) entered into a
    licensing agreement to develop bacteria-resistant corn seeds. The parties abided by this
    These facts are drawn from Zomolosky’s Second Verified Derivative Amended
    1
    Complaint. We must accept as true the facts alleged, and draw all reasonable inferences
    in his favor. Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 
    643 F.3d 77
    , 84 (3d Cir. 2011).
    2
    agreement until March 1997, when Pioneer sued Monsanto for allegedly violating the
    1993 agreement (“the 1997 litigation”). Monsanto counterclaimed that Pioneer was
    stacking its own bacteria-resistant gene with Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready genes in
    violation of the licensing agreement. On August 23, 2000, a jury returned a verdict in
    Monsanto’s favor, resulting in an $11 million judgment against Pioneer.
    In March 1999, while the 1997 litigation was still pending, DuPont acquired
    Pioneer. Monsanto claimed that this sale voided a separate licensing agreement with
    Pioneer for the use of Roundup Ready in corn seeds. DuPont disputed that contention,
    which led to three years of litigation (“the 1999 litigation”). The 1999 litigation
    terminated in 2002 when the parties entered into a licensing agreement that allowed
    DuPont to sell Roundup-Ready soybean and corn seeds, but did not permit DuPont to
    stack Roundup Ready with its own gene technology.
    Starting in 2005, DuPont—through Pioneer—initiated development of an
    herbicide-resistant technology known as Optimum GAT (“OGAT”) to compete with
    Roundup Ready. Over the next three years, DuPont invested $4 billion into the
    development of OGAT. By July 2007, however, DuPont’s development team realized
    that the OGAT soybean seeds were not performing as expected. Shortly thereafter,
    DuPont’s CEO, Charles Holliday, Jr., conceded to shareholders that OGAT was facing
    significant difficulties. He then offered an alternative plan: DuPont would explore
    stacking OGAT with Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready technology.
    3
    In August 2008, Holliday called Monsanto CEO Hugh Grant to inquire about a
    licensing agreement that would allow DuPont to stack OGAT with Roundup Ready.
    Monsanto demanded approximately $1.5 billion in royalties, and in the end, no deal was
    consummated. Four months later, in late December 2008, Monsanto indicated in a Form
    10-Q filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that it had entered
    into a dispute resolution process with DuPont regarding Monsanto’s allegations that
    DuPont was violating the terms of the 2002 licensing agreement by stacking Roundup-
    Ready genes with its own gene technology.
    In May 2009, Monsanto sued DuPont for patent infringement in the Eastern
    District of Missouri (“the 2009 litigation”). In August 2009, Monsanto’s Grant sent a
    letter to Holliday and DuPont’s new CEO, Ellen Kullman, requesting that DuPont form
    an independent committee to investigate the alleged patent infringement. No committee
    was ever formed. While the 2009 litigation was pending, however, DuPont placed the
    development of OGAT “soy stacks with Roundup Ready 1 . . . on hold pending
    resolution of [the] dispute with Monsanto.” App. 79.
    In January 2010, the district court granted Monsanto’s motion for partial summary
    judgment, concluding that DuPont had breached the 2002 licensing agreement. About
    two years later, in December 2011, the court sanctioned DuPont and its counsel for
    misrepresenting DuPont’s understanding of the terms of the 2002 licensing agreement.
    The case then proceeded to a jury trial on the issues of willfulness and damages. In
    August 2012, the jury found that DuPont willfully violated Monsanto’s patents and
    4
    awarded $1 billion in damages. A subsequent settlement agreement, however, terminated
    the lawsuit. This agreement required DuPont to pay Monsanto $1.75 billion over ten
    years in exchange for a license to stack OGAT with Roundup Ready. The arrangement
    also gave Monsanto various rights to DuPont technologies developed using the Roundup-
    Ready genes.
    In January 2013, Zomolosky filed a Verified Derivative Complaint in the District
    of Delaware on behalf of DuPont in which he alleged that the Board’s lack of oversight
    and implicit approval of illegal activity led to the patent infringement underlying the
    2009 litigation. In March 2013, Zomolosky filed an amended complaint, and after
    Appellees moved to dismiss, he filed a second amended complaint. In June 2013,
    Appellees filed a second motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted on
    September 12, 2014. Zomolosky timely appealed.
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a district court’s ruling on demand
    futility under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 for abuse of discretion.” Kanter v. Barella, 
    489 F.3d 170
    , 175 (3d Cir. 2007). For purposes of this appeal, we apply Delaware law when
    reviewing the substantive requirements of a shareholder’s derivative claim, including
    demand futility. Blasband v. Rales, 
    971 F.2d 1034
    , 1047 (3d Cir. 1992). We review de
    novo the District Court’s construction and interpretation of Delaware law. See Nelson v.
    Cnty. of Allegheny, 
    60 F.3d 1010
    , 1012 (3d Cir. 1995).
    5
    III.
    The central issue in this appeal is whether Zomolosky should be excused from the
    normal requirement that he make a demand on the Board that it bring suit on behalf of the
    corporation before commencing a derivative action. Zomolosky argues the District Court
    erred by applying the standard for demand futility articulated in Rales, and by failing to
    draw reasonable inferences in his favor concerning the Board’s knowledge of the ongoing
    pattern of infringement dating back to 1997.
    A.
    “A basic principle of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that
    directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”
    Spiegel v. Buntrock, 
    571 A.2d 767
    , 772–73 (Del. 1990); see Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §
    141(a). This includes the decision to commence litigation or, alternatively, to abstain
    from filing suit. 
    Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773
    . We have explained that “it is clear that the
    demand requirement is not a mere formality, but rather is an important aspect of
    Delaware’s substantive law.” 
    Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1048
    .
    Delaware courts have developed two tests to evaluate whether a plaintiff has
    properly pleaded demand futility. The first, set out in Aronson v. Lewis, 
    473 A.2d 805
    ,
    814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 
    746 A.2d 244
    (Del.
    2000), generally applies when a plaintiff seeks to challenge a specific action taken by a
    board—“i.e., where it is alleged that the directors made a conscious business decision in
    breach of their fiduciary duties,” Wood v. Baum, 
    953 A.2d 136
    , 140 (Del. 2008). Under
    6
    this analysis, a court must determine whether the complaint: (1) sufficiently rebuts the
    presumption of director disinterest and independence through well-pleaded facts, 
    Rales, 634 A.2d at 936
    ; or (2) pleads particularized facts creating “a reasonable doubt” that the
    challenged business decision was a product of validly exercised business judgment,
    
    Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814
    .
    On the other hand, the second test applies when “the subject of a derivative suit is
    not a business decision of the Board but rather a violation of the Board’s oversight
    duties.” 
    Wood, 953 A.2d at 140
    . Under this test, the analysis focuses on the Board’s
    inability to exercise its business judgment in evaluating the demand itself. 
    Id. In those
    circumstances, “the appropriate inquiry is whether [the plaintiff’s] amended complaint
    raises a reasonable doubt regarding the ability of a majority of the Board to exercise
    properly its business judgment in a decision on a demand had one been made at the time
    this action was filed.” 
    Rales, 634 A.2d at 937
    . This inquiry is commonly referred to as
    the Rales test.
    Zomolosky contends that the District Court improperly applied the Rales test on
    these facts. He argues that Delaware courts have recently applied Aronson to situations
    where a board has consciously failed to take action, such as in Quadrant Structured
    Products Company v. Vertin, 
    102 A.3d 155
    (Del. Ch. 2014). There, the Court of
    Chancery explained that “[a] conscious decision not to take action is just as much of a
    decision as a decision to act.” 
    Id. at 183.
    The board in Vertin was presented with a
    choice between two options: (1) take action and defer interest on junior notes, or (2) take
    7
    no action and allow the junior notes to collect interest. 
    Id. The Court
    of Chancery
    concluded that the Board’s inaction was the product of a conscious choice, undertaken
    with full knowledge of the consequences that would follow. 
    Id. In this
    case, however, the Board was not presented with an explicit choice of
    action or inaction, each of which carried known and attendant consequences. Rather,
    Zomolosky’s complaint charges the Board with general inaction, lack of oversight, and
    acquiescence. See App. 43 (“DuPont’s Board members knew of the latest infringement
    from an early date, and did nothing to halt it[.]”); 
    id. 78 (“The
    Board took no steps to stop
    DuPont’s improper actions.”); 
    id. 80 (“The
    DuPont Board’s knowing acquiescence in
    DuPont’s wrongful and recidivist course of unlawful conduct is an affirmative breach of
    fiduciary duty.”); 
    id. (“The Board
    Consciously Failed to Take Steps to Protect DuPont
    and to Bring Its Behavior Into Conformity With the Law”). Despite Zomolosky’s
    attempts to cast his complaint in a different light, at its core, his claim is that the Board
    “violated a duty to be active monitors of corporate performance.” In re Caremark Int’l
    Inc. Derivative Litig., 
    698 A.2d 959
    , 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). Accordingly, we conclude that
    the District Court appropriately determined that the demand futility analysis was
    governed by Rales. See In re INFOUSA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 
    953 A.2d 963
    , 986
    (Del. Ch. 2007) (Rales applies “[w]here the complaint does not address an action taken
    by the board”).
    B.
    8
    Having determined the appropriate substantive standard for pleading demand
    futility, we now turn to the District Court’s application of Rales. A plaintiff can satisfy
    Rales by alleging facts showing that the directors face a “substantial likelihood” of
    personal liability. 
    Rales, 634 A.2d at 986
    . Thus, Zomolosky’s complaint needed to
    contain allegations “that the directors were conscious of the fact that they were not doing
    their jobs,” Guttman v. Huang, 
    823 A.2d 492
    , 506 (Del. Ch. 2003), and that they ignored
    “red flags that should have alerted the [Board] to the problems.” 
    Kanter, 489 F.3d at 181
    .
    The purported “red flags” must be of such a nature that we can infer “that the directors
    knew or . . . should have known,” In re 
    Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971
    , that DuPont was
    engaged in patent infringement. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1
    requires Zomolosky to plead with particularity “the reason for . . . not making the effort”
    to demand that the Board bring the desired legal action itself. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3).
    Zomolosky argues that the facts pleaded with particularity in his complaint—
    coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom—demonstrate that the Board
    consciously ignored numerous “red flags” that were sufficient to put it on notice of the
    ongoing infringement on Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready technology. Such indicators
    include: (1) the 1997 and 1999 patent-infringement lawsuits; (2) the Board’s knowledge
    of the 2002 licensing agreement; (3) the major investment in OGAT; (4) Holliday’s
    attempt to broker a licensing agreement with Monsanto; (5) Monsanto’s SEC filing
    discussing the patent infringement; (6) Monsanto’s December 2009 letter to Holliday and
    Kullman calling for an investigation into the patent infringement; (7) sanctions levied in
    9
    the course of the 1999 and 2009 litigation; and (8) the Board’s decision to give Kullman a
    raise in 2013. Zomolosky also alleges that the Board had a duty—detailed in DuPont’s
    proxy statements—to regularly review information concerning the legal risks associated
    with proposed and ongoing projects. He also claims that the Board’s Science and
    Technology Committee was charged with monitoring the development of new
    technologies and associated legal risks.
    Turning first to the prior legal actions, the 1997 litigation did not involve
    Roundup-Ready genes. Instead, Monsanto based its counterclaim on Pioneer’s
    unauthorized stacking of bacteria-resistant gene technology. Similarly, although the 1999
    litigation did allege that DuPont stacked Roundup-Ready, herbicide-resistant genes
    without authorization, the action stemmed from its use in corn seeds. In contrast, the
    2009 litigation centered on DuPont’s unlicensed stacking of Roundup-Ready genes in
    soybean seeds. As the District Court noted, these prior suits involved different subject
    matters and predated the 2009 litigation by over a decade. We agree that the 1997 and
    1999 suits did not put the Board on notice of the alleged infringement at issue here.
    Zomolosky also argues that the Board was aware of “the rights . . . incorporated in
    the 2002 Licensing Agreement,” which was a result of the 1999 litigation. Appellant’s
    Br. at 32. The complaint, however, simply alleges that members of DuPont’s
    intellectual-property legal team were intimately involved in negotiating the 2002
    Licensing Agreement. In turn, they reported to the Vice-President and Assistant General
    Counsel of DuPont, who then reported to DuPont’s General Counsel, Tom Sager. Sager
    10
    answered directly to the Board and also directed the 2009 litigation. Except for the
    description of this chain of command, there is no averment that speaks with particularity
    to specific communications which would have given the Board knowledge of the rights
    incorporated in the 2002 licensing agreement.2
    Next, the complaint claims that by early 2008, the Board should have known
    OGAT was failing—despite the $4 billion expended in developing the product line—and
    that later in 2008, Holliday was attempting to negotiate a licensing agreement with
    Monsanto to stack OGAT with Roundup Ready. These events, however, were not “red
    flags” tending to show that DuPont was infringing on Monsanto’s Roundup Ready
    patent. They establish nothing more than that the Board knew Holliday was taking the
    reasonable step of negotiating a licensing agreement to remedy OGAT’s shortcomings.
    Monsanto’s SEC filing and letter of August 17, 2009 are also insufficient to
    impute knowledge of infringement to the Board. As the District Court explained, the
    SEC filing—which may or may not have come to the Board’s attention—“does not
    necessarily lead to the conclusion that DuPont” and, more specifically, its Board “knew it
    was infringing.” App. 23. Similarly, Monsanto’s letter was sent to Holliday and
    Kullman, not to the Board itself. Although we agree with Zomolosky that a court can
    2
    Zomolosky maintains that the District Court should have taken judicial notice of
    an SEC filing that purportedly showed that the Board was aware of the requirements of
    the 2002 agreement. We review the District Court’s decision regarding judicial notice for
    abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mitchell, 
    365 F.3d 215
    , 251 (3d Cir. 2004). As
    the District Court noted, Zomolosky was free to include these allegations in any of the
    three complaints filed in this matter, and he failed to do so. We discern no abuse of
    discretion.
    11
    draw a “reasonable inference . . . that those officers passed the information on to the
    directors,” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, 
    95 A.3d 1264
    , 1273 (Del. 2014), the letter merely recited the same allegations at issue in the
    then-pending patent lawsuit. We cannot infer that such information—coming from a
    major competitor and opposing party in an ongoing lawsuit—is sufficient to put the
    Board on notice that DuPont was willfully infringing on Monsanto’s patents.
    As to the court sanctions imposed during the 1999 and 2009 litigation, Zomolosky
    contends “the seriousness and harshness of both sanction orders, taken together in totality
    create an inference of a pattern of behavior and conduct about which the Board should
    have been advised.” Appellant’s Br. at 25 (emphasis added). It does not follow,
    however, that these specific orders would have notified the Board that DuPont was
    infringing the Roundup-Ready technology. In the 1999 litigation, the court sanctioned
    DuPont for “discovery misconduct.” App. 52. It cannot be the case that this type of
    procedural sanction—levied in 2001—would put the Board on notice of specific
    instances of infringement occurring seven years later. Zomolosky’s reliance on the 2009
    litigation is equally unavailing. There, the court sanctioned DuPont for “knowingly
    making factual misrepresentations concerning its subjective belief in order to maintain its
    reformation claims.” Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
    748 F.3d 1189
    ,
    1197 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphases added). We cannot conclude, however, that this
    sanction supports an inference that the Board was aware both of the explicit conditions
    contained in the 2002 licensing agreement and of the infringement at issue. Rather, this
    12
    sanction only speaks to DuPont’s unsuccessful legal strategy, namely, claiming that the
    2002 licensing agreement was subject to reformation to incorporate the stacking of
    Roundup Ready. 
    Id. Next, Zomolosky
    contends that the Board’s Science and Technology Committee
    must have known that DuPont was stacking Roundup Ready in violation of the licensing
    agreement. As the District Court explained, reports from the Science and Technology
    committee and other management personnel “would have provided the board with
    updates on ongoing research and development. However, these allegations are not
    sufficient for the court to infer that the board members knew that such research was
    infringing and, therefore, were not discharging their duties or were consciously
    disregarding such duties.” App. 23. We agree. In the absence of any allegation detailing
    what was specifically presented to the committee concerning the OGAT-Roundup-Ready
    stack prior to 2012, the complaint fails to plead knowledge with the requisite
    particularity. See 
    Kanter, 489 F.3d at 181
    (pleading must allege that committee’s “work
    was patently inadequate or that [the committee itself] functioned with clear notice of
    serious . . . irregularities”).
    The only allegation remaining is Kullman’s 2013 raise—awarded after the 2009
    litigation had concluded. This action thus bears no relation to the patent infringement or
    the Board’s knowledge of such activity.
    IV.
    13
    For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
    September 12, 2014.
    14