Arthur Stone v. Acting Secretary Department Ho , 608 F. App'x 126 ( 2015 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-1745
_____________
ARTHUR L. STONE,
Appellant
v.
JEH JOHNSON,
Acting Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2-13-cv-03765)
District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell
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Argued: November 20, 2014
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Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 23, 2015)
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OPINION*
_______________________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Dennis L. Friedman, Esq. [ARGUED]
Suite 714
1515 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellant
Richard M. Bernstein, Esq. [ARGUED]
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
MCKEE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Arthur L. Stone appeals the District Court’s order granting the
Department of Homeland Security’s Motion to Dismiss in the action that Stone filed
alleging employment discrimination on the basis of his disability. For the reasons that
follow, we will reverse the order of the District Court and remand.1
I.
Stone was a Federal Air Marshal employed by the Transportation Security
Administration (“TSA”). He was removed from his position because he had a medical
condition that rendered him unable to perform his duties. Less than a year after being
removed, he claimed to have recovered and requested that he be returned to duty.
However, he continued to receive disability benefits from the Office of Workers’
Compensation Program (“OWCP”). When the TSA refused to reinstate him, Stone filed
a complaint before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging
1
The District Court had jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
791 et seq., as reprisal for “engaging in prior EEO activity challenging his termination.”
The Administrative Judge ruled in favor of the TSA, concluding that, although Stone
established a prima facie case of reprisal, the TSA articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action: Stone continued to receive benefits. The
Commission affirmed the Administrative Judge’s order.
Stone appealed the EEOC’s affirmance of the Administrative Judge’s order to the
District Court. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed a motion to
dismiss, contending that Stone’s action should be dismissed as collaterally estopped. The
District Court granted the motion and this appeal followed.2
II.
Four requirements must be met in order for a claim to be collaterally estopped: (1)
the identical issue must have been previously adjudicated; (2) the issue must have been
actually litigated; (3) the previous determination of the issue must have been necessary to
the decision; and (4) the party being precluded from relitigating the issue must have been
fully represented in the prior action. Jean Alexander Cosmetics, 458 F.3d at 249. Mr.
Stone does not deny that all four factors are present here. Stone contends, however, that
2
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss on
the basis of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA,
Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2006). Such a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
should be “granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those
allegations ‘could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.’” Simon v. FIA Card Servs.,
N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 558 (2007)).
3
the District Court should not have relied on the EEOC’s ruling that the TSA did not
discriminate against him because the EEOC’s decision was “not a final, unappealable
decision” and that he is entitled to trial de novo under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(a)(3)(B), (e)(1)
and § 7703. We agree.
Agency decisions under Title VII do not have preclusive effect because, under that
statute, federal employees are entitled to a trial de novo of their employment
discrimination claims in federal court. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 845
(1976). While Stone’s claim of discrimination arises under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,3 instead of Title VII, we have previously explained that federal employees suing
under the Rehabilitation Act are also entitled to de novo review of administrative
decisions in federal court:
On conclusion of the administrative proceeding, a district court may
provide two distinct forms of relief. First, a federal employee who prevails
in the administrative process may sue in federal court to enforce an
administrative decision with which an agency has failed to comply. Such
an enforcement action does not trigger de novo review of the merits of the
employee's claims. . . . Alternatively, a federal employee unhappy with the
3
In his brief before this court, Stone argued he was “alleging that the Agency had failed
to restore him to his position, in violation of the restoration regulations and that the
Agency’s decision to deny him his restoration rights was motivated by impermissible
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and, in particular, in reprisal for his having
engaged in prior EEO activity.” (Appellant Br. at 2-3.) Likewise, in his Amended
Complaint before the District Court, Stone stated that “the Agency had failed to restore
him to his position, in violation of the restoration regulations and that the Agency's
decision to deny him his restoration rights was motivated by impermissible
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and, in particular, in reprisal for his
having engaged in prior EEO activity.” (J.A. 63.) In its decision, the EEOC also noted
that “in his decision, the [ALJ] referred to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). Complainant's reprisal allegation, however, falls
under the Rehabilitation Act.” (J.A. 26.)
4
administrative decision may bring his or her claims to a district court, under
Section 505(a) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a), and receive
the same de novo consideration that a private sector employee enjoys in a
Title VII action, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
Morris v. Rumsfeld, 420 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Chandler, 425 U.S. at 863.
Because Stone appealed the EEOC’s decision, the District Court should have reviewed
Stone’s claims de novo. Therefore, it erred in dismissing Stone’s suit as collaterally
estopped.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court
and remand for proceedings in accordance with this decision.
5